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Volume 18, numéro 2, fall 1998

URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/jcs18_02art04

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Éditeur(s)

The University of New Brunswick

ISSN

1198-8614 (imprimé)

1715-5673 (numérique)

[Découvrir la revue](#)

Citer cet article

Malaquias, A. V. (1998). UN Peace Operations In Lusophone Africa: Contrasting Strategies And Outcomes. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 18(2), 66–87.

UN Peace Operations In Lusophone Africa: Contrasting Strategies And Outcomes

by *Assis V. Malaquias*

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations's involvement in peace operations and peace-building in Africa has been inconsistent, ranging from complete failures to some celebrated success stories. This article assesses UN attempts to end the cycles of violence and destruction in Angola and Mozambique. Its main objective is to highlight some important lessons learned. The article first draws attention to the fact that the peace accords in both countries were designed to end bloody and protracted proxy wars - the twin legacies of Cold War and apartheid distabilization. However, especially for Angola, the peace accord did not represent a resolution of the main underlying internal problems. The civil war in Angola involved not only high political stakes but even greater economic interests given its immense natural resources, particularly oil and diamonds. Lack of a consensus on how Angola's wealth should be divided in a post-conflict era ultimately booby-trapped the entire peace operation. Political consensus in Mozambique was easier to achieve because the resource issue was largely absent.

Second, the articles suggests that the different outcomes of UN efforts in Angola and Mozambique reflect the level of international commitment and resources mobilized. Inability or unwillingness to commit enough resources to support peace-building efforts in Angola ultimately rendered the entire UN operation ineffective. The second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II),¹ was not given the mandate nor the means to be a central player in the complex process of implementing the peace accord. In contrast, in Mozambique - despite some problems related to the demobilization of soldiers - the commitment of adequate resources together with active international involvement ultimately guaranteed success.

Third, the article highlights some important lessons learned from the UN's experience in Angola and Mozambique. The contrasting results in the two cases show the importance of realistic mandates coupled with adequate commitment of resources. In Angola, the mandate to "monitor and verify" was unsuitable for such a complex situation. Furthermore, the allocation of meager resources to carry out such a mandate also contributed to its failure. In Mozambique, the UN's direct and dynamic involvement together with adequate human and material resources decisively contributed to success.

Another important lesson relates to the types of structures designed to support peace-building efforts. In the case of Angola, the main structure upon which the entire operation was entrusted was rigid and ineffective. Again, this contrasts starkly with the experience in Mozambique where the UN's mission went beyond peacekeeping and managing the implementation of the peace accord that ended the civil war. The UN operation in Mozambique also assisted in the "political evolution of a society previously riven by conflict."² Finally, the most important lesson learned is related to the need for creating a

unified, professional armed forces well ahead of elections. Failure to do so in Angola eased the relapse into war.

Fourth, the article assesses the prospects for long-term peace in Angola as the UN prepares to terminate its peace operation at a time when the two warring factions appear ready to reignite the war after a four-year period of unstable peace kept perilously in place with UN supervision. The article concludes by suggesting that the UN must take a more long-term approach to peacebuilding. It must be viewed as a critical component of a process that also involves enhancing governance and reconstituting civil society, as a first step to reversing political, administrative and economic decay that causes much human misery in Africa and elsewhere.

PEACE OPERATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

As Paul Diehl points out, the end of the Cold War has resulted in a "major power retrenchment"³ around the world. However, given the anarchic nature of the international system, conflicts - both inter- and intra-state - still occur. In the absence of major power involvement, the UN has been called upon to "promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes."⁴ The UN has responded to these demands for peace operations with increasing frequency in spite of its limited capabilities.⁵ UN peace operations involve many tasks including: observing compliance with peace agreements, creating buffer zones, controlling entry into buffer zones, monitoring arms limitations, overseeing demobilization/ demilitarization, reporting violations, mediating among parties, overseeing electoral activity, and facilitating reconstruction.⁶

This role, assumed with increased frequency by the UN, has always been problematic inasmuch as it is not contemplated in the UN Charter. The Charter, based as it is on the principle of collective security, only makes provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states (Chapter VI) and the use of force to restore international peace and security (Chapter VII). Enforcement actions to maintain international peace and security have to be approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).⁷ However, since all permanent members of the Security Council have veto power, the implementation of the spirit of the UN Charter became highly problematic during the Cold War. The ideological divisions which characterized international relations during most of the post-World War II period were also reflected in the Security Council. However, since the post-1945 era posed its own set of international challenges requiring immediate attention, the concept of peacekeeping was developed as a way to circumvent such ideological divisions and find peaceful solutions to international conflicts. Thus peacekeeping, as an instrument used to help maintain international peace, came about without "a particular theory or doctrine" behind it.⁸ This innovative approach was first used during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948. Twelve other peacekeeping operations would be conducted by the UN during the Cold War period.

One of the most extensive of these operations was undertaken in Africa. The UN peacekeeping mission in Congo, from 1960 to 1964, was its first foray into Africa. This mission was designed to help alleviate the human suffering that resulted from the

unplanned and haphazard process of decolonization in that vast former Belgian colony. The complexity of the situation on the ground, compounded by intense disagreements in the Security Council, contributed to the UN's failure to fulfill its mandate. The impact of this failure was profound and long-lasting. According to one observer, "The Congo experience was as traumatic for the United Nations as was the Vietnam War for the United States."⁹ This early debacle contributed to the UN's reluctance to intervene elsewhere in Africa during the Cold War.

Ironically, the momentous changes that have taken place in the international system since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 have further increased demand for UN peace operations. With the increasing number and intensity of intra-state conflicts - reflecting a collapse of the "order" that existed within the two opposing camps during the Cold War - the UN has been called upon to expand its role beyond a state-centric approach to "maintain international peace and security." The UN is now being asked to devote considerable resources to assist in the resolution of various inter-state conflicts. However, without a framework for intervention to solve such conflicts, the UN's record has been mixed. In some cases, like Mozambique, UN peace operations have been successful.¹⁰ In the case of Angola, however, UN peace operations have resulted in failure.

CONTEXTS AND CONSTRAINTS

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime in 1974¹¹ precipitated profound transformations in southern Africa that eventually led to processes of democratic transition in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Ironically, the former Portuguese colonies in the region - Angola and Mozambique - have not fared nearly as well. By the early 1990s, long years of civil war coupled with economic mismanagement and widespread corruption had brought both countries to the anarchical stage that Robert Kaplan wrote about in his celebrated article.¹² Angola and Mozambique were on the verge of joining the growing list of collapsed states in Africa.

