

Inhaling the Salubrious Air: Health and Development in St. Andrews, N.B., 1880-1910

Andrew Sackett

Volume 25, Number 1, Autumn 1995

URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/acad25_1art03

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Publisher(s)

The Department of History of the University of New Brunswick

ISSN

0044-5851 (print)

1712-7432 (digital)

[Explore this journal](#)

Cite this article

Sackett, A. (1995). Inhaling the Salubrious Air:: Health and Development in St. Andrews, N.B., 1880-1910. *Acadiensis*, 25(1), 54-81.

ANDREW SACKETT

Inhaling the Salubrious Air: Health and Development in St. Andrews, N.B., 1880-1910

ST. ANDREWS, A SMALL TOWN IN southwestern New Brunswick, situated on a narrow point of land extending southward into the Passamaquoddy Bay, had, by the end of the 19th century, become a mecca for tourists. Founded in 1783 by Loyalist refugees, the core of whom were members of the Penobscot Association of businessmen from Portland, Maine, it became a thriving port, dependent on international trade. By the mid-19th century the port had begun to decline; however, in the 1880s, by a most fortuitous combination of circumstances, “this sleeping-beauty of the seaside” entered a new phase in its history, becoming “the ideal summer resort”.¹ Why did this transformation occur? This study examines the rise of St. Andrews from a fading former port to a fashionable resort. Propelled by the actions of visionaries, developers and railway entrepreneurs, and facilitated by perceived philosophical and medical advantages which led the elites of Boston and Montreal to choose St. Andrews as their summer home, this small community “attained supremacy in the east as a rare summering-place”.² The St. Andrews experience was not unique. Resort hotels were built in other parts of New Brunswick, such as Campobello Island, as well as on the Maine coast in places like Bar Harbour, Old Orchard Beach and Cutler, and in Yarmouth, Nova Scotia and Summerside, Prince Edward Island during the same period.³ The development in St. Andrews is, therefore, representative of that elsewhere in the Fundy region, making it a valuable case study.

The economy of St. Andrews, New Brunswick, was, in pre-Confederation times, based on trade in staples products. Indeed, St. Andrews was a significant participant in the Maritime economy of the early 19th century.⁴ There was some trade with American ports and Nova Scotia, but most was with Britain and the

1 *Sea Coast Resorts* (Atlantic Coast), International Steamship Company (Boston, 1893).

2 *The Way we Were*, Souvenir Booklet (St. Stephen, N.B., 1908), p. 75.

3 Any number of references to such development can be found in the contemporary promotional literature. See, for example, the International Steamship Company's *Sea Coast Resorts of Eastern Maine, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Cape Breton* (Boston, 1891).

4 For details on the Maritime timber and shipping industries of the 19th century, see Graeme Wynn, *Timber Colony: A Historical Geography of Early Nineteenth Century New Brunswick* (Toronto, 1981), pp. 105-9 and Eric W. Sager with Gerald E. Panting, *Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914* (Montreal & Kingston, 1990). The early history of St. Andrews is covered in Roger Nason's “Meritorious but Distressed Individuals: The Penobscot Loyalist Association and the Settlement of the Township of St. Andrews, New Brunswick, 1783-1821”, M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1982, while the shifting patterns of population are analyzed in T.W. Acheson's “A Study in the Historical Demography of a Loyalist County”, *Histoire Sociale — Social History*, 1 (1968), pp. 53-65.

Andrew Sackett, “Inhaling the Salubrious Air: Health and Development in St. Andrews, N.B., 1880-1910”, *Acadiensis*, XXV, 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 54-81.

West Indies; the bulk of the imports and exports of Charlotte County went through St. Andrews. St. Andrews was also the port of entry for immigrants. As the timber trade flourished and the population of Charlotte County rose from 9,200 in 1825 to 16,000 in 1835, the future looked bright.⁵ St. Andrews merchants, looking to extend their influence, sought government legislation to enable them to build a railway to Quebec. Yet the town did not continue to develop, and the failure of the St. Andrews-Quebec railway scheme is significant in charting its decline as a major port.⁶ Secondary industry had never been very successful there: in the 1860s a candle and soap factory, a pail and broom factory, and a steam sawmill were all opened in St. Andrews, along the railway line, but none was notably successful.⁷ Coastal communities like St. Andrews were affected by the contraction in shipping and by the decline of the traditional timber trade with Britain following the removal of trade preferences in the 1840s.⁸ And, while Reciprocity stimulated the timber trade and led to renewed growth and recovery for parishes along the American border, it brought no relief for the port town.⁹ St. Andrews, then, had declined steadily since the mid-19th century, the population dropping from 3,910 in 1851 to 2,128 in 1881; by 1891 it was as low as 1,778.¹⁰ The town was no longer a centre of trade.

