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THE CASES *FOR* AND *AGAINST* THEOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO BUSINESS ETHICS

Robert C. TRUNDLE, Jr

RÉSUMÉ. — Un plaidoyer philosophique contre l'approche philosophique en éthique des affaires pourrait prendre la forme du dilemme suivant. Ou bien la théologie épouse la rationalité de personnes d'affaires, auquel cas elle abandonne la croyance religieuse, ou bien elle n'épouse pas une telle rationalité, auquel cas elle ne contribue pas vraiment à l'éthique des affaires. L'une ou l'autre prémisse doit l'emporter. Soit dès lors que la théologie abandonne la croyance religieuse, soit qu'elle ne contribue pas vraiment à l'éthique des affaires. Le plaidoyer en faveur de la théologie n'attaque toutefois pas, comme on l'a allégué, toute philosophie; il soutient qu'un tel dilemme présuppose dogmatiquement une conception trop rationnelle de la nature humaine. D'autre part, l'efficacité continue de la théologie quant à l'évaluation morale et quant à la motivation des personnes d'affaires est due, *pari passu*, au fait qu'elle reflète la nature morale des personnes.

SUMMARY. — A philosophical case against theology might consist of a constructive dilemma: If theology embraces a rationality of businesspersons, then it relinquishes religious belief, and if theology does not embrace such a rationality, then it does not properly contribute to business ethics. Either the first or second antecedent obtains. Therefore, theology relinquishes religious belief or does not properly contribute to business ethics. The case for theology does not, as has been alleged, attack all philosophy by arguing that this dilemma dogmatically presupposes an overly rational conception of human nature. Moreover, theology's perennial effectiveness in morally evaluating businesspersons proceeds *pari passu* with its reflecting a moral nature of persons.

What I propose to examine is a serious controversy concerning whether Christian theology can make any contributions to the field of business ethics¹. I shall

1. See, for example, Richard T. DE GEORGE'S "Theological Ethics and Business Ethics", *Journal of Business*

not only argue that it can but that it distinctively relates to businesspersons in a manner unavailable to strictly secular ethics. Let me explicate the case for theological approaches to business ethics after articulating a case against it.

1. THE CASE AGAINST THEOLOGY

The positivistic criticism, by secular philosophers, that nothing counts for or against religious belief might be transposed into a case against theology in business ethics: if a theological approach relies on faith, belief in God, and revelation, then it cannot be evaluated by experience or reason; if it relies on reason or experience, then it embraces a secular philosophical approach to business ethics. In the former case a theological approach fails to rationally contribute to the field of business ethics. In the latter case a theological approach, while rational, does not distinctively contribute to the field.

These alternatives regarding a theological approach being distinctive but lacking rationality or being rational but lacking distinctiveness are, for example, tacitly affirmed by Professor Richard T. De George:

The philosopher in business ethics starts from the assumption that he can deal with moral issues in business independently of any consideration of God's existence or of revelation. He attempts to work on the basis of *reason and experience alone* ... theologians can of course argue strictly from reason. But unless a theological argument has a theological premise, it is not clear what distinguishes it as a *theological* argument or conclusion.²

The connection of reason and experience alone with a *rationality* peculiar to philosophy and not theology is evident in De George's further assertion: "if one accepts the distinction between philosophy and theology, then the claim that in secular society ... one may assume *rationality* but not necessarily religious faith does not seem to be an exceptional claim."³ And it seems clear that this claim reflects the view of other

Ethics 5, 1986, pp. 421-432; Oliver WILLIAM's "Can Business Ethics Be Theological? What Athens Can Learn from Jerusalem", *Journal of Business Ethics* 5, 1986, pp. 473-484; and Robert TRUNDLE's "Is There Any Ethics in Business Ethics?", *Journal of Business Ethics* 8, 1989, pp. 261-269.

2. DE GEORGE, "Theological Ethics...", pp. 424-425, my emphasis. Understanding De George's assertions as generally reflective of many Anglo-American philosophers seems reasonable in view of the latter typically appealing to reason and experience in deontological and consequentialist theories. His assertions are particularly instructive for my purposes since he is a pioneer in the field of business ethics and representative, in some relevant respects, of the American philosophical community. He is University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Courtesy Professor of Business Administration at the University of Kansas as well as President-Elect of the American Philosophical Association (Central Division).
3. DE GEORGE, "There is Ethics in Business Ethics; But There's More As Well", *Journal of Business Ethics* 8, p. 338, my emphasis. While De George is not a positivist in virtue of not rejecting theology or ethics as meaningless, he does reflect a positivistic-like *concern* for an unqualified cognitive objectivity and *avoidance* of reference to unverifiable metaphysics. When he does *tacitly* acknowledge metaphysics in terms of controversial "presuppositions" of ethical theories on page 338 in response to me ("Is There Any Ethics in Business Ethics?"), he does not re-establish the cognitive objectivity he seeks. He either surreptitiously shifts to a "common rationality" that philosophers and businesspersons share *or* says that "when they [philosophers] do prescribe or make moral judgments, their statements should be judged in light of the reasons they advance" (p. 339). But if a "common rationality" did not involve metaphysics by virtue of involving mere reasoning or analysis, it is difficult to see why theologians could not employ such reasoning

philosophers who associate rationality with the use of reason and experience to, among other things, verify or determine the truth of moral claims. How, after all, could the truth or correctness of moral claims be *cognitively* determined in any other way?

If there is no other way, it is plausible to use De George's assertion, "we [philosophers] can tell whether the moral intuition of any individual or of our community are correct"⁴, for morally embracing a variety of virtues, principles, obligations, and behavior in business: Platonic-like virtues of producing quality products, being concerned for corporate constituencies, and respecting persons with whom corporations deal — being known to be virtuous in terms of our *rational natures* as human beings⁵; managerial pursuit of profit being *rationally* grounded on a "Physical Possibility Principle" wherein corporate managers, while being morally obligated to do certain things they can, cannot be obligated to do what they cannot, *e.g.* not pursue profit⁶; ethical corporate behavior being linked to *experientially* good consequences such as industry credibility or company security⁷; and various models of action being ethical in virtue of compliance with them engendering verifiable individual or collective good⁸. Part of the ostensive effectiveness of prescribing such actions, obligations, principles, or virtues — together with analyses endemic to them — is that they generally address the cognitive capacities of all persons including businesspersons.