Important domestic, regional and international factors were threatening the viability of these new and fragile states: the departure of the settler communities and subsequent mismanagement had driven their economies to ruin; civil wars, fuelled by South African interventions, had paralyzed the already weak states, rendering them ineffective inasmuch as their reach and authority outside the state capitals and a handful of major cities was decreasing rapidly, resulting in their incapacity to provide security - let alone law and order - to citizens; the authority of the state in both countries was being further challenged by two powerful armed groups - the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) - which ruled over a large portion of the country with population and a working political-military apparatus with an organized, albeit primitive, economy. Both UNITA and RENAMO were financed by Western countries and the apartheid regime in South Africa as the local executors of Western policies to contain Soviet influence in southern Africa.¹³ In this sense, the proxy wars in Angola must also be understood within the Cold War context.

By the early 1990s the ruling Marxist parties in Angola and Mozambique - Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), respectively - had lost the capacity to govern. Complete breakdown in governance was avoided only through the massive engagement of international non-governmental organizations (INGOS)¹⁴ while foreign armies - Cuba in Angola and Zimbabwe and Tanzania in Mozambique - prevented military defeat. Given this situation, the survival of the state in both Angola and Mozambique demanded an end to the civil wars and the establishment of an open, multiparty political system as a first step in a comprehensive process of state reconstitution. Thus, on 31 May 1991, MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse Peace Accord¹⁵ as a first step in what was expected to be a peaceful transition to elected government. Similarly, on 4 October 1992, FRELIMO and RENAMO signed a peace accord in Rome.¹⁶ Given the fragility of the state in these two former Portuguese colonies, the UN was expected to facilitate both transition processes through peace operations.

Although Angola and Mozambique share important similarities in terms of historical experiences - they are both former Portuguese colonies that achieved independence after protracted wars of national liberation and were (mis)ruled by former Marxist governments that supported the struggle for liberation in southern Africa - their transition to peace and elected government produced different outcomes. Angola's aborted transition did not end the cycle of war, while Mozambique, in spite of some serious problems described below, has succeeded in ending the war and has put in place the basis for democratic government centered around a vibrant parliament and enriched by a re-emergent civil society.

On 29 and 30 September 1992 Angola held its first multiparty, internationally supervised elections. The governing MPLA won a parliamentary majority of 53.7 percent, compared to 34.1 percent for UNITA. In the presidential elections the incumbent, José Eduardo dos Santos of MPLA, won 49.7 percent of the vote to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's 40.1 percent. Since dos Santos came six-tenths of one percent short of the 50 percent needed to win an outright victory, a runoff presidential election had to be contested. However, UNITA questioned the legitimacy of the entire electoral process and rejected the validity of the results which were sanctioned by the UN and other international observers. After declaring that massive fraud had taken place, it reignited the civil war by militarily occupying large portions of the country. In a gambit reminiscent of events following independence in 1975, UNITA attempted to take the capital city. Fighting for control of Luanda began on 30 October. After several days of intense fighting the government prevailed. Several senior UNITA officials, including its vice-president Jeremias Chitunda, were killed. Another peace process had collapsed and, once again, Angola reverted to full-scale civil war.

Ironically, the unraveling of the peace process in Angola came at a time when the UN was embarking on a much more successful mission in Mozambique. On 27 to 29 October 1994, 90 percent of the 6.4 million registered voters cast their ballots in the first ever presidential and legislative elections.¹⁷ In the presidential election, the incumbent, President Joaquim Chissano, polled 53.3 percent to RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama's

33.7 percent. FRELIMO won the legislative election with 44.3 percent, followed by RENAMO with 37.8 percent.

Despite maintaining that there were serious irregularities in the electoral process, Dhlakama accepted the outcome of the elections that had been certified as free and fair by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and more than 2,300 international observers. By accepting the election results, Dhlakama was quashing insistent rumors that he would reignite the civil war in Mozambique, as Savimbi had done in Angola. In the end, Dhlakama accepted the results while insisting that, "the elections were not free and fair."¹⁸ Realistically, RENAMO had few military options. However, and perhaps more importantly, the international community had set up a trust fund to help RENAMO's metamorphosis from a murderous guerrilla group into a respectable political party.¹⁹

With RENAMO committed to playing a peaceful role as FRELIMO's opposition in parliament, ONUMOZ, at a cost of nearly US\$1 billion, could be declared a success and its 5,500 peacekeepers were withdrawn gradually. By the time the newly elected government took office in December 1994, only a small contingent of peacekeepers remained in Mozambique to provide mine clearance training.

At about the same time that the international community was celebrating another success story in UN peacekeeping and peace-building in Mozambique, the two warring factions in Angola were reaching yet another peace accord under UN auspices to pave the way for a government of national unity.²⁰ However, after four years of UN-sponsored efforts to cajole both sides to adhere to the accords they had signed, the UN is ready to leave Angola without achieving the main objective of its mission: to place this war-ravaged country on a path to peace. What factors account for the UN's different outcomes in bringing an end to the civil wars and setting both countries on a course toward peaceful and democratic development?

At the domestic level in Angola, two important factors conspired against the peace process. First, the high level of mistrust between MPLA and UNITA that developed since the pre-independence period led to "a continued preference for military rather than political options."²¹ Thus, the two warring factions only reluctantly agreed to implement the Bicesse Peace Accords.

Second, the peace accords that constituted the base for the implementation of the peace process - both Bicesse and Lusaka - ignored the question of how to share the country's wealth, especially oil and diamond revenues,²² which were a significant source of revenues to MPLA and UNITA respectively. Since coming to power on 11 November 1975, the Angolan government controlled the oil producing regions in Cabinda, Zaire and Kwanza Norte. However, especially since the late 1980s, UNITA controlled most diamond mining in the Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. Since then, UNITA has simply been unwilling to surrender the diamond producing areas to the governing MPLA, especially since it regarded the government as corrupt. UNITA maintained that, after more than two decades of MPLA rule, the revenues from the exploration of Angola's vast oil and

diamond resources have benefitted only a relatively small urban elite sympathetic to MPLA. The vast majority of the population, especially in rural areas where UNITA commands considerable support, has been forced to survive severe deprivation in a country where most structures of governance had collapsed. Given this situation, UNITA has demanded participation in the management of the funds accrued from the sale of oil and diamonds in order to prevent continuing enrichment of the ruling group and its clients. No adequate mechanism was devised to deal with this issue. Since, from UNITA's perspective, the Angolan government's inability to address important domestic problems, including corruption, economic mismanagement, and uneven distribution of wealth, was a major factor in the civil war, the inability to find an acceptable way of dealing with these pressing issues ultimately have contributed to the breakdown of the latest attempts to establish a durable framework for peace.