By the late 1870s summer resort development was seen as the key to St. Andrews' economic revival. There had long been a few summer visitors to the port town, but only a few. The first summer resident of note was Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley, who, in 1871, "purchased and re-modelled a handsome brick mansion". It became "the chosen residence during the summer season for himself and family".¹¹ The Tilleys and Major deWinton, the Governor-General's Private Secretary, and another summer resident, represented, townspeople hoped, "only the vanguards of a great host of visitors". Until the great land boom of 1888, prosperity was always just over the horizon, but predictions of future glory had begun as early as 1873, with regular pronouncements in the newspaper, vociferously proclaiming that "[t]he dawn of a brighter day for the Old Shire Town is breaking.... The golden streaks in

5 See Wynn, *Timber Colony*, p. 34, Acheson, "Historical Demography of a Loyalist County", p. 58 and Harold A. Davis, *An International Community on the St. Croix* (Orono, Maine, 1950), pp. 114-15.

6 The St. Andrews-Quebec Railway plan was an attempt to make St. Andrews the winter port for the colonies by connecting it via railroad to Quebec City. However, plans had to be postponed due to the territorial dispute with Maine and, by the late 1840s, when construction finally began, the community was in a much weaker economic position and proved unable to attract sufficient financial backing to complete the road. For an early but useful narrative of the St. Andrews-Quebec Railway scheme, see the article in *Acadiensis*, 1, 3 (1903), pp. 163-9.

7 *Calais Advertiser*, 18 July and 30 August 1861, cited in Davis, *An International Community on the St. Croix*, pp. 185, 188.

8 See Wynn, *Timber Colony*, for a discussion of the decline in the timber trade between New Brunswick and Britain.

9 Acheson, "Historical Demography of a Loyalist County", p. 61.

10 *Census of New Brunswick* (1851), and *Census of Canada* (1881) and (1891).

11 *The Bay Pilot* (St. Andrews), 5 June 1879.

advance of the rising sun are up in the horizon, and the flashing sun-beams of prosperity will soon melt the ice of discontent from the land".¹²

Indeed, perhaps the most visionary of all the people involved in the town's development were the consecutive editors of the local newspaper, *The Bay Pilot*, and its successor, *The Saint Andrews Beacon*. It was newspaper policy to promote the town as much as possible. When, on 3 July 1879, Mr. John S. Magee took over as editor, he announced that, as a matter of course, he would "manfully fight for the interests of St. Andrews...as a summer resort and watering place (second to none in the Dominion)". In an editorial of 17 July, Magee extolled the town's virtues as a summer resort, promising potential visitors "immunity from danger, either by quicksands, roll of the sea or undertow, or by the presence of sharks", perfection in water quality (in terms of both salinity and temperature) and "accessible bathing places".¹³ Not only were such promotional editorials reprinted in other newspapers, but they also helped to rally support for development. That July, as well as the editorials, an advertisement appeared calling for tenders for the completion of the Saint Andrews Hotel. This hotel, 'The Argyll', was the first summer hotel in the town, opening on 24 May 1881.

Newspapers in Maine and Massachusetts also promoted the town as a summer resort, although their effect was limited, perhaps because their reviews were mixed, and some proved considerably less fulsome than others in their praise. *The Eastport Sentinel*, for example, warned potential visitors that the town's buildings were "poor and sadly in need of paint" and added that St. Andrews was "noted for the excellent quality of its turnips".¹⁴ In contrast, another Maine paper asserted that "no place on the Maine or New Brunswick coast can compare with St. Andrews in natural beauty", while *The Boston Post* offered perhaps the most balanced assessment, informing its readers that "none conversant with sea-side and upland topography" could doubt "that nature has done the most possible and the natives the least for making this the 'Saratoga of the East'". While praising the town's natural advantages, "[freedom] from fog, and with night air delightfully cool, and consequently death to the mosquito", the *Post's* commentator bemoaned the lack of adequate accommodations and activities. The Argyll was the only summer hotel. The town's two other hotels, the Kennedy and the American House, were primarily aimed at businessmen year-round, not summer tourist traffic. The American House, however, did attempt to capitalize on vacation traffic, and the article noted that, "while conveniently located for the purpose of commercial men, its surroundings render it very attractive to summer visitors". Throughout the early 1880s the *Bay Pilot* reprinted many such articles, reminding readers of the area's potential "as a summer resort" suitable for "the tourist, the artist and the seekers after health and pleasure". By the summer of 1883, according to the editor, the summer visitors

12 *Ibid.*

13 *Ibid.*, 17 July 1879.