1. *The Irrelevance of Theology*

Thus, whether businesspersons believe in God or not, they may rationally affirm various principles or consequences rendered by compliance with them including manufacturing safe products, enhancing environmental preservation, promoting managerial respect for the personhood of employees and so forth. Further, such principles or consequences may be rationally weighed against other principles or consequences. Hence, for example, managerial respect for the intrinsic worth of employees might be exercised in terms of "sensitive" policies regarding overtime work or company transfers of employees. But compliance with this policy might yield pejorative consequences such as threatening a company's market competitiveness. Such competitiveness is a morally relevant consideration since its diminishment may culminate in layoffs which themselves render further morally relevant events including marital conflicts, alcoholism, poverty, economically depressing effects on a geographical local-

or analysis as well. And if philosophers advanced "reasons" for moral truth claims, it is hard to see how this could be done independently of ethical theories whose metaphysical presuppositions would be controversial.

4. DE GEORGE, "Replies and Reflections on Theology and Business Ethics", *Journal of Business Ethics* 5, 1986, p. 522.
5. Cf., for example, Lisa H. NEWTON's "The Internal Morality of the Corporation", *Journal of Business Ethics* 5, 1986, pp. 249-258.
6. Cf., for example, John R. DANLEY's "'Ought' Implies 'Can', or, The Moral Relevance of a Theory of the Firm", *Journal of Business Ethics* 7, 1988, pp. 23-28.
7. Cf., for example, Richard H. GUERRETTE's "Corporate Ethical Consulting: Developing Managerial Strategies for Corporate Ethics", *Journal of Business Ethics* 7, 1988, pp. 373-380.
8. Cf., for example, Gerald BAXTER's and Charles RARICK's "The Manager as Kierkegaard's 'Knight of Faith': Linking Ethical Thought and Action", *Journal of Business Ethics* 8, 1989, pp. 399-406.

ity, and a host of problems well known to corporate and political officials. The rational consideration of such consequences may therefore weaken or qualify various principles or obligations that businesspersons *know to be* “right things to do for their own sake”.

But whether the focus is on right things to do for their own sake (deontological ethics), or morally desirable consequences (consequentialist ethics), or on a mixture of the two, secular ethical approaches do not rely on varying religious beliefs or faith. Indeed, it might be argued that the religious faith of businesspersons, while sensitizing them to morally desirable consequences or obligations, might positively conflict with such obligations or consequences.

2. *The Conflict of Theology with Moral Reason*

Thus, if a Christian CEO respects the intrinsic worth of employees in terms of his or her commitment to the “Golden Rule of Jesus”, and if loving one’s neighbor as oneself fulfills the laws of the prophets, then it would be a forgone conclusion that secular moral laws should be disregarded when they obviate Christian charity or love. This, for instance, would be a serious defect of a theological approach if a common sense *raison d’être* of business was to yield profit. For if yielding profit conflicted with charitable or unburdensome workloads, then, in virtue of supporting such workloads and disregarding reduced competitiveness, the Christian CEO could not efficiently pursue an intrinsic end of business itself.

The objection that the Christian CEO as well as the secular CEO could weigh the immorality of burdensome workloads against the immorality of decreased competitiveness, overlooks the fact, it might be argued, that Christian love is not an abstract love for a future humanity. Rather it is an immediate and concrete love for the individual employee at hand: the Christian is to “take up the cross” *today* — not tomorrow. The Christian CEO cannot justify the means by the end but rather must stress the means in terms of being charitable towards the individual employee in the *here and now*.

Further, although this example concerns the consequentialist’s attention to morally desirable ends including competitiveness and profit, the supposed defect of a theological approach might be related to deontology *per se* as well. For a deontological obligation of respecting the intrinsic worth of persons is, in secular philosophy — from the Platonic-Aristotelian emphasis on the *rational psyche* to Kant’s Rational Faculty —, a respect for the rationality of persons. It is their rationality that enables them to universally grasp obligations or moral reasons, and moral reasons owe their status as reasons to our nature as rational beings⁹. But, it might be argued, loving one’s neighbor as oneself is loving them even if they are mentally retarded or otherwise intellectually deficient. Thus, Christian charity might invoke less than rational if not irrational obligations to handicapped or unproductive employees who intrinsically lack the rational capacity for behaving morally in the context of business.

9. See Michael PHILIPS’ “Weighing Moral Reasons”, *Mind* XCVI, 1987, p. 368.

The rejoinder by theologians that a deontological stress on rational obligations might be equally irrational would, for secular philosophers, be mistaken. For the counter-claim would ignore the fact that secular ethics traditionally equates rationality with morality. This means not only that behaving morally is behaving rationally but that it is rational to construe obligations differently in different contexts. Thus, for example, the obligation to respect the intrinsic self-worth of employees might be interpreted in terms of not exploiting *productive* employees who have moral worth precisely in virtue of their having rational natures.

It is noteworthy that secular approaches to business ethics are not only influenced by general ethical theory but by a broader metaphysics as well. It is important to note a broader metaphysics because the latter explains much secular philosophical indifference or hostility to religion in general and to theological approaches to business ethics in particular. Hence, before I conclude the case against theological approaches, let me briefly discuss how a prevalent metaphysical realism is linked to an equation of rationality and morality.

3. *Moral Reason and Metaphysics: The Influence of Science*

The notion that behaving morally is behaving rationally and vice versa proceeds *pari passu* with a metaphysical realism. Such a realism holds that rational laws or principles, whether of science or morality, “correspond to” or “mirror” the rationality of nature and human nature alike. In the case of scientific realism, following Aristotelian physics and an Enlightenment influenced by Copernicus and Newton, science is a *paradigm* knowledge-yielding enterprise that commits one to a realist construal of knowledge wherein truths are obtained about the real physical, psychological, and social world. The unqualified nature of this view is underscored by the fact that ethical theories traditionally arose from metaphysics and, as noted by Frederick Suppe¹⁰, “to an overwhelming degree the history of epistemology (and metaphysics) is the history of the philosophy of science — although histories of philosophy tend to give scant