In Mozambique, such domestic constraints were dealt with adequately. For example, ONUMOZ and other UN agencies worked in a number of areas to build trust and cooperation between FRELIMO and RENAMO. At the military/security level, ONUMOZ was able to ensure that the main provisions of the peace accord were adhered to. Once the ceasefire came into effect on 15 October 1992, ONUMOZ played a crucial role in keeping the two armed forces separated prior to their encampment in designated sites and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons. This was followed by the selection of troops from both sides to form the new Mozambican Defense Force (FADM). At the political level, ONUMOZ supervised the implementation of the peace accord's provisions regarding the creation of new political parties and preparation for multi-party elections. However, some of the most effective work to build trust and cooperation between the former antagonists was undertaken through humanitarian intervention. ONUMOZ and other UN agencies carried out an extensive humanitarian assistance program immediately after the signing of the Rome peace accord. This program, which included the delivery of food relief, repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, constituted an important first step in reestablishing economic and social normalcy.²³

The struggle for financial resources was also largely absent in Mozambique. Although the warring factions in Mozambique did not have resources - like Angola's oil and diamonds - to fight over, two trust funds²⁴ were established to assist financially both RENAMO and other opposition political parties. This innovative feature of the UN peace operation in Mozambique reflected some of the bitter lessons learned in Angola where the meager resources committed by the international community were not sufficient to overcome some of the constraints discussed in this article.

PEACEKEEPING "ON THE CHEAP"

The peace operation in Angola failed largely because of the UN's inability to engage sufficient resources to compel the two warring factions to abide by the peace accord they had signed in May 1991.²⁵ Ironically, the end of the Cold War, in which Angola had played a conspicuous part, at least in terms of superpower rivalry in Southern Africa, did not benefit that country. In fact, it can be argued that the end of bipolarity and the dawn

of a new era of cooperation revolving around the UN and other international organizations produced a new set of pressures and demands including a scarcity of international resources for peace-building and peacekeeping. Now, Angola had to compete with other countries around the world for both attention and resources. As a result, the international community, particularly the United States and Russia, were not as willing to employ the same resources to make peace in Angola in the 1990s, as they both had been to make war in the 1970s and 1980s. In the end, the adversaries in Angola kept their armies intact, making a return to war inevitable.

It is worth remembering that UNAVEM was not created to enforce the implementation of the Bicesse Peace Accord. As mentioned earlier, it was created on 20 December 1988 to monitor the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban military contingent from Angola, as part of the settlement that led to Namibia's independence.²⁶ This mission was made up of 70 military observers and 20 civilian officials from ten countries,²⁷ and was given a 31-month mandate, beginning with its deployment one week before the start of the Cuban withdrawal, and ending one month after the completion of the withdrawal.

On the eve of the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord, the UNSC agreed to extend UNAVEM's mandate. The renewed mission, UNAVEM II, would become a 24-nation multinational force with the mandate to monitor the ceasefire between the Angolan government and UNITA. A budget of \$132.3 million and 548 personnel were allocated to this mission, which began its deployment on 1 July 1991.²⁸

UN personnel comprised 350 military observers and 90 police officers. The military observers were given the task of ensuring that the provisions of the peace accord, regarding the encampment of government troops in 27 zones and UNITA in 23 others zones, were respected. They were also deployed in 12 critical areas and had additional responsibilities of conducting patrols over the entire country. UNAVEM II also included 90 international police officers whose main task was to ensure the functioning of a new, integrated national police force.

On 24 March 1992, the UNSC unanimously approved the expansion of UNAVEM II and the enlargement of its mandate. A 400-person division was added to the existing mission to monitor and evaluate the operations and impartiality of the electoral authorities at all levels in the legislative and presidential elections. This division was expected to operate in all the 18 provinces of the country to monitor and verify the three main phases of the electoral process, including the registration of voters, the electoral campaign, and the voting process. An additional US\$18.8 million was allocated to UNAVEM II's budget for these purposes.²⁹

In both human and financial resources, UNAVEM II was, at best, a smaller reproduction of other UN operations, such as Namibia and Cambodia. In contrast to the UN role during Namibia's transition to independence, UNAVEM II did not organize the elections. The UN stressed that the Angolan elections were essentially a national, sovereign affair. Therefore, the UN assumed an auxiliary role - to observe and verify the elections, not to

organize them. As the Secretary-General emphasized, "the government must be seen clearly to be taking charge of their organization, especially concerning logistics."³⁰

This was expected of a country emerging from a devastating civil war that had crippled most of its infrastructures. By contrast, in Namibia - a country of roughly 1 million people with most of its infrastructures and bureaucracy intact - the UN mounted a full-scale operation involving more than 6,000 personnel.

The minimalist stance by the UN in Angola was partly responsible for a transition process fraught with fear and tension. For example, UNAVEM II was not able to prevent armed UNITA cadres in civilian clothing from moving into towns across the country. Nor was it able to investigate widespread reports of large UNITA arms caches being hidden around the country. More importantly, it could not compel UNITA to surrender its heavy weapons and demobilize its troops as the peace accord required. Similarly, UNAVEM II was not able to prevent the Angolan government from hiding its best troops in the police force, which remained largely outside UN control and supervision. Thus, UNITA could claim that the creation of rapid intervention riot police units known as "ninjas," constituted sufficient evidence that the government was not serious about its purported intentions to create a truly national, unified army.

Not surprisingly, UNAVEM II was unable to defuse escalating tension ahead of the country's first multi-party elections and was caught completely unprepared to deal with pre-electoral clashes between the former warring parties. Ultimately, UN incapacity, compounded by the difficulties inherent in a post-civil war society, including lack of infrastructures, weak bureaucracy, profound distrust between the former enemies, left vital features of the transition process unfulfilled. Ominously, the demobilization of the two armies and their fusion into a single, unified, non-partisan national army was not complete before elections were held. Furthermore, these difficulties impeded the government from carrying out some of the basic functions required during an election, such as efficient distribution and collection of ballot boxes. Given its limited resources, the UN mission was also unable to make a definitive pronouncement on whether the exercise had been free and fair in a manner that could satisfy all parties. In the end, given all of these shortcomings, the UN was not able to prevent the reversion to war. As the section below suggests, a more central role for the UN in Mozambique produced a better outcome, despite some difficulties.

MOZAMBIQUE: A UN SUCCESS STORY

The UN involvement in Mozambique reflected a desire not to repeat the blunders made in Angola. Thus, shortly after the signing of the peace agreement in Rome, the UN General Assembly approved a budget of US\$140 million dollars to finance the initial phase of ONUMOZ, and the first steps were taken to deploy the 5,500 peacekeepers mandated to oversee the application of the peace agreement. ONUMOZ was given a clear and specific mandate to guide its operations in implementing the four major areas of the peace agreement: political, military, electoral and humanitarian.³¹ This level of clarity and specificity contributed significantly to the overall success of the mission.

