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Volume 20, numéro 2, fall 2000

URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/jcs20_2art04

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Éditeur(s)

The University of New Brunswick

ISSN

1198-8614 (imprimé)

1715-5673 (numérique)

[Découvrir la revue](#)

Citer cet article

Hoyt, P. D. (2000). "Rogue States" and International Relations Theory. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 20(2), 68–79.

"Rogue States" and International Relations Theory

by *Paul D. Hoyt*

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INTRODUCTION

In the rhetoric of American policy makers the greatest threat to peace and stability since the end of the Cold War is the existence of "rogue" states; states which are accused of violating international norms of behavior by, for example, sponsoring international terrorism, committing human rights abuses and seeking weapons of mass destruction.¹ Also referred to as "pariahs," "outcasts" and "outlaws," these countries are commonly the subject of diplomatic isolation, economic embargo, political and economic sanctions, and even military attack. Playing such a central role in the thinking and policies of American decision makers, it becomes important to evaluate the place of such states as Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Iran, the Sudan and North Korea in the current international environment.²

While the rogue state concept has been recognized throughout history,³ its centrality to modern international relations has escalated in the post-Cold War world as the behavior, motivation and security of these states can no longer be simply ascribed to superpower patronage and influence. These states have taken a place in the international system all their own. This article argues that rogue states constitute a critical element in today's political environment and a pressing challenge to international relations theory.⁴

Before moving on, it is worth noting that there exists a debate as to whether the term "rogue state" refers to an objective category of nations or, instead, is a subjective label attached to states based on the perceptions, and political interests, of others. This article does not seek to resolve this debate as that issue has been addressed by the author in other work.⁵ Regardless of the objective/subjective determination, the concept of the rogue state has entered the mainstream of American political discourse and thus represents a political reality that effects state behavior.⁶

After examining the utility of various theoretical perspectives in explaining the rogue phenomena, I present a new conceptualization which seeks to synthesize and refine international relations theory to better account for the presence and behavior of rogues in the world. This synthesis will draw on insights from systemic/structuralist interpretations, statist/domestic politics arguments and cognitive/perceptual perspectives. I conclude with some ideas regarding the potential for conflict resolution between the United States and the rogues.

The Puzzles

The existence of rogue states raises three intriguing political puzzles. First, why do rogues resist the compellence efforts of members of the world community and why do they maintain their rogue behavior? Given their nearly universal isolation, the deprivations caused by embargoes and sanctions, the efforts at subversion and the potential for even greater compellence efforts, the willingness of these states to continue their "roguish" behavior is truly puzzling. Given the enormous costs involved in being a rogue, their refusal to alter these policies needs to be explained.

Second, why do stronger states desist from removing the rogue? Equally puzzling is the lack of strong action by the great power(s), including the United States, to move to eliminate states they describe as virulently hostile to the international system.⁷

Third, why does this relationship persist so long? In most of these cases, the rogue label was attached many years ago, oftentimes going well back into the Cold War period. For example, in American political thinking Iran has been essentially a rogue state since the 1979 revolution, Cuba since the early 1960s, and North Korea since the early 1950s. Yet, these states persist in their deviancy despite years, if not decades, of compellence efforts. How can this be? This is particularly interesting given the end of the Cold War and hence the elimination of the protection that many alleged rogues derived from close relations with the Soviet Union.

Structural Explanations

In seeking answers to these three puzzles, an appropriate starting place is the various formulations of international relations theory based on structural interpretations. Not only do these arguments constitute the dominant paradigm in international relations theory, but they also appear to be useful for examining situations in which conflict and power are so integral. In this section, several structuralist explanations of international behavior will be presented and examined as to their persuasiveness in explaining the three puzzles laid out above.

Balance of Power

Balance of power type arguments rest on the logic of states attempting to maintain their security in an anarchic system by countering the power of others through alliances with other threatened states and/or by developing their own domestic power capabilities.⁸ Relative power capabilities are thus the determining factor in the dyadic relationship. Under this logic, weak states (based on relative power capabilities) should seek out allies and/or make efforts to increase their indigenous power capability. Conversely, strong states should actively move to eliminate potential challengers before they can constitute a significant threat.