10. Cf. *The Structure of Scientific Theories*, ed. F. Suppe. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979, p. 716. SUPPE notes that “Frederick Copleston does tend to cover the scientific influences and connections in his *A History of Philosophy* [1946-65]... John Losee’s *A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* [1972] does have the merit of correctly viewing the history of metaphysics and epistemology as being in large part the history of philosophy of science. W.T. Jones, *History of Modern Philosophy* [1952], also has the merit of stressing the connections between developments in science and the history of philosophy, although he ultimately underplays the connection. In *Knowledge and Society* [1974], Arnold Levison shows how a number of methodological issues in the philosophy of social science (for example, the holistic vs. reductionistic controversies) arise out of the history of modern philosophy. Despite a few works such as these which are aware of the intimate genetic connections between the history of science and the history of epistemology and metaphysics, contemporary philosophical accounts of the history of philosophy seriously distort matters as a result of paying inadequate attention to such connections...”. Such connections are also evident in Abraham EDEL’s “Romanell Lecture” (*Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*, 1987, pp. 823-840), which grounds changing ethical conceptions on changing scientific theories; E.M. ADAMS’ “The Accountability of Religious Discourse” (*International Journal of Religion*, 1985, pp. 3-17) where religious discourse is made “accountable” to scientific discourse via a “tolerant verification” principle; and Thomas O’DEA’s “Religion in the Year 2000” (*Philosophy Looks to the Future*, 1985, p. 545) in which science has tended to consign nonscientific or nonmathematical thought to second-class importance in our culture.

attention to this fact". Scientific *realism is rational*¹¹ since the denial of realism would prima facie render truth relative to possibly inconsistent and subjective specifications concerning what reality is really like.

The metaphysical analogue of scientific realism is an ethical realism in which moral truth-claims are not relative to possibly conflicting construals but are *objective specifications* of how rational persons ought to behave¹². The denial of ethical realism would result in equally irrational assessments of a given ethical claim being both true and false. Moreover, since there is a "correspondence" between scientific as well as ethical truth-claims and nature or the behavior of human beings, to behave in accordance with descriptive or prescriptive laws is to behave in a manner which incurs "success": in science the successful predictions or manipulations of phenomena; in ethics, say, the successful balance of the various parts of the soul and state (Plato and Aristotle) or the success of achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number of persons (utilitarianism).

Before summarizing the case against theology, it is only fair to note *degrees* of scientific influence on metaphysics, since the Enlightenment. On the one hand, the scientific revolution tended to foster antagonism towards ancient and medieval (teleological and theological) metaphysics. The development of Logical Positivism was only one among several philosophical movements which rejected metaphysics as well as ethical objectivity. On the other hand, while a sort of positivistic view towards physical nature was generally retained by other Anglo-American philosophers, they generally distinguished between minds (souls or spirits) and the rest of the physical universe. Thus, although the physical universe was explicated through science, rational *minds* might grasp the truths of physics as well as morality and theology. But, while Kant sought to "save" theology and morality from Hume's radical empiricism by distinguishing between Noumena and Phenomena, natural science eventuated into an epistemic ideal by virtue of its apparent reliance on universal reason and experience alone.

It is beyond my scope to expand upon the association of *reason* with logic and mathematics (logical axiomatization of theories) and the association of *experience* with observation terms or statements. But I draw attention to the ubiquitous influence of a positivistic verification principle which, while formulated for science, held that all statements, on pain of being *nonsense*, must be "verifiably" true (false) in terms of logical analysis or empirical testing. Notwithstanding "weak" and "strong" construals of verification, Professor Hilary Putnam, among others, has noted a tendency by nonpositivist philosophers (and others in society generally) to employ verification outside science:

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11. Cf. W.H. NEWTON-SMITH's *The Rationality of Science*. Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. Newton-Smith, in view of epistemic problems endemic to scientific realism, argues for a "weak" rational realism which acknowledge reliance on metaphysics.
 12. See, for example, M.A. GONSALVE's classic and comprehensive *Faith's Right and Reason*, 9th Edition. Columbus, Ohio, Merrill Publishing, 1989, 611 pages. Gonsalve compares ethics to empirical science and refers to *rules of reason* by which "moral convictions can be shown to be true or false" (pp. 12-13).

The forms of "verification" allowed by the logical positivists are forms which have been *institutionalized* by modern society. What can be "verified" in the positivist sense can be verified to be correct (in a non-philosophical or pre-philosophical sense of "correct"), or to be probably correct, or to be highly successful science, as the case may be; and the public recognition of the correctness, or the probable correctness, or the "highly successful scientific theory" *status*, exemplifies and reinforces *images* of knowledge and *norms* of reasonableness maintained by culture.¹³

Thus, although the *original* notion of verification was not the one publicly institutionalized, "under the urgings of Neurath, Carnap soon shifted to a more public, more 'intersubjective' conception of verification"¹⁴. This conception emphasized reason and experience, or a mere "rationality" (surreptitiously connected with a "successful scientific theory status") in speaking or arguing about, among other things, ethics as well as business ethics. In this manner those who are *not* Logical Positivists, including many philosophers and laypersons alike, have tended to apply positivistic or scientific-like notions of rationality and success to ethics. But secular ethics seems universally and rationally acceptable in a manner unavailable to religious belief. For such belief appeals, not to reason or success *per se*, but to faith.

4. Summary

Thus, the case for secular philosophical approaches to business ethics is that, besides their putative success, they appeal to a universal and objective rationality of businesspersons in a manner similar to an epistemic ideal of science¹⁵. The case against theological approaches is that, in addition to their lack of success, they appeal to subjective and "unverifiable" beliefs which not all businesspersons share:

Since the philosopher wishes to address all people willing to reason, whatever their religious beliefs and independent of those beliefs, the philosopher assumes that the two [philosophers and theologians] are intentionally either addressing different audiences or addressing partially overlapping audiences in different ways. It seems appropriate to the philosopher that theologians address members of their own religion.¹⁶

The logical point is that philosophers, whether Aristotelians, Kantians (following Kant's "Copernican Revolution"), utilitarians (following Bentham's scientific calculus), or otherwise, share a common notion of rationality with businesspersons whatever their religious beliefs. Indeed, philosophers are influenced by or tacitly embrace the same rationality and realism engendered by science that, among other things, superseded notions of "up" (heaven) and "down" (hell) with the isotropic or homogeneous notions of space endemic to Newtonian mechanics or Einstein's theory of relativity.