14 *Eastport Sentinel*, 26 September 1883, cited in Davis, *An International Community on the St. Croix*, p. 266.

were “arriving in force”. Judging from the published lists, however, they were, with one or two exceptions, still mainly from within the province.¹⁵

At long last, in 1887, it seemed that the prophecy of the town's future greatness was about to come true. In that year Sir John A. Macdonald visited St. Andrews. Ever the politician, he declared: “There is no reason why St. Andrews should not be a great summer resort, where people may come and be refreshed by the cooling breezes of the Bay of Fundy, and the healthful and salubrious atmosphere permeating your pretty town”. After years of heralding “the dawn of a brighter day”, it was about to arrive. For MacDonald was not the town's only important visitor that year. *The Bay Pilot* noted “that a number of the guests at present in the Argyll have returned thereto season after season, and bring their friends with them”.¹⁶ One of these guests, a Mr. Robert S. Gardiner of Boston, brought his family regularly. He was to return the next year, bringing a very select group of friends. They would become known as the American Syndicate, and would be the driving force behind the sudden development of St. Andrews. They brought in outside capital to complement the vision of the newspaper editors, earlier hotelkeepers and Robert Gardiner, providing the funds required to develop the town. With their involvement, control over the town's future passed from the hands of the community into the hands of outsiders, and, for better or worse, life would never be the same. Part of a growing trend of new seasonal resorts and of a new standard of luxury in resort living,¹⁷ St. Andrews was to become a summer enclave for the rich.

In March 1888 the development of St. Andrews as a summer resort actually began. Finally, after years of cajoling, announcing and self-promotion, someone had taken notice, and the capital required to develop St. Andrews' valuable potential as a summer watering-place had materialized. The headline story in *The Bay Pilot* of 1 March 1888 reported a “Great Movement in Real Estate”. Considerable property had been purchased in the St. Andrews area recently, but no one was sure who was responsible. The editor of *The Bay Pilot* was, of course, greatly interested in these activities, and, undoubtedly with considerable journalistic acumen, ferreted out the identity of those responsible: “The parties so far known to be at the head of the purchase of real estate at St. Andrews are Americans, and railroad men”. As the spring of 1888 progressed, the “Great Movement in Real Estate” quickly became “The Land Boom” and then, simply, “The Boom”. The interested parties became “the American syndicate”, and, in the best newspaper fashion, *The Bay Pilot* learned “from reliable sources” that their actions were motivated solely by their desire for “the establishment of a watering place, for which nature has so generously provided, in the surroundings of our town”.¹⁸ Development by an “American syndicate” was nothing new to Charlotte

15 *North Star* (Presque Isle, ME) cited in *The Bay Pilot*, 24 August 1882; *Boston Post* cited in *The Bay Pilot*, 17 August 1882, 1 June 1882; *The Bay Pilot*, 3 June 1880, 24 June 1880, and 28 June 1883.

16 *Ibid.*, 11, 18 August 1887.

17 See William K. Wyckoff, “Landscapes of private power and wealth”, in Michael P. Conzen, ed., *The Making of the American Landscape* (Boston, 1990), p. 338.

18 *The Bay Pilot*, 1, 8 and 15 March 1888.

County. In 1881, most of Campobello Island was purchased by a similar group, the Campobello Land Company, “composed of several well-known Boston and New York gentlemen”.¹⁹ They, too, planned to create a summer colony of wealthy tourists, and built hotels called The Owen, Tyn-y-Coed, and Tyn-y-Maes in 1881 and 1884.²⁰