Another key factor in explaining the success of ONUMOZ resides in the fact that the UN insisted on the establishment of flexible mechanisms and timetables³² to help carry out the peace accord. In Angola the entire process was supervised by the Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC) made up of government and UNITA representatives, while the UN, along with the US, Russia, and Portugal sat in as observers. However, in contrast, ONUMOZ worked with many commissions created specifically to ease the implementation of the peace agreement. These commissions invariably included members of the Mozambican government, RENAMO and ONUMOZ. ONUMOZ, for example, was an integral part of two key commissions: the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) that held primary responsibility for the day-to-day management of the transition process, and the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) that dealt with incidents and/or complaints from either side. It also played an important role in the National Electoral Commission (CNE), Territorial Administration, Information, and Police Affairs.

Arguably, however, the success of ONUMOZ rested largely on its leadership role in the Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (CCFADM). The UN had the primary responsibility for managing the encampment and registration of up to 100,000 government and RENAMO soldiers. The UN was also responsible for ensuring that a new national army of 30,000 was created with equal numbers of soldiers drawn from the government and RENAMO forces before elections took place.

The peace agreement provided for 49 cantonment areas where the soldiers were assembled and registered. An important screening process then took place with some soldiers being selected to join the new armed forces while others were offered the opportunity to participate in a social adjustment program devised by the UN to help demobilized soldiers adapt to civilian life. Some soldiers opted to go back immediately to their places of origin. However, many others participated in various technical courses offered by the UN to ease their return to civilian life.

By the end of March 1994, nearly 50,000 troops had been confined in UN cantonment sites. Many camps were already full and some had more than double the forces they were initially supposed to hold. Since the process had gone according to plan, ONUMOZ could concentrate on the establishment of a new army. The tragic situation in Angola had taught the UN that the formation of a national army before the elections was a basic condition for the success of the peace process. In Angola, the UN was unable to play a key role in the creation of a new, unified army partly due to its secondary role in the JPMC. It was only able to hastily proclaim the existence of a single armed forces two days before the elections were held,³³ In reality, both the MPLA and UNITA kept the crack units in place as a precaution. What followed was an armed conflict even more devastating than the previous ones, with the warring factions emerging on the ground better equipped than ever before.

The UN was determined not to repeat the mistake in Mozambique. Thus, various military centers for the new army were created to provide both training and the opportunity for former combatants to develop mutual trust. ONUMOZ also ensured that, as the soldiers

presented themselves for registration, distribution of food and clothing accompanied the process of disarmament and collection of war material and, when possible, social and medical assistance was extended to their dependents.

The UN had to exert great pressure on both the Mozambique government and RENAMO to commit themselves to a final date to end demobilization. There was some speculation that the government, in particular, was deliberately keeping back many of its best troops from the disarmament process. A major snag developed over the case of what became known as "the missing 12,000 FRELIMO troops." More than 18 months after the signing of the peace accord, the government claimed that its army was in fact some 12,000 soldiers smaller than previously believed.³⁴ Predictably, RENAMO was not impressed with this government "miscounting," and claimed that FRELIMO had been massaging the figures in order to hide soldiers.³⁵

But RENAMO was causing its own set of problems. FRELIMO complained, for example, that RENAMO was sending mostly children, elderly and disabled people to assembly areas while hiding its best soldiers.³⁶ FRELIMO also observed, with concern, that the weapons delivered by RENAMO to ONUMOZ were old, obsolete, and did not correspond to the principle of "one man one weapon." In other words, RENAMO was allegedly stashing away its most sophisticated weapons for possible use in the eventuality of electoral defeat. Furthermore, and in open contradiction with the peace accord and its own public statements, RENAMO was allegedly continuing to ban the movement of citizens in areas under its control through arbitrary detention and intimidation.

Given the long history of animosity between the former warring factions, mutual accusations during the transition process were anticipated even in the most optimistic scenarios. What was not envisaged, however, was that ONUMOZ's successes would create difficulties. One of the main problems arose from the fact that, having encamped most of the government and RENAMO soldiers, ONUMOZ had some difficulties in demobilizing them quickly enough. As a result, many soldiers became involved in mutinies and other disturbances because they wanted to know whether they would be demobilized or join the new national army.³⁷

In the Boane and Moamba assembly areas, for example, soldiers rioted and seized several UN personnel and their vehicles. They moved outside the camp and sacked shops, beat up people and caused UN personnel to flee the assembly area. In a worrying development, former combatants in other assembly areas began to adopt copycat tactics. Once they heard how their colleagues elsewhere had been able to secure immediate demobilization by seizing hostages or through another favorite tactic - blocking a major road for a day or two - riots quickly spread to other camps. Although no UN personnel were seriously hurt, FRELIMO and RENAMO commanders were regularly beaten up, innocent civilians were killed, raped, or saw their property looted.

In one incident, mutinying soldiers of the 6th Tank Brigade returned to their barracks in a suburb of Maputo only after holding talks with the chief of the General Staff of the Mozambique Armed Forces. In this frightening episode, the Mozambique government

blamed ONUMOZ for not deactivating the tanks used by the mutinying soldiers. However, the UN claimed that the Mozambique government did not allow ONUMOZ to disable the tanks by removing the firing mechanisms. In the end, active ONUMOZ mediation and cooperation between all parties enabled the resumption of the peace transition process along more peaceful lines.

The nature and degree of ONUMOZ involvement in Mozambique's transition process helped defuse a potentially catastrophic pre-electoral crisis. One day before Mozambicans were expected to go to the polls RENAMO pulled out of the electoral process claiming to have uncovered a number of irregularities that endangered the whole electoral process. The alleged irregularities included:

a lack of timely presentation and verification of all surplus voter registration and voting material; the fact that voting booth lists were not handed over to the Elections Administration Technical Secretariat, all leaders, and the political parties; and the fact that voter lists had not been put up at the voting places.³⁸

In a ominous move, Dhlakama declared, like Savimbi in Angola, that he would not accept the results if RENAMO lost.³⁹ But, unlike in Angola, ONUMOZ was able to quickly convince Dhlakama that such actions would not be tolerated by the international community. Neighboring states, like Zimbabwe and South Africa, threatened strong measures, including military action, if RENAMO resumed the war. Dhlakama had no choice but to quickly rejoin the electoral process. In a face-saving statement he declared that:

the international community gave us guarantees that irregularities reported by RENAMO will be investigated henceforth and other complaints will be looked into after elections . . . I would like to announce that RENAMO will participate in elections.⁴⁰

This ensured that the elections took place without further incidents. When ONUMOZ's mandate expired with the inauguration of the newly elected president on 9 December 1994, the UN could rightly congratulate itself for having achieved another peace-building success story. However, even in Mozambique, the UN's work was not complete, particularly in weapons collection, mine clearance and human rights monitoring.⁴¹ Aldo Ajello, the dynamic Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Mozambique, was forced to acknowledge that mine clearance had been one of ONUMOZ's weakest points. According to Ajello, the mine clearance program was planned to last two years, but it had to be completed in six months, mainly due to "administrative problems between New York and Maputo."⁴² Unfortunately, although the war has ended, innocent victims will continue to be killed and maimed in Mozambique for years, perhaps decades, to come.