An explanation focused on relative power capabilities falls short when applied to the rogue state phenomena. In all the cases under examination, there is no objective measure by which the rogue state can be seen as even approaching parity with their primary opponent, the United States. The relative power levels are clearly asymmetric.

Yet, in these situations both sides of the dyadic relationship fail to act in the ways balance of power prescribes. The weaker states, the rogues, are generally very isolated in the world community. While some may make efforts to break out of this isolation, such as Iraqi overtures to Russia and France, the general pattern is of limited success in this regard usually due to a refusal to alter their overall pattern of behavior. In the end no balancing counter-coalition is formed and the rogue remains weak and isolated.

Another anomaly involves the actions of other states. If the United States is the dominant power in the world today, we would expect to see the emergence of a counter-coalition, which may include the rogue states as members. While few countries agree in entirety with United States policy, there is little evidence of a burgeoning counter-coalition, especially one that incorporates the rogue states as members.

Efforts by the rogues to balance through internal means, such as the acquisition of new weapons systems, make sense in balance of power type arguments but in the end are likely to be counterproductive. Stronger states have a vested interest in countering growing challengers to their privileged position.⁹ Thus, they will take actions to limit the ability of rogues to acquire the means to alter the strategic balance. Efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction from North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya all fit this pattern.¹⁰

While the actions of the United States as the great power are generally in line with balance of power expectations, those of the rogues and secondary powers do not fit well.

Balance of Threat

A variant on the balance of power argument has been put forth by Steve Walt in his book *On the Origins of Alliances*.¹¹ While Walt accepts the role of power in state alliance choices, he argues that the more critical factor is the perceived intent of the other. For Walt, states tend to balance against perceived threat and aggressiveness not simply power imbalances. As Walt puts it, "Intentions, not power, are crucial."¹²

This explanation also has a mixed record in the case of rogue states and those opposing them. Balance of threat appears to work in explaining the actions of the rogues. Perhaps they see a strong threat coming from states such as the United States and thus are taking actions to balance against that threat. This certainly would explain the antagonistic relationship that develops.

As for the great power however, the connection is not so clear. If the great power does see a strong threat coming from the rogues, despite their clear power inferiority, perhaps due to their perceived aggressive intent, then one would expect more forceful moves to eliminate the threat. While such actions as embargoes and sanctions are common, it is also clear that these moves are not sufficient in the short-term to eliminate the threat. Most rogues have been considered so for years and continue to antagonize the international community. Alternatively, if the great power does not see these states as a threat, thus explaining their continued presence in the system, then the degree of attention and compellence they receive is unwarranted. Weak states that cannot present a clear

threat to the great power should not receive such treatment under the balance of threat argument. In the end, neither version is convincing.

Bandwagoning

An alternative to the various forms of balancing is the notion of bandwagoning. Bandwagoning argues that balancing is not the only explanation for how states make their alliance choices. For Walt, the argument is that, at times, states will join with a threatening state to either avoid attack or to gain rewards.¹³ Randall Schweller extends this notion to argue that revisionist states (jackals and wolves in his jargon) will bandwagon together because of the potential for profit in altering the status quo.¹⁴

Bandwagoning is clearly not occurring in the case of the rogue states and the threatening great power. The dynamic here is of continued confrontation and tense relations. Some tentative openings between the rogue and the great power may take place, such as in the American-Iranian relationship, but these are small shifts which do not approach a bandwagoning-type relation.¹⁵ Also, we do not see the creation of a unified, revisionist coalition of rogues. Finally, the collapse of the Cold War has left the rogues/revisionists without a superpower patron. They are now more exposed, and weak, than ever before.

In sum, these three perspectives are unable to provide a compelling explanation to the behavior of both the rogues and the great powers.

Alternatives to Purely Structural Explanations

The first three perspectives have all attempted to explain international behavior and interstate relations as a function of the structural characteristics of the international system. While the particular logic has changed from one to the other, they all share some basic assumptions: states are the central actors, domestic politics are not considered and relative power capabilities are a central variable.