Shortly after their actions became widely known to the general public, the American Syndicate began a carefully calculated series of moves designed to gain support and demonstrate its intention to become part of the community. First, it applied to the New Brunswick House of Assembly for “an Act of Incorporation, under the title of ‘The St. Andrews Land Co.’, whose object will be to deal in and improve lands in the parish of St. Andrews and other parishes in the County of Charlotte. The capital stock of the company is fixed at \$50,000”. The syndicate even involved that paragon of respectability, Sir Leonard Tilley, placing him as a figurehead in the company, a move which gave their actions a veneer of legitimacy. When confusion arose regarding the nature of his role, however, the Land Company acknowledged that “Sir Leonard has no connection with it, other than that of trustee for the syndicate, which is composed entirely of Americans”.²¹ Capitalizing on the public attention paid to their new company, and hoping to capture the town’s goodwill, the St. Andrews Land Company held a public meeting, chaired by Robert Gardiner, to discuss the “beneficial effects on the interests of St. Andrews”. At this town meeting, Gardiner explained that he had heard of St. Andrews as a restful place nine years previously, and had come there with his family every summer since then. Following a discussion of the Syndicate’s plans to develop the town, the ratepayers, by an almost unanimous vote (there was but “one feeble nay”), agreed to deed a considerable amount of land to the St. Andrews Land Company,²² in addition to that which the Syndicate had already purchased. The people of the town, for the most part, believed that the company’s plans for development would bring prosperity to St. Andrews.²³

It is difficult to tell what opposition there was, because the editor of the local paper and the local merchants were strongly in favour of development. Some of the town’s inhabitants remained sceptical, however, as excerpts from a poem signed ‘Mabel’ reveal:

The wintry sun at eve went down
 Behind the Devil’s Head
 As Keezer rang the village bell
 To show the day was dead.

19 *Campobello* (Boston, 1891), p. 2. Ganong Collection, New Brunswick Museum Archives.

20 Kate Gannett Wells, *Campobello: an historical sketch* (Boston, 1893), p. 34.

21 *The Bay Pilot*, 15 and 22 March 1888. Tilley, however, was not immune to the draw of land speculation. According to the *Boston Post*, as reprinted in the 23 February 1889 issue of *The Bay Pilot*, he had invested in building lots.

22 *Ibid.*, 5 April 1888.

23 *Ibid.*

But every old inhabitant
As he strolled home to tea
Was conversing with his neighbour
Of the Boom that was to be.

...

For companies were forming fast,
led on by Mr. Cram;
For capitalists from Boston
Had said "We'll buy the town",

...

The fathers of our City
Had met in the Town Hall,
And listened to some speeches
That had captured one and all;
What care they then for turnips
Or how the weirs may fish?
For St. Andrews now was going to boom,
And what more could they wish?

...

They found they'd slept for fifty years,
But were bound to sleep no more;
And then a leading citizen
Got up upon the floor;
He said, "Oh kind Americans,
Our town no more we'll hide,
We'll give you Chamcook Mountain
And we'll throw in the Bayside.
We'll give our Point without a word
Your promises are bold;
We are quite sure with men like these
We never shall be sold".²⁴

'Mabel', amongst others, clearly feared that the town was being given away to American speculators. This was not a majority viewpoint, however, and certainly not that of the editor, who was quick to publish a retort which portrayed those afraid of development as cowardly, perhaps stupid. No other opposition to the 'Boom' was published.

By May the Syndicate's operations were proceeding smoothly. In announcing the first stockholders' meeting, to be held on 7 May, the editor of *The Bay Pilot* stressed the importance of making a favourable impression on the American visitors:

²⁴ Mr. Cram was the manager of the New Brunswick & Canada Railway. *Ibid.*, 24 May 1888.

[A]s it will be the first visit made by some of them to our town, it is probable that they will embrace the opportunity to look over the place. Although they will not, like the men sent out to search the land of Canaan, be able to bear back with them branches with clusters of grapes, pomegranates and figs, they can take with them the memory of the delightful scenery and healthful atmosphere that so abounds in the vicinity of St. Andrews.²⁵

When the members of the American Syndicate arrived in St. Andrews, they found a slightly dilapidated port town, a town that had begun to decay. As one contemporary observed,

it has a flavor of romance about it, and is the ruins of a once lively shipping port, now passed into a dream.... The oldest inhabitant still tells tales of the days of his youth when its harbour was so crowded with merchantmen, which lay so closely alongside of one another that one could walk from the lower end of the town to Joe's Point at the other on the decks of the vessels, stepping from one to the other. All this if it be true, is long gone by, and only a few decaying hulls, or pleasure craft and fishing boats are seen at the docks.²⁶