What lessons, then, can be derived from the UN's experiences in Angola and Mozambique? UN peace operations in these two countries demonstrate that a clear mandate, functional transitional institutions and emphasis on the creation of a unified army well-ahead of elections, are crucial factors in determining success or failure.

REALISTIC MANDATES AND ADEQUATE RESOURCES

One of the main differences between the UN missions in Angola and Mozambique can be found in the resources allocated respectively to UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ. Although severely constrained by lack of resources, UNAVEM II could have done a much better job if it had been given a more realistic mandate.⁴³ Its weak mandate reflected the UN's general practice of not challenging the sovereignty of member states. However, as mentioned before, Angola's long years of civil war and economic mismanagement had brought the country to the verge of total collapse. Given this situation, a more realistic mandate for UNAVEM II would have included various measures to facilitate state reconstruction to be implemented concurrently with the peace process. This could have involved the restoration of state authority in areas still controlled by UNITA. Failure to do so emboldened UNITA which, predictably, undertook to undermine the power of the MPLA regime during the transition process through an intense campaign of politically motivated violence.

The peace accord rested on the crucial assumption that both sides would cooperate in its implementation since, at least outwardly, all wanted peace. Instead, UNITA took full advantage of the prevailing situation - a weak government, a dysfunctional JPMC, and an ineffective UNAVEM II - to reinforce its own position, partly by preventing the government from extending its administration to areas it had lost during the civil war.

Ironically, the UN unwittingly facilitated UNITA's attempts to keep tens of thousands of peasants under its control - instead of being allowed to return to their villages under the terms of the peace accord - because of the substantial quantities of food aid supplied to the area by UN agencies for distribution by UNITA officials.⁴⁴ This reflected lack of UN "intelligence" regarding the domestic political situation.

But there were other factors contributing to political violence. Contrary to what happened in Mozambique, the demobilized soldiers from both armies in Angola retained many of their weapons due to the haphazard way in which the demobilization process was conducted, again reflecting lack of proper UNAVEM II involvement. In many cases, soldiers simply did not report back to their barracks once the ceasefire was signed.

The government's inability to handle increasing political violence during the period leading up to elections, was related to the fact that, paradoxically, peace had eroded its power by transferring authority to new structures like the JPMC. Tragically, however, these structures proved to be highly dysfunctional. Moreover, the troika of observers expected to act as the guarantors of peace in Angola (i.e., the United States, Russia and Portugal) were not prepared to use extraordinary measures, such as the use of military force, to enforce the peace agreements. All these factors contributed to a situation of uncertainty which quickly escalated into hostility and political violence. This ultimately booby trapped the entire peace process. Thus, the first multiparty elections in Angola amounted to little more than, "an exercise in make-believe."⁴⁵ When the elections were held, many of the fundamental pre-conditions stipulated in the Bicesse Peace Accord remained unfulfilled. In other words, the implementation of the accord had failed to

create a peaceful climate for political discourse and intercourse. The two main opponents, having been denied victory on the battlefield, were attempting to win the civil war at the ballot box. Both sides still had armies and UNITA still controlled the territory it occupied during the civil war.

Given the situation described above, UNITA's return to war after the publication of the election results was to be expected. Angola's relapse into civil war was facilitated by two main factors: the structures designed to manage the transition process proved to be highly dysfunctional and the unified army had not yet been created.

In Mozambique, as mentioned before, ONUMOZ was given a realistic mandate and adequate resources. Thus, at the end of its mission, ONUMOZ had succeeded in helping Mozambique make the difficult transition from civil war to a democratically elected government. This could not have been achieved without functional mechanisms to manage the peace operation.

FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURES

The primary responsibility for implementing the peace accord in Angola, unlike Mozambique, did not rest with the UN, but with a joint political-military commission, the JPMC. Predictably, this structure was incapable of managing a peaceful transition to the elections. In fact, it was not even able to prevent the peace process from beginning to unravel soon after the signing of the peace accord in Portugal.

UNITA withdrew from this joint commission in the early stages of its existence, claiming that the MPLA government was not seriously implementing the peace accord, thus endangering the entire peace process. Although UNITA returned to the JPMC shortly afterwards, this body had lost most of its effectiveness. Without a strong and effective mechanism to manage the transition process, the country completed its descent into political turmoil, characterized by intimidation and violence. As a crucial mechanism for the transition process, the JPMC was poorly designed because many of the problems it had to face were not anticipated by the signatories of the peace accord.

Again, this contrasts sharply with how the UN managed its peace operation in Mozambique. Here, "the CSC was effectively in almost constant session."⁴⁶ This commission, whose composition also included the ambassadors of France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States, operated as a "mini-Security Council."⁴⁷ This level of involvement in Mozambique resulted in the kind of legitimacy and leverage which the UN mission in Angola never had. International involvement was particularly needed to create unified armies as important cornerstones for sustainable peace.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF A NATIONAL, UNIFIED ARMY

Under the Bicesse Peace Accord, the Angolan government and UNITA were expected to form a new 50,000-person united army from their estimated 250,000 troops and

demobilize the remaining soldiers before elections were held. However, from the start, the process of assembling government and rebel troops was very slow, resulting in huge delays in the establishment of the new army. This slowness was caused by a number of logistical problems, including lack of food, shelter and transportation, in assembly areas. It was also a direct consequence of the UN's lack of involvement in this crucial aspect of the peace process. Margaret Anstee, the UN Secretary General Special Representative in Angola, would later recognize the absurdity of this fundamental omission. She argues that:

While it was perfectly sensible to give the British, French and Portuguese the task of training the new force, the enterprise constituted such a critical element in the process that UNAVEM should at least have been given a role of verification and a seat in the CCFA (the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces, under the CCPM).⁴⁸

Thus, not surprisingly, in a report to the Security Council, the Secretary General pointed out that, two and a half months after the assembly of troops was supposed to have been completed, barely 60 percent of the troops declared by both sides had been encamped in assembly areas.⁴⁹ The report declared that such a state of affairs undermined confidence and imperilled the implementation of various other aspects of the peace accord.⁵⁰