13. H. PUTNAM, "Philosophers and Human Understanding", *Scientific Understanding*, Ed. A.F. Heath. London, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 100, my emphasis.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

15. See my criticism of scientific realism as an epistemic paradigm in "Religious Belief and Scientific Weltanschauungen", *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 45, 1989, pp. 405-422.

16. DE GEORGE, "Theological Ethics...", p. 424.

If theologians appeal to such a realism or rationalism, then, besides holding inconsistent ontologies, they contribute nothing distinctive to business ethics. If they contribute something distinctive in virtue of appealing to religious belief, then they are not properly addressing the business world. But the field of business ethics addresses the business world. Therefore the business world and *a fortiori* business ethics are not proper to theological approaches to business ethics.

II. THE CASE FOR THEOLOGY

Although secular philosophers and businesspersons may not share religious belief, it is held in the *New Testament* that secular persons (“gentiles”) have the law of God “written in their hearts”. Further, it is said that their “conscience bears witness” together with that law so that their thoughts will accuse or defend them (*Romans* 2:15, 16). Hence, while secular businesspersons may not believe in revelation or the Bible, a theological approach that appeals to the Bible will, for the theologian, be relevant to secular businesspersons. And thus, while secular philosophers might think that theological approaches are relevant only to Christian businesspersons, it is to all businesspersons to which the theological approach applies.

Why should theologians or Christian philosophers ignore their own beliefs in favor of secular philosophers who *do not* ignore their own beliefs? The theologian’s appeal to his or her beliefs is no more circular than the secular philosopher’s appeal to his or her beliefs¹⁷. Thus it is commonly supposed that theologians argue as follows: the Bible is true because it is divinely inspired, and we know it is divinely inspired since the Bible says so and the Bible is true. But supposing that theologians argue this way is no more viable than supposing that utilitarians argue as follows: The theory of utilitarianism is true because the principle of utility is empirically verifiable, and we know that this principle is verifiable since utilitarianism posits this and the theory of utilitarianism is true. Notwithstanding the fact that empirical verification is ascribed of the principle and divine inspiration is attributed to the Bible, the belief that utilitarianism is true has no more epistemic significance than belief in the Bible. The Bible, at least, makes no pretension to empirically verifying that what persons *ought* to desire (pleasure) is what they *in fact* desire. And the fact is that philosophers and businesspersons will no more universally affirm pleasure as being morally desirable than they will universally affirm the divine inspiration of the Bible. But the theologian’s belief in the Bible and subsequently that Biblical standards of conduct are reflected

17. This does not imply that all theologians have the same theology or that all philosophers have the same philosophy. Philosophy and theology lend themselves to different views — including different approaches to business ethics. At the same time, I am drawing attention to many secular philosophers who misguidedly assume that their beliefs are universally rational; rational in a manner that permits verification-like claims of truth. Such a misguided assumption is alluded to by, among others, Michael PHILIPS’ “Weighing Moral Reasons”, *Mind* XCVI, 1987, pp. 367-375. Thus, Philips refers to many influential philosophers, including Kurt Baier, David Ross, John Rawls, and Jonathan Bennett, who believe that moral *reasons* are applicable *a priori* in all contexts. But the fact is, says Philips, that such philosophers must “appeal to intuitions on a case by case basis” (p. 373). And Philips notes that this often results in *ad hominem* rather than rational argument.

in the consciences of disbelievers does, nevertheless, *rationally* warrant the theologian's attention to disbelieving businesspersons.

1. *The Facade of Scientific Rationality*

It is entirely forgotten by secular philosophers that the "rational" criticism that nothing counts for or against religious belief belies a so-called verification principle in which meaningful truth-claims must be empirically verifiable or falsifiable — or at least have empirical data possibly count for or against them. Ironically, however, reliance on a strong or weak verification principle is reminiscent of the very religious belief it is misused to reject: Christ admonished the pharisees (*Luke 7:33*) precisely because nothing would count for or against their *disbelief*: John the Baptist *was* austere and Jesus *was not* austere — consorting with sinners and drinking wine.

Besides the fact that a verification principle would *itself* be meaningless in virtue of no empirical data counting for or against *it*, the admonishment of Christ reminds us that nothing will count for or against the disbelief of secular philosophers. It reminds business ethicists that belief in revelation or God is no less or more rational than disbelief. It reminds some secular members of an academic community, *deceived by an "epistemic log" in their own eye*, that a verification principle is proper to a realism in science and not *ceteris paribus* to a realism in ethics or religion.

The very thesis of scientific realism is itself an unverifiable metaphysical thesis. For, by the logic of *implication*, the empirical success of theories in making true predictions (*implicates*) does not imply or verify the truth of the theories (*implicans*). The implicit view of scientific realism as an unqualified epistemic ideal, behind much of the antagonism towards theology, is influenced by a pseudo-rationality of the Enlightenment which had de Holbach's words as its dictum: "man is unhappy because he is ignorant of nature" (*Système de la nature*, 1770). The post-enlightened scholar with the Ph.D., typically having pride in his or her knowledge — which the Bible calls the "wisdom of men" that God makes foolish when one relies totally on it—, tends to reject what cannot be articulated through human reason.

What, however, would be the point of asserting, as has been done¹⁸, that a "logical point" is that philosophers give *reasons* which do not require religious belief? Could such *reasons*, in ethics or business ethics, appeal to ethical beliefs whose truth could be determined logically or empirically? Either secular ethics in business appeals to obligations or principles whose truth can be empirically or logically determined or it does not. If it does not, then how are such beliefs more rational than religious beliefs? If such secular ethical beliefs can be logically or empirically assessed, how can this be so unless they are trivially true or assert what *is the case* as opposed to what *ought to be the case* — in which case they make no moral claims about business? If the *reasoning* of secular business ethicists involves no moral claims but rather merely articulates morally relevant facts or analyzes how moral terms are used, why cannot theologians engage in this reasoning as well?

18. DE GEORGE, "There is Ethics in Business Ethics...", p. 339.

Such reasoning would no more render less theological the approaches of Christian business ethics than such reasoning would render less philosophical the approaches of secular business ethics. Hence the notion that theologians could only appeal to a reasoning characteristic of philosophy on pain of making no distinctive contribution to business ethics is as *absurd* as the notion that philosophers could only appeal to a reasoning characteristic of theology on pain of philosophy making no distinctive contribution!