But the twelve stockholders had already determined their course and remained firm in their resolve. They met first in a general meeting of the stockholders of the St. Andrews Land Company, then, reconstituting themselves as a further body crucial to development, continued the meeting, this time as the stockholders of The Chamcook Water Company. With an eye to the future municipal services development would require, the Chamcook Water Company undertook to supply water from the Chamcook Lakes to residents of St. Andrews and other parishes in the County of Charlotte.²⁷

As *The Bay Pilot* reminded its readers, such facilities, as well as other civic improvements, were viewed as essential by the type of visitors and residents the new investors were seeking to attract, individuals "accustomed to city ways".²⁸ The community responded enthusiastically. In preparation for a summer of increased activity, the Hotel Argyll, the only operating summer hotel, was "completely renovated".²⁹ Later, as the town grew, more businesses, such as livery stables, opened to serve summer visitors. It seems that almost every household must have joined in the drive for improvement and beautification, at least judging from the reaction of one Boston journalist, who reported that "as you walk [the] quaint

25 *Ibid.*, 3 May 1888.

26 *The Saint Andrews Beacon*, 18 July 1889. This article, entitled "BEAUTIFUL SAINT ANDREWS", was reprinted from the *Boston Home Journal*.

27 *Ibid.*, 3 May 1888.

28 *Ibid.*, 17 May 1888.

29 *Ibid.*, 28 June 1888.

streets you will see everywhere, even in the humble houses, pots of flowering plants".³⁰ Work on the Algonquin Hotel, planned as the flagship of 'St. Andrews the summer resort', was being "vigorously pushed" by the end of 1888. *The Bay Pilot* kept readers apprised of progress. In January of 1889, an engraving of the Algonquin Hotel, "designed by Reed & Taylor, Architects of Boston, Mass., U.S.", was published, and readers were informed that the hotel was "replete with every convenience and luxury".³¹ The hotel was a masterpiece of design, planned to tower over the town. Promotional literature was distributed widely, and by mid-January, "a large number of rooms [had] already been secured".³² Local enthusiasts made no mention of the fact that, of the three provisional directors of the Algonquin Hotel Company, two were also directors of the Land and Water Companies.³³ Interlocking directorships were not a cause for public concern, merely a fact of life. The integration of the Hotel, Land, Water and Railway Companies provided an effective means of coordinating development, but the lack of local control is instructive.

The actions of the American Syndicate were not limited to the town of St. Andrews itself. These American investors, who were also 'Railroad men', helped to prepare the transportation infrastructure necessary to transform the community into a resort. As the newspaper made quite clear,

The parties so far known to be at the head of the purchase of real estate at St. Andrews are Americans, and railroad men, who say their only object is to secure building lots and make St. Andrews a watering place, second to none on the Atlantic sea board of the North American continent, and to create a traffic during the summer months that will add to the earnings of the New Brunswick railway company.³⁴

The railway was to play a key role in the development of St. Andrews as a summer resort. In 1880 the New Brunswick and Canada Railway (N.B. & C.) line had been purchased by George Stephen, Donald Smith and several other key figures in the Canadian Pacific Railway (C.P.R.); by 1887 it connected to the Inter-Colonial at Rivière du Loup.³⁵ Yet, the N.B. & C. was, at this time, quite an unprofitable line. Its manager, Mr. Cram, "had but very little traffic over the railway to St. Andrews [the] road was in bad condition [and] he was afraid to go to his directors and ask them to expend money on it unless he could show them reasonable prospect of increased traffic".³⁶ Certainly the increased efficiency of connections to the local railway from other points had opened the opportunity to attract more traffic.

30 "BEAUTIFUL SAINT ANDREWS", *Ibid.*, 18 July 1889.

31 *The Bay Pilot*, 3 January 1889.

32 *Ibid.*, 3 and 17 January and 21 February 1889.

33 *The Bay Pilot*, 21 February 1889.

34 *Ibid.*, 1 March 1888.

35 Davis, *An International Community on the St. Croix*, p. 257.

36 *The Bay Pilot*, 5 April 1888.

Development of the area meant increased traffic on the line, and this meant increased profits. It is not surprising, therefore, that the manager of the N.B. & C. became heavily involved with the American Syndicate.

