Abstracts
Abstract
In the late 20th century theorists within the radical feminist tradition such as Haraway (1988) highlighted the impossibility of separating knowledge from knowers, grounding firmly the idea that embodied bias can and does make its way into argument. Along a similar vein, Moulton (1983) exposed a gendered theme within critical thinking that casts the feminine as toxic ‘unreason’ and the ideal knower as distinctly masculine; framing critical thinking as a method of masculine knowers fighting off feminine ‘unreason’. Theorists such as Burrow (2010) have picked up upon this tradition, exploring the ways in which this theme of overly masculine, or ‘adversarial’, argumentation is both unnecessary and serves as an ineffective base for obtaining truth. Rooney (2010) further highlighted how this unnecessarily gendered context results in argumentative double binds for women, undermining their authority and stifling much-needed diversity within philosophy as a discipline. These are damning charges that warrant a response within critical thinking frameworks. We suggest that the broader critical thinking literature, primarily that found within contexts of critical pedagogy and dispositional schools, can and should be harnessed within the critical thinking literature to bridge the gap between classical and feminist thinkers. We highlight several methods by which philosophy can retain the functionality of critical thinking while mitigating the obstacles presented by feminist critics and highlight how the adoption of such methods not only improves critical thinking, but is also beneficial to philosophy, philosophers and feminists alike.
Keywords:
- critical thinking,
- feminism,
- critical pedagogy,
- dispositional pedagogy
Résumé
Les philosophes cherchent souvent la vérité à travers les méthodes enseignées sous la bannière de la «Pensée critique». Pour la plupart, une variation de cette méthode est utilisée pour organiser les pensées et éliminer la subjectivité et les préjugés. Les philosophes féministes ont mis en relief un ensemble critique de lacunes au sein de ces méthodes, mais ces lacunes n’ont toutefois pas encore été entièrement abordées. Dans cet article, nous examinons ces critiques et explorons comment elles peuvent être atténuées en intégrant des éléments tirés de la pédagogie critique et des réflexions sur les dispositions qui oriente l’application des habiletés de la pensée critique. Le résultat est un ensemble de recommandations pour améliorer les méthodes de la pensée critique qui tiennent mieux compte des biais contextualisés tout en poursuivant plus précisément la vérité.
Appendices
Bibliography
- Anderson, E. (2015). Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retr’d from: http://plato.stanford.edu/cgibin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=feminism-epistemology Blair, J. A. (2012). Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Pages of J. Anthony Blair. Dordrecht; NY: Springer Science+Business.
- Burrow, S. (2010). Verbal Sparring and Apologetic Points: Politeness in Gendered Argumentation Contexts. Informal Logic, 30(3), 235-262.
- Dewey, J. (1910). How We Think. Buffalo; NY: Prometheus Books.
- Duffin, S. (2006). Reason in the Real World. Wellington: Dunmore Publishing.
- Facione, P. (2015). Critical Thinking: What it is and why it Counts. Millbrae, CA: Insight Assessment/California Academic Press LLC. Retrieved from www.insightassessment.com/pdf_files/what&why2015.pdf
- Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Herder and Herder.
- Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575-599.
- Harding, S. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Johnson, R.H.& Blair, J. A. (2009) Teaching the Dog’s Breakfast: Some Dangers and How to Deal with Them. APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy, 9(1), 2.
- Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York, Farrar: Straus and Giroux.
- Kraut, R. (2015). Plato. In Zalta, E. (Eds) The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/plato/
- Lang, J. (2010). Feminist Epistemologies of Situated Knowledges: Implications for Rhetorical Argumentation. Informal Logic, 30(3), 309-334.
- Lloyd, G. (1984). The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy. London: Routledge.
- McLaren, P., Macrine, S., & Hill, D. (2010). Revolutionizing pedagogy: Educating for social justice within and beyond global neo-liberalism. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mouffe, C. (2000). The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso.
- Moulton, J. (1983). A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method, in S. Harding & M.B. Hintikka (Eds.) Discovering Reality. Boston: D. Reidel.
- Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rooney, P. (2010). Philosophy, Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason. Informal Logic, 30(3), 203-234.
- Rooney, P & Hundleby, C. (2010). Introduction: Reasoning for Change. Informal Logic, 30(3), 194-202.
- Thayer-Bacon, B. (1998). Transforming and Redescribing Critical Thinking: Constructive Thinking. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 17, 123-148.
- Young, M. (2009). What are schools for? In Daniels, H., Lauder, H., & Porter, J. (Eds). Knowledge, values and educational policy. London, UK: Routledge.