2. *The Truth About Metaphysics*

The fact is that the distinctive contributions of secular and theological ethics rest alike, at a philosophical level, not on reason *per se* but on various truth-valueless metaphysical assumptions. Such assumptions for secular ethics are typically of the sort that the good consists in the greatest happiness of the greatest number of persons, or that virtue is performing one's function well, or that the good is only unqualifiedly a goodwill.

Assumptions concerning goodwill, virtuous functions, or a principle of utility are no more derived from experience *a posteriori* or known by human reason *analytically* than the assumptions of theology regarding God's existence, supernatural virtues of hope, faith, and love, or natural virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. Rather, the metaphysics of theological and secular ethics is assumed *a priori* for the moral interpretation of experience.

Thus, although it has been alleged, by Professor De George¹⁹, that my analysis is a broadside attack on philosophy in general and ethics in particular, it is in reality a critical exegesis of philosophy in the very tradition of Hume and Kant. But Hume's criticism of dogmatic *a priori* reason and Kant's relegation of God to a rational concept but unknowable noumenon did themselves engender theological skepticism and a rational theology respectively. It is beyond my purpose to elaborate upon the implications for contemporary philosophy, but I note that such skepticism and rationalism, which influenced the Enlightenment, exceeded what was warranted by their critical thought: such thought strictly culminated in the recognition that metaphysical propositions, being neither *analytic* nor *a posteriori*, were truth-valueless *synthetic a priori* propositions. The assertions that theological claims — being unknowable through logical analysis or sense experience — were either illegitimate ideas or claims based on unknowable noumena, were themselves metaphysical assertions. Hence my discussion is not only *not* a broadside attack on philosophy but a defense against implicit or explicit metaphysical attacks on traditional theology as well.

3. *The Distinctiveness of Theological Metaphysics*

What, however, is truly distinctive about theological metaphysics is twofold. First, it may not only be consistent with secular ethics but may positively embrace it. Second,

19. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

theological ethics may add an ethical ingredient to secular ethics in terms of morally relevant feelings. Let me expand upon such feelings after briefly addressing how theology embraces secular ethics.

Secular ethics may be embraced by the Christian CEO, for example, who contemplates hiring and training handicapped persons. Deontology is relevant to underscoring and articulating the Christian CEO's sense of duty to aid disadvantaged persons. Consequentialism draws attention to morally relevant considerations including expenses which might endanger the corporation's financial integrity, the obvious good in harnessing otherwise lost productivity, and favorable public relations that would increase sales. (Consideration of increased sales need not be merely interpreted egoistically since they might neutralize expenses and promote employee security.)

Such considerations are instructive for indicating the relevance of theology as well as possibly different functions of deontological and consequentialist reasoning. For if beneficial consequences of the "handicapped program" are calculated to outweigh harmful consequences, a decision to institute the program is unproblematic. Deontology, however, is significant both for making the CEO *cognizant* of a duty to aid the disabled in the first place and for shifting moral weight in favor of the program if the difference between harmful and beneficial consequences is negligible. Hence *consequentialism in itself* might disregard moral considerations as well as hedge on moral practices when the consequences have no significantly calculable advantage. But, in the absence of calculating fiscal advantages, *deontology in itself* renders irresponsible the CEO's institution of any morally relevant program, policy, or course of action.

4. *Morality Without Theology*

The relevance of theology is that it inextricably embraces both deontology and consequentialism while addressing morally relevant desires to initiate morally desirable courses of action, policies, or programs. Such programs, policies, or actions in secular ethics tend to be assessed in mutually exclusive ways: in terms of right things to do for their own sake which are logically independent of their affect on success in business or in terms of their affect on success in business. While the latter "pro-business" alternative implicitly appeals to the businessperson's brute self-interest, neither alternative explicitly addresses *desiring* what is morally desirable. Further, if what is morally desirable *in business* cannot be disentangled from a purpose indigenous to business, namely the maximization of profit, then the moral principles or duties of the deontologist must be relative to that primordial purpose of business. This generally leaves the CEO, in the context of business, with a *fundamental* duty to stockholders and a board of directors for long-term maximization of profit, as Edward McSweeney noted in *Business Week*²⁰. And this coupled with Philosophy Professor John Danley's reminder that "a *serious case* can be made that corporations [by virtue of their very natures]

20. Edward MCSWEENEY, "A Score Card for Rating Management", *Business Week*, June 4, 1974, pp. 12-15. From F. D. Sturdivant's *The Corporate Social Challenge*. Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1985, pp. 74-78.

can do nothing other than maximize profit”²¹ challenges much of deontology and consequentialism in business ethics.

This seemingly strong statement is not intended to deny that consequentialism and deontology are relevant to business ethics within the parameters of businesses pursuing profit — a purpose intrinsic to business. Rather, the words “serious case” might be taken to underscore the fact that it is reasonable to expect, without surprise or great moral blame, that *any person* who was a corporate manager would tend to “minimize” or ignore moral principles that conflicted with maximization of profit. The question is how to make corporate managers acknowledge such principles in the relevant cases. On the assumption that corporate managers are not uniquely a narrow-minded or “greedy bunch” but rather reflect a common rationality that persons generally share, the question ensues regarding whether *anyone* in their circumstances would acknowledge and act upon such principles when the latter conflicted with the pursuit of profit.

5. *If Moral Philosophers Were in Corporations...*

If moral philosophers were in corporations, would it be reasonable to suppose that corporate behavior would be more moral? While the main objective of corporations is the self-interested pursuit of profit, the central mission of universities is the disinterested pursuit of truth. Is it reasonable to suppose that moral philosophers *in business* would more disinterestedly or morally pursue profit than businesspersons in business? The frequently ignored fact is that philosophers *in universities* may have as much apparent need for “outside” regulation to curb their strident pursuit of tenure, promotion, power, and exploitation of underpaid part-time faculty as corporate managers have an evident need for governmental regulation to restrain their self-seeking pursuit of short-term profit, domination of markets, and worker exploitation. Thus, the moral philosopher in business ethics might readily see the “speck” in the eye of the corporate manager but fail to see the “log” in his or her own eye²². This is not a *Tu Quoque* (“You Too”) argument which ignores the need for ethics in both universities and corporations. Rather it draws attention to the fact that mere reason and experience alone are easily subverted for rationalizing self-interest — more insidious in universities than in corporations where brute self-interest of corporate managers is openly acknowledged but “ideally” coordinated with strategic corporate goals. (This does not imply that pursuit of careers or self-interest in universities is necessarily immoral or inconsistent with pursuit of truth but rather that pursuit of truth has often