The Land Company's activity was not the only preparation for increased travel to St. Andrews. At McAdam, the major junction for train travel into the Maritimes from New England, the yard was graded and improved. From Watts Junction, where trains for St. Andrews were split off the main line, preparations were made for the laying of steel rails, in anticipation of increased traffic that the summer resort would attract.³⁷ The cooperation of the rail companies was essential, as the anticipated guests would expect a comfortable, efficient trip. If travelling to St. Andrews was miserable, then even the most exemplary hotel facilities would not be enough to ensure repeat customers. In asserting the importance of railroads, the *Saint John Daily Sun* claimed that St. Andrews' "future as a resort [is] an assured success" because of "the favourable attitude of the railway corporations, whose lines stretch out to this region and its accessibility from New York, Boston, Montreal, Ottawa and Quebec".³⁸ To complement the work on the tracks, as of 27 June 1888, the N.B. & C. added a second train serving St. Andrews each day.³⁹ Travel to St. Andrews was becoming both comfortable and convenient. As occurred in other isolated settings in the Adirondacks and along the Maine coast, the railroads opened St. Andrews to resort development.⁴⁰

Throughout the early stages, railway companies remained intimately involved in the development of this summer resort. The first annual meetings of the St. Andrews Land and Water Companies attracted high-level representatives of the Boston & Maine Railroad, Maine Central Railroad and New Brunswick Railroad.⁴¹ Their interest produced a campaign to promote St. Andrews, by including sketches of its attractions in the 1889 railway time tables.⁴² The C.P.R., too, was involved in the town's promotion. The *St. John Globe* reported the C.P.R.'s intention to operate a Pullman car the following summer direct from Toronto to St. Andrews. The trip was expected to take about 14 hours.⁴³ With railway executives as directors of the various enterprises, using their promotional expertise and ability to disperse information widely, the railways became crucial to St. Andrews' success as a resort. In an article entitled "The place for summer homes", *The Saint Andrews Beacon* summarized why:

Another desideratum, and one which must ever be important to the man of business, is the fact that the region can be easily and quickly reached from any of the large centres of population, either in the New England States or

37 *Ibid.*, 7 June 1888.

38 Reprinted in *Ibid.*, 21 June 1888.

39 Railway advertisement, *Ibid.*, 19 July 1888.

40 See Wyckoff, "Landscapes of private power", p. 347.

41 *The Bay Pilot*, 23 August 1888.

42 *Ibid.*, 18 October 1888.

43 *Ibid.*, 7 February 1889.

Eastern Canada. The Montreal man or the Boston man can lie down at night in his car and the next morning he is enjoying the cool sea breezes of Quoddy, and with the same celerity can speed back to their places of business.⁴⁴

The C.P.R. saw new opportunities in the St. Andrews market. In July of 1889, *The St. Andrews Beacon* announced:

We publish this week for the first time the advertisement of the C.P.R., and we hope our readers will give it the attention which it deserves. St. Andrews and the C.P.R. both look for a great deal from each other, and it is our earnest wish that the hopes of both will be more than realized.⁴⁵

St. Andrews and the C.P.R. did indeed embark upon an era of cooperation. The New Brunswick and Canada Railway, which served St. Andrews, became part of the C.P.R. on 1 September 1890.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the connection to central Canada was improved in the early 1890s, when the C.P.R.'s "short line" across northern Maine to McAdam was completed.⁴⁷ By 1905 the C.P.R. had an even more definite stake in the future of St. Andrews; the Algonquin Hotel was now under direct management of the C.P.R.'s Hotel System.⁴⁸ Although the C.P.R. had had very little to do with the creation of the Algonquin, or even of the railway going to St. Andrews, this was eventually forgotten. By 1917, C.P.R. publicity brochures claimed that "[t]he Canadian Pacific Railway ran its long arm down from McAdam, set the Algonquin Hotel on the hills with a sea view on three sides of it, and made St. Andrews the unquestioned Newport of the North".⁴⁹ Once the C.P.R. officially owned the route leading to St. Andrews they began to advertise it seriously. In their "Summer Tours" Brochure of 1891, for example, there was a poem describing the attractions of St. Andrews.

Search the leagues of coast around,
Fairer spot cannot be found
From the phalanxes of pine
Sweeps a healing breath divine,
Changing with the fitful breeze
To the salt strength of the seas,
Bearing health with pleasure blent
To the weary and the spent.⁵⁰

44 *The St. Andrews Beacon*, 23 July 1896.

45 *Ibid.*, 11 July 1889.

46 *Ibid.*, 4 September 1890.

47 Davis, *An International Community on the St. Croix*, p. 257.

48 *The St. Andrews Beacon*, 6 July 1905.