The next set of perspectives challenges the exclusive focus on aspects of the international structure as the determinative factor in state behavior. Instead the perspectives detailed below argue for the inclusion of a domestic political component in constructing a theory of international behavior.

Omnibalancing

Arguing that the structuralist's focus on states as unitary actors in an anarchic international structure is insufficient, a new, statist approach has emerged which emphasizes various aspects of the domestic environment in influencing state behavior.¹⁶ Omnibalancing, for example, argues that the proper unit of analysis is not the unitary state but instead is the elite leadership, whose primary interest is personal survival in power and not state security.¹⁷ Thus the elite leadership, seeking to maintain themselves in power, may lead the state to take actions that do not promote the security of the state overall.¹⁸ The central dynamic here is of a leader, especially within the Third World,

seeking to balance against the perceived threat of domestic challengers. To facilitate this move, the leader may, in essence, bandwagon with the foreign threat to gain strength and maneuvering room vis-à-vis the internal threat.

The utility of this approach in the case of rogue states is again limited. The theory can work two ways. If the leaders in the rogue state see the internal threat as greater than the external threat (the United States) then we should see bandwagoning behavior between the rogue and the great power. Clearly this has not been borne out empirically.

Also, there is very little evidence that rogue states suffer from the kind of regime instability that is so central to omnibalancing logic. While the majority of Third World states may fit Steven David's depiction of the domestic environment, rogue states appear to suffer from little domestic opposition. Usually combining a mobilizing ideology with strong repressive control, leaders in rogue states do not face the sorts of critical domestic challenges that constitute a central condition for omnibalancing. This is not to say that rogues never face such domestic pressures, only that the current record doesn't show it as a pressing issue.

Vulnerability and Strategic Culture

In *The Vulnerability of Empire*, Charles Kupchan incorporates several of the structuralist notions with a domestic politics component plus an individual cognitive perspective.¹⁹ His basic argument is that due to changes in the international environment (structural level), decision makers may perceive (individual level) a situation of high vulnerability (essentially a situation of high power asymmetry) for the state. The leader then overreacts by either being overly cooperative (if the state is in decline) or overly competitive (if the state is on the rise). To gain domestic support for these new strategic policies, the leader creates a new strategic culture among the general population (domestic politics argument). The downside comes in that should the new policies fail, subsequent policy adjustment is made difficult because of the now embedded views of the strategic culture.

Applied to the rogue state situation, this conception would argue that the leaders in rogue states, aware of their strategic vulnerability vis-à-vis the great power, have embarked on a policy of competition with the great power. This policy choice is then justified to the local population by creating a strategic culture of hostility toward the great power.

Such an explanation is helpful in answering two of the three puzzles presented at the outset. First the policy of resistance toward a stronger power is explained as the response of a rising power facing high vulnerability. Also the continued hostility of the rogue is explained as the result of a strategic culture from which the leadership of the rogue state cannot escape.

Yet, this explanation may not be as complete as it appears. Several difficulties arise. First, not all rogue states are rising powers. Some may fit the pattern of the rising state, such as Iraq in the late 1980's and Iran since 1988, but other so-called rogue states, such as Cuba and the Sudan, are declining powers. To Kupchan, the response of a declining power

facing high vulnerability is overly cooperative policies. This is not part of the rogue pattern.

Another problem is that the role of domestic politics is only incorporated in situations of high vulnerability. Kupchan provides no role for domestic politics during situations of low vulnerability. While not a logical failing, it does raise the empirical question of whether domestic politics might play a role in policy formation during situations of low vulnerability. I will return to this point later.

A final issue is the scoring of the state as to its being a rising or declining power. In the cases under examination here this determination is not always easy or clear. For example, North Korea was moving toward a nuclear weapons program yet is suffering from a debilitating drought. Libya has almost no military projection capability at all but has been accused of developing chemical weapons. The United States has the world's strongest military but its size is being scaled back.²⁰ Are these cases of ascendance or decline? Such critical judgments are difficult to make.

While representing an improvement in the explanatory power of structuralist theories, these statist elaborations are still not sufficient to answer all the puzzles associated with rogue states.