21. DANLEY, “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’...”, p. 26. My emphasis.

22. This criticism of philosophers in universities might seem to reflect a “Holier Than Thou” attitude. It might also be objected that the author should examine ecclesiastical institutions for moral shortcomings as well. It may be noted in response that, while many Christians are hypocritical or sinful, human sinfulness and the need for redemption are traditional doctrines of the church. Thus, besides the fact that the author is not “moralizing” without recognizing his or the church’s shortcomings, he is drawing attention to secular moral philosophers who tend to base morality on reason. One is reminded of Kierkegaard who, although keenly cognizant of his own shortcomings, noted that *rational* philosophers feel *guilt* and not *irrational* when they do wrong.

been emphasized at the expense of admitting self-interest or its abuse. Such abuse has been compounded, on some occasions, by anti-business agendas to “raise our consciousness” to evils of self-interest while promoting the self-interest of selected persons *in business* as well as in universities.)

6. *Corporate Morality Through Politics: An Alternative?*

Does the putative failure of business to regulate itself suggest that the pursuit of self-interest by corporate managers should be regulated by government? Although Danley opts for “political regulation” in place of enrolling corporate managers in business ethics, the question ensues concerning whether corporate morality would be any more enhanced by politics. Consider how politics exacerbates the abstractness of secular ethics and belies the need for attention to individuals and morally relevant feelings addressed by theology.

Deontology, by emphasizing that business practices ought to be determined a priori in virtue of rational duties or obligations, would lend itself prima facie to governmental intervention. Consequentialism, by stressing the obvious success of corporate capitalism — made more ubiquitous by recent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union —, would support a free or nearly free market. While deontology is more orientated towards liberal political agenda, consequentialism is more attuned to conservative political agenda.

Liberals typically argue that the interests of businesspersons, in addition to reflecting craftsmen-like appetites in Plato’s *Republic*, enhances the wealth of corporate officials. Corporate wealth goes hand in hand with self-seeking lobbies, monopolies, worker exploitation, and tax-funded defense contracts which increase international tension. Conservatives typically argue that governmental intervention stifles a pure or nearly pure capitalism in which creative solutions, stimulated by competition, would otherwise resolve such morally relevant problems as pollution, employee concerns for insurance or retirement, and the difficulties of poverty and unemployment²³.

The questionableness of Danley’s option is augmented by the contemporary “politicalization” of issues in the university²⁴ as well as by the most perfunctory glance at conflicts between “pragmatic” conservatives and more “idealistic” liberals. Such political conflicts reflect the fact that different construals of political regulation will

23. See Professor Ralph CLARK’s forthcoming book, *Business Ethics and Business Success*, for a connection between consequentialism and deontology as well as for a “pro-business” approach that embraces a pure or nearly pure capitalism.

24. See Sydney HOOK’s 60th anniversary address in *Proceedings And Addresses Of The American Philosophical Association* 60, 1987, pp. 511-513: “One of the greatest dangers I foresee to freedom ... is the growing politicalization of the University. This began in the mid-sixties... In those years ... what had been regarded as citadels of reason were seriously breached by forces of violence that undermined freedom of research, freedom to teach, freedom to listen, freedom to learn.” Also consider Richard RORTY’s remark in his public address at George Mason University, March 1, 1989: “A new American cultural Left has come into being made of deconstructionists, new historicists, people in gender studies, ethnic studies, media studies, a few left-over Marxists, and so on. This Left would like to use the English, French, and Comparative Literature Departments of the universities as staging areas for political action.”

not empirically or rationally resolve moral dilemmas. Each political faction will tend to interpret a priori the marketplace experience through Kantian-like metaphysical “lenses”. The difficulty is that such “lenses”, reminiscent of Kant’s *a priori cognition*, are essentially abstract and cognitive.

7. *Returning to Theological Metaphysics*

The metaphysical “lenses” of theology, by contrast, are neither essentially cognitive nor restricted to politics. While theological ethics can be articulated metaphysically, it is not to a chimera of rational metaphysics to which theologians appeal. Although the Christian CEO has faith, he or she has a primordial relation to *love (agape)*. For, in Christian theology, all things including knowledge shall pass away except *love*. Such unconditional *love* for concrete individuals is not mere sentient feeling or even a state of mind (Happiness or *Eudaimonia*). Rather such *love* has *Being* in virtue of *God being love*: “God is love” (1 John 4:8) and love is God’s very essence or Being. The CEO who *loves* individuals in this manner *is in* God and God *is in* him or her (1 John 4:16).

Thus *love* rather than reason or experience alone affects the Christian CEO’s grasp of duties and morally relevant consequences. If Biblical standards of conduct are reflected in the consciences of businesspersons, then it is fundamentally conscience in the sense of their loving or not loving which triggers ethical decision-making in business. Hence, even if businesspersons do not believe in God or revelation, they still typically speak of their conscience, guilt, “having to look at themselves in the mirror”, and other morally relevant feelings. Such feelings are acknowledged, for example, by William L. Weiss, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Ameritech:

Conscience is a practical judgment about the morality of a concrete action or decision. Ultimately, this means that the corporation’s leadership must determine its value system and lead the management team to behavior that conforms to it. . . . It is clear to me that I cannot check my own value system at the door when I arrive at the office. . . . I translate my own behavior into *being willing to look into the mirror in the morning. . . there does result a corporate culture which effectively creates a corporate conscience*.²⁵

A theological approach to business ethics underscores the fact that without reference to conscience or other morally relevant feelings, there is nothing to prompt

25. William WEISS, “Minerva’s Owl: Building A Corporate Value System”, *Journal of Business Ethics* 5, 1986, p. 244. My emphasis. Reference to “conscience”, or “guilt”, or “love”, such as that by William Weiss, reflect moral elements that are more compatible with theology than secular philosophy. This begs for several clarifications. First, following a Socratic-Platonic paradigm, moral truth-claims about something, say “love”, obliged a definition of what “love” is. Although such a definition would be true only if it corresponded to an unchanging referent (Idea) which was knowable, theology identifies *love* with a God who passes human understanding. This is not a philosophical “cop-out” but rather an assumption which is at least as viable as that of a “Knowable Good”. At least theology makes explicit appeal to faith rather than to a chimera of knowledge. Second, theology neither implies a capitalistic ethos nor ignores criticism of it. For, among other things, theology reminds businesspersons that they are to love their competitors as well as enemies. Further, theology fosters recognition that while capitalism promotes some freedom and tolerance, it also engenders cold calculation and indifference to the unsuccessful and poor. (See, for example, Pope Paul II’s “Workers and Employment”, *The Pope Speaks* 33, 1988, pp. 293-296).

businesspersons *to be* moral. Will mere rational contemplation invoke them to be moral? What is rational is, in any case, relative *prima facie* to conflicting individual or cultural construals. Yet a corporate morality based on only *human feelings* is equally relative. And certainly for Weiss or other businesspersons, conscience is not reducible to mere subjective and changing feelings.

