Abstracts
Résumé
L’objectif de cet article est de déterminer la prime pure à payer par l’agriculteur sénégalais assuré à des risques classiques. L’utilisation du modèle linéaire général (GLM) a permis de déterminer la fréquence et la sévérité en fonction des différents types de risques auxquels sont exposés les agriculteurs. Nous avons montré que le nombre de sinistres suit une loi zéro-inflation binomial négative et le coût une distribution log-normal. Nous avons aussi montré que les risques sanitaires, les invasions acridiennes (criquets pèlerins), d’animaux et de canards et d’oiseaux sauvages, la présence de nématodes et de pourriture de collet sont les risques auxquels l’agriculture est exposée. Le modèle estime une prime plus élevée que la prime observée pour les animaux sauvages, les maladies, les oiseaux granivores et les oiseaux sauvages. En revanche, la prime calculée est inférieure à celle observée pour les canards sauvages et les criquets pèlerins. La différence entre la prime observée et celle calculée s’explique par le fait que le premier est évalué à partir de la valeur du capital assuré et non du risque auquel l’agriculteur est exposé. Pour une meilleure tarification, la compagnie d’assurance devra tenir compte du type de risque auquel chaque assuré est le plus exposé et déterminer la prime correspondante. Cette segmentation permettra de déterminer la prime adéquate.
Mots-clés :
- Risque,
- prime,
- sinistre,
- tarification
Abstract
The objective of this article is to determine the pure premium to be paid by the Senegalese farmer insured for conventional risks. The use of the general linear model (GLM) has made it possible to determine the frequency and severity according to the different types of risks to which farmers are exposed. We have shown that the number of claims follows a negative binomial zero-inflation law and the cost of a log-normal distribution. We have also shown that health risks, locust (locust), animal and duck invasions and wild birds, the presence of nematodes and crown rot are the risks to which agriculture is exposed. The model estimates a higher premium than the premium observed for wild animals, diseases, grain-eating birds and wild birds. On the other hand, the premium calculated is lower than that observed for wild ducks and locusts. The difference between the premium observed and that calculated is explained by the fact that the former is assessed on the basis of the value of the capital insured and not of the risk to which the farmer is exposed. For better pricing, the insurance company should take into account the type of risk to which each insured is most exposed and determine the corresponding premium. This segmentation will determine the appropriate premium.
Keywords:
- Risk,
- premium,
- loss,
- pricing
Appendices
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