Abstracts
Abstract
This paper explores the compelling hedonistic intuition that emotions affect happiness because they are states of pleasure and displeasure. The discussion focusses on two constraints on a plausible version of hedonism and explains which accounts of the emotions satisfy these constraints. Section 1 revolves around the nonalienation constraint: the constituents of a subject’s happiness must engage him or her. We argue that the intuition that emotions have prudential value presupposes that emotions are forms of engagement, a condition that only some accounts of the emotions satisfy. Section 2 centres around the unity constraint: if we acknowledge a great variety of (dis)pleasures, we still need to understand what makes all of them (dis)pleasures. Conceiving of the emotions as forms of engagement, we contend, allows us to resolve the difficulties concerning the variety and unity of (dis)pleasures that weigh on traditional hedonism. In section 3, we defend the form of affective hedonism that has emerged. We argue that the approach can be extended from emotions to other affective states and that the central role we give to action tendencies in our conception of affectivity does not call into question the idea that emotions contribute to happiness because of their hedonic value.
Résumé
Cet article explore l’intuition hédoniste convaincante selon laquelle les émotions affectent le bonheur parce qu’elles sont des états de plaisir et de déplaisir. La discussion s’intéresse à deux contraintes sur une version plausible de l’hédonisme et explique quels récits des émotions satisfont ces contraintes. La section 1 s’articule autour de la contrainte de non-aliénation : les constituants du bonheur d’un sujet doivent l’engager. Nous soutenons que l’intuition selon laquelle les émotions ont une valeur prudentielle présuppose que les émotions sont des formes d’engagement, une condition que seules certaines conceptions des émotions satisfont. La section 2 est centrée sur la contrainte de l’unité: si nous reconnaissons une grande variété de (dé)plaisirs, nous devons encore comprendre ce qui en fait des (dé)plaisirs. Concevoir les émotions comme des formes d’engagement, soutenons-nous, permet de résoudre les difficultés concernant la variété et l’unité des (dé)plaisirs qui pèsent sur l’hédonisme traditionnel. Dans la section 3, nous défendons la forme d’hédonisme affectif qui se dégage de ce qui précède. Nous soutenons que cette approche peut être étendue des émotions à d’autres états affectifs et que le rôle central que nous donnons aux tendances à l’action dans notre conception de l’affectivité ne remet pas en question l’idée selon laquelle les émotions contribuent au bonheur en raison de leur valeur hédonique.
Appendices
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