While feeling is not identical with *love*, it is not bifurcated from it either. When the Bible says that the "Word became flesh and lived for a while among us" (*John* 1:14), it gave a visible human dimension to unchanging and nonrelative manifestations of *love*: Christ, who was the Word made flesh or Son of God (*love*), wept over Lazarus' death, rejoiced at healing the handicapped, angrily drove out sellers and buyers in the temple, and had compassion for sick and hungry crowds. Such morally relevant feelings reflect the fact that *desiring* to help imperfect flesh and blood individuals together with *actually* helping them is the very manifestation of *love*.

The *love* embraced by the "private self" of the CEO is not separated from the CEO's "corporate self". Whatever corporate behavior conflicts with *love* is rejected and whatever reflects *love* is affirmed. The CEO can affirm consequentialism because *loving* others in the "here and now" involves doing what will really help them. It is not really helping the handicapped, for example, to institute a program which will diminish competitiveness or bankrupt a company. The company might increase morally desirable consequences by contributing tax-deductible money to charities, generating jobs, and manufacturing better goods at lower costs. The objection that these can be accomplished without *love* or conscience begs the very question concerning what will make businesspersons *desire* what is *morally desirable*.

CONCLUSION

Morally relevant feelings such as *love*, conscience, and guilt are not explicable in terms of sentient experience alone. Rather such experience will tend to be assessed *a priori* by philosophers in terms of different ethical theories that they understand as reasonable or rational. Such supposedly rational theories, however, must have recourse to the very morally relevant feelings that are traditionally disregarded. Businesspersons do not typically disregard such feelings and, generally, in virtue of a capitalistic ethos devoid of ideology or philosophy *per se*, do not ethically assess business practices in an *a priori* manner.

Business codes of conduct do not counter this claim. For such codes traditionally address conflicts of interest, minimal governmental regulations, and competing freely with others that are indigenous to free market capitalism. Moreover, capitalism is not inherently inconsistent with theology. The case for theological approaches is that businesspersons are still persons: theology addresses the primordial need of individual persons *to love* and *to be loved* while simultaneously sanctifying work as a manifestation of *love* (*2 Thessalonians* 3:10-13). Work does involve different persons, motives, and consequences which are not knowable *a priori* by reason and experience alone. But varying circumstances in the workplace do always involve persons who need *love*.

1. *Loving Your Neighbor and an Impersonal Humanity*

Love will not dissolve the problems of international poverty as some philosophers observe in their case against theological ethics in business. But secular philosophers struggling to develop a satisfactory view of global justice, while worthy in itself, overlooks the fact that “justice” is a *concept* in secular ethics which begs for the individual’s struggle or *desire* to be just. Besides the fact that what is just is relative to possibly conflicting philosophical views, the *desire to be just* cannot be inspired by theories or analyses. While analyses or theories can be limitedly embraced by theological approaches, such approaches would question the *sentimental cult of humanity* endemic to proponents of global theories when they ignore the flesh and blood individual.

Thus, for example, Professor De George asserts that “Religious writers and preachers often give the impression that they think the problems of international poverty will dissolve before love and charity”²⁶. He says that “philosophers in business ethics, who approach the poverty of the Third World from the point of view of justice, are still struggling to develop a satisfactory view of global justice”²⁷. And he saliently contrasts an *impersonal* philosophical concept of justice to theology: “The approach of many theologians to problems of world poverty focuses on *individuals* or the churches themselves. Many philosophers search instead for *impersonal*, structural, secular, organizational solutions *demanding by justice*.”²⁸ One is inclined to ask whether justice really “demands” emphasis on an impersonal humanity. Just as theology reminds philosophers seeking global peace that peace begins in the heart of the forgiving and loving *individual*, it reminds philosophers seeking global justice that justice begins with being just in the *personal* encounters at hand. “I often had to recognize”, said Albert Schweitzer, “that the need ‘to do something special’ was born of a restless spirit. Such persons wanted to dedicate themselves to larger tasks because those that lay nearest did not satisfy them.”²⁹ Although such persons as Schweitzer and Mother Teresa tackled larger tasks, they endured *real* risks and hardships in personally contributing to the welfare of *actual* individuals. Thus such persons, who embody theological love to an extraordinary degree, address the personal encounters at hand. Does anyone really believe that they have the illusion that international poverty will simply dissolve before love? One may more readily believe that it is secular philosophers who think that international poverty will dissolve before theory.

A coterie of critics has objected that theories of liberation and “self-determination” should supersede “patriarchal” missionaries in the Third World. Besides the fact such critics have engendered more poverty than justice, it is questionable whether their philosophical assumptions are more viable than those of theology. Further, if secular philosophers believe that there are “organizational” *solutions* for global justice, then

26. DE GEORGE, “Theological Ethics...”, pp. 426-427.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 427.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 427, my emphasis.

29. ALBERT SCHWEITZER, “Out of My Life and Thought”. New York, The New American Library, 1953, pp. 74-75.

it is they — not theologians — who may be disillusioned by continuing poverty and strive. (Research Professor of Philosophy, Abraham Edel, recently alluded to the philosophical bewilderment concerning moral progress not keeping pace with scientific progress³⁰. Whereas the scientific revolution and rationalism of the Enlightenment still promote philosophical optimism, theology has posited the doctrine of original sin: *quae tantum et talem meruit habere Redemptorem*. This is the other side of the coin that, ignored by De George and others, belies their “straw man” criticism of Christian love. They criticize love as being naive and ignore sin, or they criticize sin for invoking obsequious behavior and disregard love.