Synthetic Model

While the various approaches outlined above may not be individually sufficient to answer all of the puzzles regarding rogue states and their relation with the great power (the United States), they do provide the elements necessary to construct a synthetic model appropriate to the task. What follows is an adaptation and integration of several of these key elements. In doing so a more compelling argument can be made that accounts for the puzzles of the rogues and that does so with a minimum of variables, thus preserving much of the parsimony of the theories which inspired the model.

In this new view three elements are utilized. First is the notion of "perceived threat."²¹ This is a judgment of the international relationship through the eyes of the decision maker. It can be scored as low or high.²² The second variable is the notion of "perceived relative capability," which is analogous to Kupchan's variable of strategic vulnerability. This is a judgment by the decision maker as to the relative power levels of the involved states. This can be scored as stronger, equal or weaker. Finally, there is the element of domestic influences on behavior which extends on Kupchan's notion of strategic culture. I label this variable "extent of domestic involvement."

Three basic patterns are possible. The first is widespread involvement by the general public regarding the issue at hand. Here, sectors in the public not normally attentive to an issue have been mobilized to become aware and play a role in the political process. This is likely to be the case during periods of high perceived threat. In this scenario, the influence of the public is great. During periods of low perceived threat, one of two alternatives is possible. For some issues, the public essentially is silent due to a lack of

pressing concern on the issue. In this scenario the influence of the public is quite low. The second alternative in the low perceived threat scenario is of limited, though significant, influence by a small, attentive public. Due to historical factors, cultural factors or business interests, a segment of the larger population may care deeply about certain countries and issues and work diligently to influence policy in that area. In this scenario, I argue that this attentive public will influence policy to a degree disproportionate to their numbers.

Answers to Original Puzzles

Rather than present the logic behind all of the various combinations of these elements, for this article I'll simply utilize these three variables to account for the puzzles which instigated this research. First, why do rogues resist the actions of the world community and maintain their rogue behavior? Rogues resist the various efforts at compellence imposed by the great power because they perceive a high threat from a more powerful other with imperial ambitions to control and dominate. There is a need to recognize that the implicit assumption in much of the international relations literature that so-called "status quo" powers are conservative, non-threatening, states may not be shared by leaders around the world. Diplomatic isolation, economic embargoes, attempted subversion and military conflict are common elements in the compellence strategies of status quo states. Such behaviors are readily perceived by many leaders and citizens throughout the Third World, including the rogue states, as the threatening acts of a state intent on imperial control.²³

In this circumstance the extent of public involvement is generally very high and the tone is hostile. Seeking to create public support for resistance to the perceived imperial state, the leaders create a strategic culture based on demonizing the external threat.

Resistance by the rogue to the imperial state is thus seen as the only available option. Capitulation is portrayed as tantamount to national suicide given the perceived threat posed by the imperial state. It is also politically untenable domestically given the embedded strategic culture within the rogue state. This situation leads to a continuance of previous policies, including efforts to acquire more sophisticated weapons systems and support for those seen as challenging the dominance of the great power and its allies.

Second, why do stronger states *desist* from removing the rogue? The imperial state faces a different environment. While the rogue state may pose a danger to valued interests, it is not an existential threat and thus is scored as a low threat.²⁴ Also the relative power capabilities is advantageous. Thus while the great power may have the capacity to eliminate the rogue, there is no strong motivation for undertaking such a forceful action. Should the rogue, at some time, enhance their capability to a point where the threat perception becomes acute, there should be a strong reaction due to the altered strategic environment and the subsequent expression of public concern.

Yet, even at low levels of perceived threat, the great power often maintains a moderately coercive strategy vis-à-vis the rogue states. The critical question here is why is Cuba, for

example, treated differently (as a rogue requiring sanctions) than other states in the world which possess similar relative capabilities? This is where the role of the attentive public is crucial. Certain sectors of the domestic population are highly engaged regarding policy toward particular states. Their influence is heightened during periods of low perceived threat because there are fewer counter influences operating. In response to the political power and influence of this attentive public the government takes a mid-range policy stance, more coercive than in most low threat circumstances, but not at a level of devoting the political and economic capital necessary to eliminate the rogue.

