In the later decades of the Twentieth century, Canadian locals of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) enjoyed a ‘cosy’ non confrontational relationship with various supermarket stores and other employers in their orbit. Deals were completed by leaders with limited involvement and input from members. In the 1990s, industrial relations became more difficult for UFCW and its locals with the entry of low cost competitors which resulted in employers seeking to achieve give backs and more flexibility, such as the use of more part time labour than hitherto. Local 401 of UFCW, based in Alberta, found that its ‘top down’ approach was ineffective in countering the now ‘tougher’ bargaining stance of employers. It suffered a major defeat after a 74 day strike against Safeway in 1997. One of the major problems it encountered was in knowing how to align itself with a changed workforce from traditional white Canadians to one which was younger, female, from a variety of ethnic/immigrant backgrounds and employed on a part time rather than full time basis. Local 401’s leadership realized that it would have to adapt or die. It began to experiment with new ways of operating. For a start, it believed that there was a need to increase the level of strike pay to ensure members would maintain picket lines and be able to pay their bills during, potentially, long and drawn out strikes. Strike pay was increased to approximately eighty per cent of normal pay. Next, it did not shy away from representing members from diverse immigrant backgrounds. Leaders engaged with these groups, ‘found’ their ‘organic’ leaders (or the ‘organic’ leaders found them), and explained and educated them in what Local 401 was about and the principles of unionism. In turn, these ‘organic’ leaders were used to educate fellow members of their respective ethnic groups and Local 401 devoted resources to providing printed material in different languages and dialects. They would also use photos and statements from representatives of these groups in their campaign literature to demonstrate to them and others how their interests and needs were uppermost in the campaigns being waged by Local 401. Finally, and most importantly, the leadership of Local 401 devoted itself to interacting with its members at meetings and other occasions. Leaders spent much of their time on the road visiting members, rather than being holed up in the office. It treated all members with equal respect, as it sought to understand their problems and views, and explain the reasons for the strategies that they were pursuing in various campaigns. Within a few years Local 401 had transformed itself from a lazy ‘top down’ to a cohesive militant union with a highly developed and close relationship between the leadership, and rank and file. Throughout the twenty-year period of this study by Jason Foster, the leadership has been stable. It, and especially its president Doug O’Halloran, have been responsible for the transformation that has taken place. The role of leadership with Local 401 turns Michels’ iron law of oligarchy on its head. Michels saw union and labour leaders using their position in the union as a stepping stone to advancing their careers into politics or ‘bourgeoisie’ society, more broadly, and being disinterested in the welfare of, and ‘wasting’ time with, members. The leaders of Local 401, on the other hand, have devoted their careers to the needs and welfare of members. They have not had their eye on glittering prizes elsewhere. This is the major lesson to be learned from this case study of union renewal. Foster successfully describes the processes by which Local 401 transformed itself …