Abstracts
Abstract
Philosophers have tried very hard to show that we must be virtuous to be happy. But as long as we stick to the modern understanding of happiness as something experienced by a subject – and I argue against contemporary eudaimonists that we should indeed do so – there can at best exist a contingent causal connection between virtue and happiness. Nevertheless, we have good reason to think that being virtuous is non-accidentally conducive to happiness. Why? First, happiness is roughly the experiential condition of enjoying predominantly positive affective phenomenal states concerning things that are subjectively important to us. I argue that this straightforward sentimentalism about happiness has several advantages over Daniel Haybron’s emotional condition account. Second, insofar as we’re virtuous, we can correctly identify what is worth doing in our particular situation and will skillfully pursue it. At the same time, we’re not bothered by things that are not worth caring or worrying about. Consequently, virtuous people are likely to enjoy central positive emotions related to success and approval by others, and avoid common negative emotions related to social comparison or avarice. While their happiness is still in part a matter of luck, it is such to a lesser degree than for the rest of us.
Résumé
Les philosophes se sont efforcés de montrer que nous devons être vertueux pour être heureux. Mais tant que nous nous en tenons à la compréhension moderne du bonheur comme quelque chose de vécu par un sujet – et je soutiens contre les eudaimonistes contemporains que nous devrions effectivement le faire – il peut au mieux exister un lien de causalité contingent entre la vertu et le bonheur. Néanmoins, nous avons de bonnes raisons de penser qu’être vertueux est non accidentellement propice au bonheur. Pourquoi? Premièrement, le bonheur est, sommairement, la condition expérientielle de jouir d’états phénoménaux affectifs principalement positifs concernant des choses qui sont subjectivement importantes pour nous. Je soutiens que ce sentimentalisme à propos du bonheur a plusieurs avantages par rapport à la conception de Daniel Haybron comme état émotionnel. Deuxièmement, dans la mesure où nous sommes vertueux, nous pouvons identifier correctement ce qui vaut la peine d’être fait dans notre situation particulière et nous la poursuivrons habilement. En même temps, nous ne sommes pas dérangés par des choses qui ne valent pas la peine d’être prises en charge ou de s’inquiéter. Par conséquent, les personnes vertueuses sont susceptibles de profiter d’émotions positives centrales liées au succès et à l’approbation des autres, et d’éviter les émotions négatives communes liées à la comparaison sociale ou à l’avarice. Bien que leur bonheur soit encore en partie une question de chance, il l’est dans une moindre mesure que pour le reste d’entre nous.
Appendices
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