Abstracts
Abstract
John Woods and Brent Hudak’s theory on arguments by analogy (1989), although correct in its meta-argumentative approach, gives rise to problems when we consider the possibility of weighing reasons. I contend that this is an outcome of construing the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of arguments compared in argumentation by analogy as inferences. An interpretation in terms of reasons is proposed here. The reasons-based approach solves these problems and allows the theory to be extended to account for a particular variant of argumentation by analogy in which the subjects of comparison are not arguments, but weighings of reasons.
Keywords:
- argumentation by analogy,
- inference model,
- reason model,
- weighing of reasons
Résumé
La théorie de John Woods et Brent Hudak sur les arguments par analogie (1989), bien que correcte dans son approche méta-argumentative, pose problèmes quand on considère la possibilité de peser les raisons. Je soutiens que c'est le résultat d’interpréter la relation entre les prémisses et la conclusion dans l'argumentation par analogie comme une inférences. Une interprétation en termes de raisons est proposée ici. L'approche fondée sur les raisons résout ces problèmes et permet d'étendre la théorie pour rendre compte d'une variante particulière de l'argumentation par analogie dans laquelle les sujets de comparaison ne sont pas des arguments, mais des pesées de raisons.
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