Résumés
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to contribute to knowledge of profit-sharing by utilizing a before-and-after analysis of panel data to assess whether the effects of profit-sharing adoption on productivity growth vary, depending on whether a profit-sharing adopter utilizes work teams or not, while controlling for numerous variables that may affect these results within a carefully constructed sample of Canadian establishments. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the moderating role of teamwork in the relationship between profit-sharing and productivity growth. Besides the implications for profit-sharing, ascertaining whether profit-sharing and work teams are complementary practices would have important implications for understanding how to develop more effective work teams, a topic of ongoing interest.
We utilized a longitudinal research design to compare within-firm productivity growth during the three-year and five-year periods subsequent to profit-sharing adoption and within-firm productivity growth during the same periods in firms that had not adopted profit-sharing. Overall, our results suggest that use of team-based production plays an important moderating role in the success of employee profit-sharing—at least in terms of workplace productivity growth. Establishments that had adopted profit-sharing showed a substantial and highly significant increase in workplace productivity over both the three-year and five-year periods subsequent to adoption, but only if they had work teams.
These findings are in line with the notion that work teams help to mitigate potential shirking behaviour in profit-sharing firms (Freeman, Kruse and Blasi, 2010) and are also in line with the argument that work teams serve as an effective mechanism to help translate the purported motivational and other benefits of profit-sharing into tangible productivity gains (Heywood and Jirjahn, 2009).
Keywords:
- profit-sharing,
- work teams,
- productivity growth,
- Canada
Résumé
L’objectif de cette étude est de contribuer à la connaissance de la participation aux bénéfices en utilisant une analyse avant-après de données recueillies au moyen d’un panel afin d’évaluer si les effets de l’adoption de la participation aux bénéfices sur la croissance de la productivité varient selon qu’on utilise ou non des équipes de travail, cela tout en contrôlant les nombreuses variables qui peuvent affecter ces résultats au sein d’un échantillon soigneusement construit d’établissements canadiens. À notre connaissance, il s’agit de la première étude à examiner le rôle modérateur du travail d’équipe dans la relation entre la participation aux bénéfices et la croissance de la productivité. Outre les implications pour la participation aux bénéfices, déterminer si les équipes de travail constituent des pratiques complémentaires aura des implications importantes pour comprendre comment développer des équipes de travail plus efficaces, un sujet d’intérêt permanent.
Nous avons utilisé un plan de recherche longitudinal afin de comparer la croissance de la productivité au sein d’entreprises au cours de périodes de trois et cinq ans suivant l’adoption d’un « Plan de participation aux bénéfices » à celle d’entreprises n’en ayant pas adopté au cours des mêmes périodes. Dans l’ensemble, nos résultats suggèrent que le recours à la production en équipe joue un rôle modérateur important dans le succès de la participation aux bénéfices des salariés, du moins en termes de croissance de la productivité sur le lieu de travail. Les établissements ayant adopté la participation aux bénéfices ont enregistré une augmentation substantielle et très significative de la productivité sur le lieu de travail au cours des trois et cinq années qui ont suivi son adoption, mais seulement s’ils y avaient des équipes de travail.
Ces résultats sont conformes à l’idée que les équipes de travail contribuent à atténuer les comportements de non-participation dans les entreprises ayant un « Plan de participation aux bénéfices » (Freeman, Kruse et Blasi, 2010) et ils sont également conformes à l’argument selon lequel les équipes de travail constituent un mécanisme efficace pour aider à traduire les prétendus avantages motivationnels et autres de la participation aux bénéfices en gains de productivité tangibles (Heywood et Jirjahn, 2009).
Mots-clés:
- partage des bénéfices,
- équipes de travail,
- croissance de la productivité,
- Canada
Parties annexes
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