Finally, why does this relationship *persist* so long? Rogues maintain their resistance to the imperial state because their perception of high threat from the great power, they feel, necessitates resistance. The continued efforts at compellence on the part of the imperial state are taken as incontrovertible evidence of its unending hostility. Accommodation with such a power is unthinkable. Also, the creation of a strategic culture of resistance to the imperialist power limits the political options available to the leadership even if they came to believe accommodation wise. Confrontation becomes ingrained.

From the great power side, the unwillingness of the rogue to yield is taken as evidence of their unalterable hostility and aggressive intent, feeding the threat perception. Efforts by the rogue to enhance their power capability are also taken as evidence of aggressive intent and not as defensive reactionism. However, as long as there is little existential threat, there is little governmental or public support for decisive action. The attentive public exerts enough influence to maintain a moderate compellence stance but moves beyond this level are not sanctioned. Thus the actions of both parties create a cycle of mistrust and hostility which both sides, perhaps unwittingly, maintain.

The Potential For Conflict Resolution

One possible resolution is decisive action by the stronger state to end the weaker state's perceived challenge. In their pursuit of the instruments (weapons) believed necessary to successfully confront and resist the imperial state, the rogue state may alter the relative power balance to a point where the imperial state perceives a rising threat. Given this new strategic environment, and the attendant increase in public concern, the stronger state will likely move against the rogue in a decisive manner, degrading their capability and thus re-establishing the power asymmetry. However, this is at best a temporary cessation of the impasse, as the attack will only serve to fuel the perception in the rogue state of a threat emanating from the imperial state and thus serve to recreate and enhance the prior relationship.

Efforts to break the impasse in a peaceful way are also unlikely to succeed. Two of the most commonly prescribed techniques, mutual deterrence and the promotion of "confidence building measures" (CBMs), can be examined in this regard.

Under deterrence, strong signals of military resolve are sent to demonstrate the ultimate futility of aggression by the other. Mutual deterrence, though not ending hostilities, at least lessens the probability of direct aggression. However, in the imperial-rogue

interaction pattern, deterrence is very difficult to achieve. The imperial state does not feel an existential threat from the rogue and thus will not be deterred. The stronger state is in a position to impose its will, should it choose, with little fear of real opposition. If the rogue moves to acquire the capability to constitute such a threat to the interests of the imperial state, it will meet with even greater compellence efforts. In the end, the imperial state is undeterrable because of the relative power differences. The rogue state is also not deterrable because it sees itself as existentially threatened. It sees a fight for survival. Efforts to deter and compel the rogue by the imperial state will only heighten this sense of threat and enhance the resistance. Again, the strong power asymmetry makes mutual deterrence unworkable.

Confidence building measures operate from the notion that conflict resolution is possible in certain dyadic relations by having both sides engage in actions designed to demonstrate their benevolent intentions thereby breaking the cycle of mistrust. In this situation, however, CBMs will not be undertaken by the imperial state because it just doesn't care that much about the situation to try so hard. Without the existential threat, the stakes are not so high as to necessitate a search for accommodation. For both actors, they face the possibility that they could be wrong about the other's real interest in conflict resolution and thus fear exposing themselves to the other's hostile intent.

Also, pursuing such CBMs could alienate the domestic support base. In the rogue state the dominant strategic culture emphasizes great threat from the military, economic, political and/or cultural imperialism of the imperial state. Moving away from this confrontation would be seen as capitulation to those forces. This would be a very risky political move domestically.

For the imperial state the policy of continued pressure is a fairly low cost and politically low-risk move that is greatly supported by a small attentive public. Most of the population has little interest and thus does not weigh in to alter policy in either an escalatory or deescalatory direction. CBMs would require that the political leadership get out ahead of the vast majority of the population, perhaps alienate the attentive public, all for uncertain results. In the absence of strong pressures to pursue CBMs, it is less costly and risky to simply maintain current policies.