UNITA claimed that it had concluded the process of confining its troops to UN-controlled assembly areas just before the 15 November 1991 deadline stipulated by the JPMC. UNITA noted, however, that not all government troops had been encamped and suggested that many government soldiers were being transferred from the army into the police force to avoid demobilization.⁵¹ According to UNAVEM II's count, a total of 95,634 troops (68,666 government troops and 26,968 from UNITA) had been assembled in 45 sites, compared with the projected total number of 165,440 troops that should have been in the assembly areas (115,640 government troops and 49,800 UNITA troops).⁵²

By early April 1992, it became clear that the provisions of the peace accord regarding the formation of a unified national army would not be met. Given the slow pace of implementing some of the crucial aspects of the peace accord, the UN and the foreign powers involved in overseeing the peace process had all but given up most attempts to meet the stipulated schedule for demobilizing approximately 250,000 soldiers and guerrillas, and forming a unified army before the elections. The British, Portuguese and French officers in charge of forming the new army had only succeeded in creating a unified command structure on paper.⁵³ Thus, in a move that would prove fatal to the country's long-term unity and stability, the parties involved undertook to make the first serious revision of the peace accord. The government and UNITA decided to hold back on their initial pledge to demobilize all their soldiers or integrate them into the new national army. UNITA decided to keep at least 15,000 soldiers in reserve, while the government kept about 33,000 in reserve including a 6,000-strong air force and a 4,000-strong navy.

A month before the elections only about 25 percent of the combined soldiers had been demobilized and a mere 12 percent of the national army had been formed.⁵⁴ It was becoming clear that Angola would not have one army, but three - the embryonic Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), FAPLA, and FALA⁵⁵ - at election time.

Pressured by the United States, Russia and Portugal - the troika of international observers to the peace process - the MPLA government and UNITA officially agreed to disband their armies on 27 September 1992, just 48 hours before the start of what were supposed to be the first fully free elections in Angola. However, the unity of the new armed forces only lasted a week. UNITA withdrew from the country's newly formed joint armed forces on 5 October 1992, thus setting the stage for another round of bloodletting.

LESSONS NOT LEARNED

The new round of fighting precipitated by UNITA's electoral defeat lasted for two years. By most accounts, it inflicted a level of devastation - both in human lives lost and infrastructure destroyed - worse than before. UNITA had clearly planned for the eventuality of electoral defeat. It had accepted, as a given, that MPLA would not surrender power through political means. Thus, UNITA used the temporary peace brought about by an externally imposed transition process to reorganize and reposition itself on the ground to cope with changing international and regional realities. The imminent cut-off of aid from the United States and South Africa forced UNITA into a desperate search for new sources of funding. For the rebels, the most accessible and plentiful source was in Angola itself, in the abundant supply of diamonds that could be found in the northeastern part of the country. Thus, UNITA deployed a substantial amount of its forces in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces to protect what would become extensive diamond mining operations. Currently, UNITA is able to smuggle diamonds out of Angola via Zambia and Burundi to be sold on international markets, particularly in Antwerp.⁵⁶ The control of this lucrative operation has enabled UNITA to resist MPLA's attempts to co-opt it into the government and the ruling party. UNITA prefers to wait until it has guarantees of its fair share of the country's wealth or the government collapses due to mounting domestic pressures.

Since the signing of the Bicesse accord in 1991, UNITA adopted a two-track strategy for the peace process. On the one hand, it went through the motions of an electoral campaign and a make-believe demobilization process to appease the international community while, on the other hand, it maintained its best soldiers and weapons outside government control and continued to restock and resupply for the ever-present possibility of a resumption of the war.⁵⁷ Its financial self-sufficiency assured for the foreseeable future - with the potential to earn up to \$ 1 billion dollars per year for the next 50 to 60 years via the sale of diamonds⁵⁸ - UNITA is in no hurry to reach a lasting political settlement.

In the aftermath of the electoral fiasco, UNITA achieved military control of most of Angola before returning to the negotiating table in 1993. Exploratory talks were held in Addis Ababa before peace talks resumed in Lusaka under UN mediation.⁵⁹ After more than a year of negotiations both parties signed a power-sharing agreement commonly

referred to as the "Lusaka Protocol."⁶⁰ Yet, as they were signing this document, which established a new framework for peace, government troops were driving out UNITA from most of the areas it had captured in 1992, including the rebels' headquarters at Huambo and their diamond mines in northeastern Angola. Without control of the diamond mines the government's army could "significantly damage UNITA's power base."⁶¹ This prompted UNITA to threaten a substantial escalation of guerrilla activities and make Angola ungovernable for "a few more years."⁶²

When the Lusaka peace accord was finally signed in November 1994, UNITA had been once again driven out of its stronghold in Huambo but had held on to the diamond mines in the northeastern provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. The Lusaka accords provided for the demobilization of the rival armies and the integration of FALA into the national army. It also made provisions for several government posts to be given to UNITA. To facilitate the implementation of the accord, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of UNAVEM III. This 7,000 strong multinational force was given the mandate of supervising the disarmament and encampment of UNITA and government soldiers prior to their integration into a unified national army.

UNITA once again gave only lukewarm endorsement to the latest peace accord because it was confident that UNAVEM III⁶³ would end its mission in failure, much like previous UN efforts in Angola. Even with the human and material resources that previous missions lacked,⁶⁴ and an expanded mandate,⁶⁵ UNAVEM III was never expected to ensure successful implementation of the Lusaka agreement, given its complexities⁶⁶ and the fact that neither party to the conflict was genuinely committed to peace. UNITA, in particular, calculated correctly that, given enough difficulties on the ground, the UN's own financial afflictions would result in considerable pressure in New York to bring UNAVEM III to a close with or without peace in Angola.⁶⁷

The fact that there was no enforcement clause in the Lusaka Protocol meant that UNITA could, single-handedly, thwart its implementation by simply delaying the quartering of its troops and handing over its weapons to the UN. The Lusaka Protocol stipulated a 180-day period for the completion of quartering and disarmament of troops. However, three years later, this process had lost all credibility as UNITA sent only children and old men with rusty weapons to the UN quartering areas while its best troops and equipment were used to continue controlling most of the territory taken since the post-electoral debacle.⁶⁸ This suggests that the Lusaka Protocol has produced a different outcome than the one originally envisioned: UNITA is still strong enough, both militarily and financially, to continue playing the role of the spoiler indefinitely. Thus, once again in Angola, the UN has failed to properly assess the likelihood for peace, especially the commitment of both parties, before undertaking a peace mission.

