Abstracts
Abstract
On Gilbert’s multi-modal theory of argumentation, the “logical” is but one among many modes of argument, including the emotional, the visceral (physical), and the kisceral (intuitive). Yet, I argue that, properly understood, the logical is not one mode among many. Rather, it is better understood as the uber-mode of argument. What Gilbert calls the “logical mode” of argument—a linear, orderly, highly verbalizable, way of arguing—is made possible only to the extent that the logic of some space of reasons has been articulated. The “anti-logical” penchant of multi-modal argumentation is not found at the object-level—in its countenancing “non-logical” modes of argument, but at the meta-level—in its resistance, as a mistaken embracing of the “logical” mode, to using the logics governing the different modes to self-regulate the course of our arguings.
Keywords:
- Michael Gilbert,
- meta-argumentation,
- multi-modal argumentation
Résumé
Selon la théorie multimodale de l'argumentation de Gilbert, le mode "logique" n'est qu'un parmi de nombreux modes d'argumentation, y compris l'émotionnel, le viscéral (physique) et le kiscéral (intuitif). Pourtant, je soutiens que, bien comprise, la logique n'est pas un mode parmi d'autres. Au contraire, la logique est mieux comprise comme le super-mode d'argumentation. Ce que Gilbert appelle le « mode logique » de l'argumentation – une manière linéaire, ordonnée et hautement verbalisable d'argumenter – n'est rendu possible que dans la mesure où la logique d'un certain espace de raisons a été articulée. Le penchant « anti-logique » de l'argumentation multimodale ne se trouve pas au niveau de l'objet - dans son approbation des modes d'argumentation « non logiques », mais au niveau méta - dans sa résistance, en tant qu'acceptation erronée du mode « logique », à utiliser les logiques régissant les différents modes pour autoréguler le cours de nos argumentations.
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Appendices
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