EN :

In this paper, I investigate two clashing perspectives regarding the good of the university: a socio-economic and an epistemic perspective. I position current writing on the university in the philosophy of education as being largely socio-economic and contrast this view to an earlier tradition of writing about the university that I position as mostly epistemic. Following on from this discussion, I review the university’s role in the distribution of social and epistemic goods. I hold that the university directly controls only the latter, not the former and hold that whatever socio-economic roles the university plays in society, it must do so through the distribution of knowledge in society. Next, I explore what this means for the university’s socio-economic functioning: I hold that seeing the good that the university distributes as knowledge places limits on its socio-economic functioning. Lastly, I ask what the university can do to promote epistemic justice in how it conducts teaching and research. I hold that one of the most important things that the university can do in the name of epistemic justice is to educate others (especially employers) about the true worth of a university degree.

EN :

In Canada, several universities have recently implemented course requirements in Indigenous studies as a condition of graduation, while others are considering following suit. Policies making Indigenous course requirements (hereafter ICRs) compulsory have caused considerable controversy. According to proponents, a main purpose of ICRs is to address historical wrongs and to foster a more complete understanding of the ongoing relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous citizens. According to critics, making such courses compulsory effectively imposes illiberal restrictions on university students and faculty by limiting the epistemic aim of free inquiry, while wrongly prioritizing concern for the welfare of one social group over others. In this essay, we propose a liberal-democratic justification for ICRs that addresses these two worries about the ideals that may underwrite these courses. We argue that ICRs can be justified in liberal democratic terms insofar as they foster knowledge of what John Rawls refers to as ‘the constitutional essentials’ and remediate civic forms of what Miranda Fricker refers to as ‘epistemic injustices’. Universities, we claim have highly plausible role responsibilities to promote the civic epistemic aims identified by Rawls and Fricker, which are especially weighty due to the power university degrees confer, as part of the formation of a “democratic elite”. We then defend this line of argument against objections on the basis of academic freedom, by arguing that universities have reasons, internal to the search for truth to champion the political aims we identify.

EN :

Does the liberal state have a role in helping mature citizens make worthwhile educational choices? The question has clear relevance for the aims of higher education in a liberal democratic society. As systems of higher education internationalize, it has become difficult for liberal states to steer high education policy in directions that serve civic interests. This is, in part, because political liberalism imposes restrictions on what one might call directive educational authority: the power to direct citizens toward specific kinds of knowledge, understanding and skills in the interests of making their lives better. This restriction follows from the view that citizens have the capacity to make thier own decisions about how best to live, including decisions about the kind of education they need. My aim in this paper is to make the case for a more direct role for the state in promoting a good life through higher education. In particular, I argue that the liberal state’s obligation to promote autonomy across its citizenry confers legitimate educational authority over post-compulsory, as well as compulsory, education. This argument affirms the State’s educational obligations to citizens beyond a basic or compulsory education. Getting in the way of this affirmation, however, is an overly restrictive account of educational authority that occludes these obligations under the guise of respect for autonomy. Accordingly, in making my case I propose an autonomy-based account educational authority derived from Joseph Raz’s Service Conception, defending this account against the charge that such authority is illegitimately paternalistic.

EN :

Increased wellness and mental health strategies have been implemented across campuses in post-secondary institutions, which is reflective of the broader discourse on wellness in societies.  In response to increased awareness of wellness on campuses, universities respond in various ways which include student and staff engagement surveys, academic plans that include wellness, and institutional mental health strategies.  While these initiatives are important to support the communities that universities serve, such initiatives may do better if a more robust notion of wellbeing underpins these initiatives.  In this paper, I draw upon Nussbaum’s capabilities to broaden the discourse on wellbeing in academia.  I argue that considering wellbeing through a capabilities approach may provide a better normative framework to address more substantive tensions that undermine academics’ well-being.

EN :

The idea of the ‘developmental university’ was popularised on the African continent in the post- independence period, but has recently returned to view on account of the positioning of the university in the newly agreed United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The developmental model is characterised by service to society, application of knowledge, non-academic benefit and prioritising the most marginalised. Yet to what extent are these goals and characteristics coherent and viable given the nature of the university as institution? While the developmental model per seis limited to a few experiences, the implications of these questions are much broader, given the public service mission held by many if not most higher education institutions around the world. After outlining its historical emergence, this article presents a conceptual exploration of the model, highlighting three major limitations, in spite of its highly positive intentions: its positioning of the university as an ‘adaptable factory’, its encroachment on a distinctive space for the university in relation to society, and its particular and contested conception of development.