Abstracts
Abstract
I discuss and compare Joseph Raz’s and Christine Korsgaard’s accounts of reasons for action. One fundamental disagreement separating the two approaches is the role that they assign to two central features of practical deliberation: Korsgaard assigns priority to identity-constituting practical principles, whereas for Raz reasons are the fundamental normative units. In the course of this comparison, two claims are defended: (1) Taking-up a realist stance vis-à-vis one’s reasons is a non-optional feature of one’s first-personal deliberative standpoint. This remains true even if this renders the workings of an agent’s reasons analogous to a placebo. (2) The motivational aspect of an agent’s reasons should not be conceived along causalist lines. Exploiting a thought by Hegel, I discuss an alternative conception of reasons’ temporal genesis and force—i.e., one that allows reasons for a particular action to emerge at a later point.
Résumé
Cet article résume et compare les théories de Joseph Raz et de Christine Korsgaard sur les raisons qui supportent l’action. Un désaccord fondamental séparant ces deux approches tient au rôle qu’elles attribuent à deux caractéristiques essentielles de la délibération pratique : Korsgaard accorde un primat normatif à l’identité constituant les principes pratiques, alors que Raz accorde ce primat aux raisons comme unités normatives. Au fil de cette comparaison, deux revendications sont défendues : 1) L’adoption d’une position réaliste quant aux raisons de quelqu’un est une caractéristique non facultative de son point de vue délibératif à la première personne. Cela reste vrai même si cela rend le fonctionnement des motifs d’un.e agent.e analogue à celui d’un placebo. 2) L’aspect motivationnel des raisons d’un.e agent.e ne doit pas être conçu selon une perspective causaliste. Exploitant une idée de Hegel, je discute d’une autre conception possible de la genèse temporelle et de la force des raisons d’agir, ce qui permet d’envisager qu’elles peuvent aussi apparaître après coup.
Appendices
Bibliography
- Anscombe, G. E. M., Intention, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Blackburn, Simon, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1993.
- D’Oro, Giuseppina and Constantine Sandis (eds.), Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Enoch, David, “An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism”, in Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 2), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007, p. 21-50.
- Enoch, David, Taking Morality Seriously. A Defense of Robust Realism, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Fitzpatrick, William J., “The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard’s Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity”, Ethics, Vol. 115, No. 4, 2005, p. 651-691.
- Gibbard, Allan, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Gibbard, Allan, Thinking How to Live, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Hanisch, Christoph, Why the Law Matters to You, Boston MA, DeGruyter, 2013.
- Hanisch, Christoph, “Negative Goals and Identity: Revisiting Sen’s Critique of Homo Economicus”, Rationality, Markets, and Morals, Vol. 4, 2013a, p. 157-172.
- Hanisch, Christoph, “Self-Constitution and Inescapability: A Diagnosis”, Philosophia, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2016, p. 1145-1164.
- Hegel, G. W. F., Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Hegel, G. W. F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Translated by H.B. Nisbet, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Joyce, Richard, The Myth of Morality, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Kalderon, Mark Eli, Moral Fictionalism, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Korsgaard, Christine M., The Constitution of Agency. Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Korsgaard, Christine M., Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Laitinen, Arto and Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- McDowell, John, Mind and World: With a New Introduction, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Moerman, Daniel E., Meaning, Medicine, and the ‘Placebo Effect’, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- O’Neill, Onora, Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- O’Neill, Onora, Towards Justice and Virtue. A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- O’Neill, Onora, Acting on Principle. An Essay on Kantian Ethics, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Parfit, Derek, On What Matters, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Pippin, Robert B., Hegel’s Practical Philosophy – Rational Agency as Ethical Life, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Quante, Michael, Hegel’s Concept of Action, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Raz, Joseph, Engaging Reason, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Raz, Joseph, From Normativity to Responsibility, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Regan, Donald H., “The Value of Rational Nature”, Ethics, Vol. 112, No. 2, 2002, p. 267-91.
- Scanlon, T. M., “Reasons: A Puzzling Duality?”, in Wallace, R. Jay, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler and Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 231-246.
- Scanlon, T. M., Being Realistic About Reasons, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Street, Sharon, “Constructivism about Reasons”, in Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 3), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2008, p. 207-245.
- Street, Sharon, “Mind-Independence without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can’t Have It Both Ways”, in Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 6), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2011, p. 1-32.
- Tubert, Ariela, “Korsgaard’s Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 243, 2011, p. 343-362.
- Velleman, J. David, “The Possibility of Practical Reason”, Ethics, Vol. 106, No. 4, 1996, p. 694-726.