Theologians will not resolve the problem of global poverty but neither will secular philosophers. Still, it is secular philosophers who might suggest they can better resolve the problem through theories than love. This is in contrast to Christ’s emphasis on love and not on theories as well as his assertion that the poor would always be with us. Christ’s assertion is not a prescription for moral complacency in business or, when taken with his compassion for the poor, an advocacy of theories which are anti-business. His assertion serves, in this context, as a reminder that philosophers who use their reason and experience alone to extrapolate the *reality* of global justice from *theories* of global justice will, if history is any indication, tend to foster smug philosophical dogmas more than ameliorate injustice.

2. *Analysis of Justice and Just Analysis*

Before struggling to develop philosophies of justice, I would plead to such philosophers for just and fair-minded appraisals of what persons are saying who criticize their approaches. The critical analysis of reason and experience in addressing business ethics is not an attack on all philosophy. Whether such analysis involves theology or not, it constitutes a critical perspective in the tradition of Hume and Kant. This perspective indicates that an *applied* philosophy of business ethics, in its increased incentive to avoid *speculative* metaphysics, may well tend to emphasize a “neutral territory” of reason in terms of an analysis of practical issues and moral concepts in business.

Such analysis is incontrovertibly an important part of business ethics. But ethics in business does involve metaphysical assumptions and is not epistemologically “neutral”. Recognition of its non-neutrality, however, implies neither a rejection of quality research nor attention to only motivating businesspersons to be moral. For quality research would positively embrace critical analysis of metaphysical assumptions or presuppositions. And the presuppositions of utilitarians, Kantians, virtue ethicists, and theologians alike should address various moral considerations including morally relevant motivations independently of seeking to motivate businesspersons to be moral.

30. Abraham EDL, “Naturalism and the Concept of Moral Change”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60, n° 5, 1987.

3. *Teaching Morality and Being Moral: The Philosophical Connection*

At the same time, unless businesspersons are motivated by moral motives articulated in philosophical or theological approaches, it is difficult to see how the assumptions of the latter concerning human nature could reflect the natures of persons in business. In philosophical approaches such motivation should generally be only a matter of rational education. It is controversial, to say the least, whether secular education, moral or otherwise, would be any more effective in making businesspersons moral than “values clarification” has been in making pre-college students moral³¹. Insofar as the morality of secular philosophical approaches appeal to reason and experience alone, and inasmuch as the latter could neither establish the epistemic primacy of one approach over another nor address nonphilosophical notions of love, conscience, guilt, or even simple human compassion, it is unclear how a secular philosophical education relevant to business ethics *could be* much more than a sort of glorified values clarification. This is not a surreptitious shift from emphasizing morally relevant motives to a plea for motivating businesspersons to be moral. Rather it is a recognition of the fact that motivating businesspersons to be moral should proceed *pari passu* with teaching ethics in business if philosophical assumptions concerning the rationality of persons reflects their rational natures.

Theological approaches to ethics in business do not posit merely their rational natures, or, for that matter, the moral desirableness of desire *per se*. But it seems to be common knowledge that religious education is more effective than secular education in inducing morality. Although it will be objected that such morality is induced merely by motivating persons to be moral, this begs the question regarding why addressing the morally relevant desires or feelings posited by theology are effective in education and elsewhere. It is well to remember that the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s which lead to the concern in business ethics for minorities and affirmative action, *did not* have its origin in secular philosophy or political ideology. The latter, if anything, have tended to “politicalize” such issues and engender conflict as noted by Sidney Hook, Richard Rorty, and other persons in the academe³². Rather, racial

31. See Professor A. BAIER'S “Parents, Schools, and Values Clarification”, *The Wall Street Journal*, April 12, 1982: “Since ‘by definition and right ... values are personal things’ (*Values and Teaching*, 1966), teachers should never try to teach children correct values... Sidney Simon, Howard Kirschenbaum and other Values Clarification authors repeatedly belittle teachers of traditional values. Such teachers, they claim, ‘moralize’, ‘preach’, ... and they rely on ‘religion and other cultural truisms’.” Baier notes that Professors Kenneth Strike of Cornell, Alan Lockwood of Wisconsin, and John Steward of Michigan State have argued that Values Clarification emphatically indoctrinates by encouraging narcissistic self-gratification and ethical relativism. At the level of metaethics, Values Clarification assumes that a “subjective” theory of values is correct.

32. See footnote #24 for reference to Sidney Hook and Richard Rorty. Also, see Elizabeth BEVERLY'S “Liberals Must Confront the Conservative Argument: Teaching Humanities Means Teaching About Values”, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, November 1, 1989, A52: “The continuing debate [between liberals and conservatives] over the humanities is increasingly dissatisfying... We don't want to preach or appear to be taking sides or trying unduly to influence young minds. We are heirs to a long Enlightenment tradition of ‘scientific’ commitment to ‘objective’ knowledge, which often sees values as illegitimate holdovers from the benighted days of arbitrary authority.” Such references do not mean that philosophers do not helpfully contribute to clarifying issues. Rather they underscore that clarification, as a basis for unambiguously positing a given approach for ethics in business, does not prevent ethics in business from lending itself to

sensitivity and affirmative action in business had their genesis in Reverend Martin Luther King's peaceful civil disobedience whose inspiration was theology.

4. *A Warning*

In the end it is well to recall the warning of T. R. V. Murti (formerly Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ceylon) and Sayaji Rao Gaekwad (Professor of Indian Civilization at the University of Benares):

We must end with a note of warning. It is possible...to over-rate the part played by scholarship and the theoretical understanding of things... It is good to remember that history does not record a single instance of a spiritual revolution of global dimensions brought out by a band of scholars or skillful thinkers. The malady of the world is far too universal and deep-seated for remedies to be prescribed from books.³³

I cannot help adding that the great twentieth century remedies prescribed from books — contemptuous of theology and capitalism because of their ultimate obtuseness to human reason — have resulted in cultural purges, gulags, and concentration camps rather than the prescribed liberations and utopias. Utopias, which were never prescribed by businesspersons or theologians, have been good but unworkable ideas. Ideas of theologians or businesspersons, while often uneasy in their relationship, may be philosophically elusive but work.

or embracing conflicting political agenda. It is questionable whether such agenda in themselves have lessened or worsened injustice in the marketplace.

33. T. R. V. MURTI, *The Central Thought of Buddhism*, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1974, p. 34.