The potential for an alteration of the imperial-rogue dyad appears to be reliant on one of three mechanisms. First, the rogue state is somehow able to surprise the imperial state by instantly and massively increasing their power capability to a point of near parity. If the strategic equation is altered to a point where the imperial state is made to feel heightened vulnerability (from a state of near equal capability), then a situation of mutual deterrence may emerge. While the mistrust and hostility would not be negated, the possibility of armed conflict would be lessened. Second, in the imperial state, the emergence of a counter attentive public may serve to influence policy to move in a new direction. For example, if an attentive public consisting of certain business interests is able to replace the exile community which previously influenced policy within the imperial state on this issue, then change is possible. Third, in both types of states, such change in the relationship may be facilitated by a change in leadership. New leaders are not as likely to

be the creators and propagators of the dominant strategic culture and thus are less bound by it. While change is not guaranteed, there is greater flexibility that could be exploited by a new leadership should it care to.

CONCLUSIONS

The existence of what are deemed "rogue states" represents a serious challenge to policy makers around the world and also to international relations theory. Given the level of attention they receive in international policy circles it is important that political scientists evaluate how well these states fit with our theoretic expectations.

This article has argued that rogue states and their inter-relation to the great power(s) highlights three central theoretic puzzles. Reference to current structuralist and domestic politics explanations were found to be insufficient as no single model could adequately deal with all the puzzles described.

Reformulating prior theory into a three variable model, encompassing structural, statist and individual level elements, this research argues that the current situation can be explained as an imperial-rogue interaction dyad based on perceptions of threat and relative capability, modified by the extent of public involvement in the policy process. The goal has been to create a theory compelling in its ability to answer current pressing political and theoretic questions, while retaining the parsimony and spirit of prior international relations research.

The imperial-rogue relation warrants critical attention from both policy makers and political scientists because it is so unlike the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Critical differences between the two as to the level of threat perception and the relative strategic balance makes the imperial-rogue dyad much more dangerous in that deterrence does not hold and the desire to seek mutual accommodation is much weaker.

Endnotes

1. Michael Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Paul Hoyt, "The 'Rogue State' Image in American Foreign Policy," *Global Society* 14 (April 2000); Raymond Tanter, *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1999).
2. For a more detailed analysis of which states the Clinton administration defines to be rogues and of their alleged roguish behavior, see Hoyt, "The 'Rogue State' Image."
3. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making* (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984).
4. Throughout this article it is important to note that the terms "rogue state" and "imperial state" are argued to be perceptual images held by one actor about another. I do not argue

that these classifications are real or objective. However, they are consequential in terms of behavior and interstate relations.

5. For a specific discussion of the objective/subjective debate, see Hoyt, "The 'Rogue State' Image." See also Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*; Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994); Robert Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000); Barry Rubin, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Rogue States," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 (September 1999); Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*.

6. A current manifestation of the significance of "rogue states" in American policy-making is the argued need to create a National Missile Defense (NMD) for the United States based on the alleged threat of missile attack from rogue states.

7. Hoyt, "The 'Rogue State' Image."

8. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Richard Rosecrance, "Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 145-63.

9. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

10. The use of various export controls plus international agreements, such as the NPT, CWC, Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Agreement, well demonstrate this effort. 11. Steve Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 12. Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," in M. Brown, et. al., eds., *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 218.

13. Walt, *Origins of Alliances*.

14. Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in M. Brown, et. al., eds., *Perils of Anarchy*.

15. More will be said later about the potential for altering the relationship between the rogue and the great power.

16. Steven David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Deborah Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?" in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and Strategic Ideology* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

17. David, *Choosing Sides*.
18. David, *Choosing Sides*, p. 16.
19. Charles Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
20. Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*.
21. Richard Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*; Richard Herrmann, "The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Inferences about Perception," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (June 1988), pp. 175-203; William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," in M. Brown, et. al., eds., *Perils of Anarchy*.
22. There is also the possibility of the perception of opportunity. However, in the rogue-imperial relationship this is assumed not to be the case.
23. For a full description of the "imperial" image in international relations, see Richard Herrmann and Michael Fischerkeller, "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995).
24. For more on the relative capabilities of rogues and the United States, see Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*.