Résumés
Abstract
In many cases, the public (or large parts of it) want to restrict an activity or technology that they believe to be dangerous, but that scientific experts believe to be safe. There is thus a tension between respecting the preferences of the people and making policy based on our best scientific knowledge. Deciding how to make policy in the light of this tension requires an understanding of why citizens sometimes disagree with the experts on what is risky and what is safe. In this paper, we examine two highly influential theories of how people form beliefs about risks: the theory that risk beliefs are errors caused by bounded rationality and the theory that such beliefs are part and parcel of people’s core value systems. We then discuss the implications of the psychological theories for questions regarding liberal-democratic decision making: (1) Should policy be responsive to the preferences of citizens in the domain of risk regulation? (2) What risk-regulation policies are legitimate? (3) How should liberal-democratic deliberation be structured?
Résumé
Dans de nombreux cas, le public (ou une grande partie de celui-ci) veut restreindre une activité ou une technologie qu’il croit être dangereuse, mais que les experts scientifiques considèrent être sécuritaire. Il y a alors une tension entre le respect des préférences des gens et des politiques fondées sur nos meilleures connaissances scientifiques. Décider comment élaborer une politique à la lumière de cette tension nécessite de comprendre pourquoi les citoyens sont parfois en désaccord avec les experts à propos de ce qui est risqué et ce qui est sûr. Dans cet article, nous examinons deux théories très influentes sur la façon dont les gens forment des croyances sur les risques : la théorie selon laquelle les croyances liées au risque sont des erreurs causées par la rationalité limitée et la théorie selon laquelle ces croyances font partie intégrante des systèmes de valeurs fonda-mentales des personnes. Nous discutons ensuite les implications des théories psychologiques pour les questions touchant la prise de décision libérale-démocratique : (1) Les politiques devraient-elles être sensibles aux préférences des citoyens dans le domaine de la régulation des risques? (2) Quelles politiques de régulation des risques sont légitimes? (3) Comment la délibération libérale-démocratique devrait-elle être structurée?
Parties annexes
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