UNTIMELY DEPARTURE

In light of the situation on the ground, the optimism generated by the signing of the Lusaka Protocol has disappeared. A new sense of pessimism has slowly and predictably crept in. This pessimism derives from the fact that both sides appear ready for another

devastating round of fighting.⁶⁹ Having lost patience due to UNITA's chronic and deliberate procrastination, the Angolan government has decided to forcibly extend state administration to the areas still under UNITA control, especially the diamond producing areas from which UNITA draws approximately \$500 million dollars per year.

The timing of the government's push to establish state control over UNITA-dominated areas reflects major regional changes, particularly the regime changes in the two Congos where presidents Mobutu Sese Seko and Pascal Lissouba were overthrown by rebellions supported by Angola. Mobutu, in particular, was a long-time ally of Jonas Savimbi and allowed his country to be used as the main funnel for weapons and other supplies for UNITA. Partly due to this relationship, the Angolan government backed Laurent Kabila's victorious insurgency. Angolan support at all levels, including both troops and military hardware, was decisive in the final push to take Kinshasa. Having helped to topple Mobutu in Congo, thus cutting off UNITA's main supply routes and stranding some of the rebel groups' best troops in the neighboring country,⁷⁰ the Angolan government appears to have won the support of another key neighbor which could help to inflict a final and mortal blow against the rebels. Namibia is said to have "given agreement in principle to allow Angola use of its air base at Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi Strip and, in addition, to land an expeditionary force at Walvis Bay that would be moved north-east for an assault on the Unita stronghold of Jamba in the far south-east of Angola."⁷¹ Even with the help of its neighbors, the Angolan government is not expected to destroy UNITA. In recent months UNITA has displayed an unexpectedly strong military capacity and has been able to hold on to most disputed areas, including the diamond mines.⁷² In demonstrating a continuing fighting ability UNITA has, perhaps unwittingly, confirmed reports that most of the rebels had not been demobilized. The hard core of UNITA's troops had never been registered in the UN camps at all.

While renewed fighting takes place throughout Angola, the UN has maintained its timetable for withdrawal,⁷³ further adding to the sense of pessimism. The UN's exit from Angola is premature because it takes place at a time when its continuing involvement is most needed. On the ground, the legitimacy and capacity of the government of national unity, installed on 11 April 1997 is highly questionable. As constituted, it still precludes UNITA from exerting official control over the two major levers of economic power: oil and diamonds. Full acceptance of the present division of power would leave UNITA completely at the mercy of the government, especially from an economic/financial perspective. Thus, UNITA is not yet ready to give up its last means of survival; it is expected to continue fighting for what it considers to be its fair share of Angola's vast wealth.

At the military level, the UN has yet to complete the key task of quartering UNITA troops and facilitating their incorporation into the national army. In fact, the UN efforts to demobilize UNITA troops and help integrate them in the national army has been a complete failure. UNITA registered 70,000 of its troops at the UN quartering camps. Of those, 11,000 joined the national army and 36,000 were demobilized. However, another 23,000 deserted the UN camps.⁷⁴ Moreover, there is no reliable follow-up mechanism to determine whether the demobilized soldiers have returned to their villages or to their

original rebel bases. This means that the UN may have helped to house, feed and cloth UNITA's soldiers while they were pausing for a predictable resumption of the war.

Partly due to the political and military situation prevailing in the country, but also due to gross mismanagement, the economy is in a shambles, teetering on the verge of collapse.⁷⁵ Together all these factors have a negative effect on human security and prevent the emergence of a civil society with voice. Thus, instead of a cut-and-run approach to conflict resolution, the UN must find creative ways to handle this extremely complex situation. A reduced UN presence in Angola is inadequate to help solve this country's problems.

CONCLUSIONS

The UN's peace-building and peacekeeping efforts in Angola and Mozambique demonstrate that, in the final analysis, the success or failure of such missions hinges on several important factors, including a clear mandate, commitment of adequate resources from the start, and the willingness of the main internal actors to implement the peace accords they sign. In Mozambique, ONUMOZ had both a clear mandate and the means to play a pivotal role. ONUMOZ was given the mandate to manage the entire peace process. Also, the sizable UN presence in Mozambique served both as an incentive for the former enemies to implement the peace agreement they had signed and as a credible deterrent against any ploy to re-ignite the civil war. Thus, the success of the peace support operation in Mozambique suggests that the international community is still capable of rescuing collapsing societies.

In Angola, UNAVEM II never had the mandate to manage the implementation of the peace process. Surprisingly, it was relegated to a secondary role. As such, it could not help solve Angola's multifaceted and multilayered crisis before elections took place. The severity of the crisis would have required initial arrangements for a much longer transition process in order to allow for the bolstering of credible governance and the reconstitution of civil society. Angola, like many other African countries, faces a "crisis of governance."⁷⁶ This crisis is reflected in the "coercive and arbitrary"⁷⁷ nature of the state, where government officials habitually follow their own interests without fear of accountability. In the particular case of Angola, this was further complicated by the fact that UNITA believed that after spending many years in the bush it was now their turn to pillage the country's wealth, as the MPLA government had done in the past.

If the peace process is to work in Angola under UN supervision, the UN must necessarily take into account this crisis of governance. The UN must take steps to remedy political and administrative decay and initiate a process of political renewal that will ultimately lead to the establishment of a new order based on transparent, accountable governance, pluralistic institutions, respect for the rule of law, a free press and the protection of human rights. This would also entail working to strengthen elements of civil society to enable them to play a more significant role in the peace process. In sum, international efforts aimed at helping Angola end its long cycle of violence must move beyond the

conventional practices of peacekeeping and peace-making to include greater attention to the equally important areas of deterrence, and peace enforcement and reconstruction.

Endnotes

1. UNAVEM was created in December 1988 as part of the international agreement to facilitate the transition to independence in Namibia. It was mandated to monitor the withdrawal of an estimated 50,000 Cuban troops stationed in Angola since 1975. UNAVEM II was created in 1991 to monitor the implementation of the Bicesse Peace Accord that was expected to end the civil war in Angola.
2. United Nations, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995* (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 68.
3. Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 1.
4. Ibid., p. 4. See also Mats R. Berdal, *Wither UN Peacekeeping?* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 3; Raymond F. Hopkins, "Anomie, System Reform, and Challenges to the UN System," in Milton J. Esman and Shibley Telhami, eds., *International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 76-77.
5. Milton J. Esman and Shibley Telhami, "Introduction," in Esman and Telhami eds., *International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict*, p. 1.
6. Adapted from Bruce R. Pirnie and William E. Simons, *Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), p. 4.
7. The five permanent members of the UNSC are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
8. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, 1990), p. 4.
9. Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 6.
10. For Diehl, "success" involves three important elements: the ability to broker a peace agreement; deployment for a brief period; and, a "low chance of conflict escalation" at the time of withdrawal. See Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, pp. 39-40.
11. On 25 April 1974, a group of Portuguese junior officers, dissatisfied with their country's colonial policies, including the counterinsurgency wars in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, led a military coup that toppled the fascist regime of Marcelo Caetano.

12. Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, (February 1994), pp. 44-76.
13. William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994).
14. United Nations, *The United Nations in Mozambique*, pp.12-13.
15. This accord derives its name from the Portuguese town of Bicesse where it was signed.
16. This accord is also known as the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique.
17. Presidential Decree 1/94 of 11 April 1994 had set the election dates for 27 and 28 October 1994. However, voting was extended by one day to accommodate RENAMO which had staged a one-day boycott of the elections.
18. Afonso Dhlakama, Radio Mozambique, 14 November 1994.
19. United Nations, *The United Nations in Mozambique*, p. 4
20. The Angolan government and UNITA signed their latest formal peace accord in Lusaka on 20 November 1994.
21. Fen O. Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1996), p. 96. See also, Syngue, *Mozambique*, p. 6.
22. Angola earns an average of US \$10 billion/year in oil revenues and \$1 billion/year in diamond revenues.
23. United Nations, *The United Nations in Mozambique*, p. 5.
24. The United Nations Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Mozambique was established in May 1993 to channel international financial donations for RENAMO. The UN made an appeal for \$15 million to be contributed to this fund. By August 1993, \$14.6 million had been pledged and \$13.6 million donated. See United Nations, *The United Nations in Mozambique*, pp. 58-59.
25. Margaret J. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), p. 223. See also Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, p. 125.
26. Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, p. 62.

27. Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain and the former Yugoslavia.

28. Besides the original participants, 14 other countries, including Canada, Egypt, Guinea- Bissau, Hungary, Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden and Zimbabwe, also participated. UNAVEM II personnel included 350 military observers, up to 90 police officers, 14 medical staff, 80 international and 80 local staff for administrative and support units. The entire operation was supported by three aircraft and 12 helicopters. (Figures taken from a Reuters dispatch from the UN, 31 May 1991.)

29. Reuters News Agency, 24 March 1992.

30. Xinhua News Agency, 6 March 1991.

31. United Nations, *The United Nations in Mozambique*, pp. 151-52.

32. Ibid., pp. 23-37.

33. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, p. 67.

34. United Nations, *The United Nations in Mozambique*, p. 40.

35. BBC World Service (in English), 5 May 1994.

36. Final communique of the fourth session of FRELIMO's Central Committee held in Matola on 28 March 1994, in *Noticias*, Maputo, 2 April 1994, p. 2.

37. Synge, *Mozambique*, pp. 100-02.

38. Radio Mozambique, 27 October 1994.

39. BBC World Service (in English), 26 October 1994.

40. Radio Mozambique, 28 October 1994.

41. Synge, *Mozambique*, p. 146.

42. *Le Soir*, Brussels, 18 November 1994, p. 2.

43. Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, p. 126.

44. *The Guardian*, 23 March 1992, p. 7.

45. Christine Messiant, Centre d'Etudes Africaines, Paris, quoted in Inter Press Service, 26 September 1992.

46. Synge, *Mozambique*, p. 153.
47. Ibid.
48. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, p. 64
49. Ibid., p. 56.
50. Ibid.
51. Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel (UNITA's clandestine radio station), 18 November 1991.
52. *The Washington Post*, 11 April 1992, p. A14.
53. Ibid.
54. Inter Press Service, 26 August 1992.
55. Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA) is UNITA's armed wing.
56. Richard Cornwell and Jakkie Potgieter, "Angola: Endgame or Stalemate," *ISS (South Africa) Papers*, 30 (April 1998), p. 9.
57. Ibid., p. 11.
58. *The Washington Post*, 2 August 1997, p. A1.
59. The United States, Russia and Portugal participated in the talks as observers.
60. Under the terms of the Lusaka Protocol, signed on 22 November 1994, UNITA would be awarded four ministerial portfolios, seven vice-ministerial portfolios, six ambassadorial positions, three provincial governorships, five deputy-governorships, 30 district administrator positions, and 35 deputy district administrator positions.
61. Christine M. Knudsen and I. William Zartman, "The Large Small War in Angola," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 541 (September 1995), p. 141.
62. Eugenio Manuvakola, UNITA's General Secretary, US Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, AFR-94-223, 18 November 1994, p. 24.
63. UNAVEM III was established by the UNSC Resolution 976/95 of 8 February 1995 to implement the Lusaka Protocol. Previous UN missions in Angola, UNAVEM I and II, were responsible for the verification of the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and the implementation of the 1991-92 peace process respectively.

64. UNAVEM III included 7,000 peacekeeping troops, 350 military observers and 260 police observers.

65. The expanded UNAVEM III mandate involved direct responsibility for the implementation of the accord, including its key military provisions of managing quartering areas and disarming UNITA troops.

66. Some of the key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol were: a ceasefire; disengagement of troops; confinement of UNITA troops to quartering areas under UN control; handover of all UNITA's weapons to the UN; resumption and completion of the integration of UNITA troops into the national army; demobilization of surplus troops; disarming of civilians; participation of UNITA in a government of national unity; holding of the second round of presidential elections postponed since 1992 once the UN declared that appropriate conditions were in place.

67. At the height of its operations in Angola, the UN was spending about \$1 million a day on UNAVEM III.

68. Further attesting to its military strength, UNITA went as far as sending some of its best troops into Congo (former Zaire) in a desperate and failed attempt to prevent Mobutu's fall from power.

69. Ross Herbert, "All-out War Looms Again in Angola," *Saturday Star*, (Johannesburg), 25 July 1998, p. 13.

70. As noted above, Savimbi had made one last, desperate attempt to save his old ally in Congo by sending some of his best troops to fight alongside Mobutu's inept army. Even Savimbi, however, underestimated the depth of regime decay in the former Zaire, making Mobutu unsalvageable.

71. Herbert, "All-out War," p. 13.

72. On 13 August 1997, forty-eight hours before the UNSC was expected to impose crippling sanctions on UNITA, further tightening the ban on the sale of arms and fuel, and additional restrictions on travel and banking abroad, Savimbi offered to give up all territory still under UNITA control by November 1997 in exchange for allowing his radio station to broadcast throughout Angola. See *The Washington Post*, 13 August 1997, p. A17.

73. The UNSC Resolution 976 established a two-year time frame to complete UNAVEM III's mandate. On 30 July 1997, Security Council Resolution 1113/97 established MONUA (United Nations Observer Mission in Angola) to replace UNAVEM III. MONUA will include 625 unarmed military observers.

74. *The Washington Post*, 12 August 1997, p. A14.

75. The exception has been the oil sector. Multinational oil companies' involvement has ensured continuing growth in this sector.

76. World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989), p. 60.

77. Ibid.