49 Betty Thornley, *St. Andrews By-the-Sea*, illustrated booklet (C.P.R., 1917).

50 Reprinted in *The Saint Andrews Beacon*, 2 July 1891.

It was not only in their promotional brochures that the C.P.R. was coming to St. Andrews. Their controlling interests, too, were moving into the town. William Van Horne and Sir Donald Smith began to build summer homes in St. Andrews in 1891.⁵¹ Van Horne went so far as to purchase an island on which to build his summer home. And, as the *St. Andrews Beacon* noted, “It is no ordinary structure that Mr. Van Horne has in contemplation, for, when completed, it will be [a] fit mansion for a prince to occupy”.⁵²

Its hotels and rail links in place, St. Andrews established its reputation as a summer resort in 1889. In June of that year, the *New York Times* referred to St. Andrews as a “Canadian resort of fashion”. The Algonquin formally opened in July, and was immediately successful, a focus of life in the town. A new column, “Algonquin Gossip — News and Notes about the Summer Tourists”, appeared in the paper, informing readers that “St. Andrews [is] moving along”, “[t]he Algonquin is a little world in miniature”, and “[t]here are now considerably over one hundred permanent guests on the list”.⁵³ Most promising for the investors, by the end of the first season a letter to the stockholders of the hotel proclaimed that the “first season’s business shows a profit, even with the extraordinary expenses attendant on the opening and its first season”.⁵⁴ St. Andrews, the port town, was becoming the resort of St. Andrews-by-the-Sea.⁵⁵

As more and more summer visitors came to the hotels, a shift in the pattern of development occurred. As existing accommodation became more popular and more crowded, new housing facilities had to be found to provide the space and exclusivity craved by those who travelled to St. Andrews. More people began to build elegant summer homes. The town’s prime promoter, Robert S. Gardiner, Vice-President of the St. Andrews Land Company, purchased two lots on Acadia Avenue, just to the rear of the Algonquin tennis ground. His house was designed by Winslow & Wetherell, Architects of Boston. D.H. Clallin of Boston also began construction that summer. The next year, 1893, brought to completion summer dwellings for George Inness, Jr., of New Jersey, and F.A. Taft and J. Emery Hoar of Boston, the latter, like Gardiner, a major stockholder in the Hotel and the Land and Water Companies. The ‘cottage industry’ continued to increase in importance, and, by 1897, residents of summer homes had become common. Among them was T.G. Shaughnessy, manager of the C.P.R., who constructed Fort Tipperary in 1902, joining the other stalwarts of the railway, Sir William Van Horne and Sir Donald Smith. A category of more modest summer homes, designed as rental properties,

51 *Ibid.*, 9 July 1891.

52 *Ibid.*, 23 June 1892.

53 *Ibid.*, 27 June and 25 July 1889.

54 Letter to the stockholders of the Algonquin Hotel Company, Ltd., 22 October 1889. Charlotte County Archives.

55 By the early 1890s the suffix “by-the-Sea” was appended to the town’s name on tourism materials. As the involvement of the C.P.R. increased, so too did the use of the new name. Imposed by outsiders for promotional purposes, its longevity attests to the power of developers in creating the resort.

could scarcely keep pace with the demand; although the season began in July, by mid-May “most of the available cottages [were] engaged for the season at St. Andrews”.⁵⁶

Who were the summer visitors coming to St. Andrews, rubbing shoulders with people like Sir William Van Horne? They were the wealthy elite of Eastern Canada, particularly Quebec, and of northern New England. Over time, the links to Montreal, bolstered by the presence of people like Shaughnessy, gained preeminence, until the town became, in effect, a summer colony for wealthy Montrealers.⁵⁷ The kind of summer people promoters sought to attract was described in advertisements and brochures such as the one which proclaimed that “[t]he Algonquin is the summer home of the man of discrimination and a rendezvous for women of refinement”.⁵⁸ In another advertising circular, a number of prominent people who had been among the 1400 visitors who stayed at the hotel in 1889 provided testimonials attesting to “the excellence of the hotel, the healthfulness of the climate, the natural beauties of St. Andrews, etc”.⁵⁹ The hotel management, reporting to stockholders, stressed the ‘quality’ of their clientele, claiming that they represented “the best people of Canada and the United States”.⁶⁰ This quickly became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as word spread along the elite networks. By the end of the next summer, 1890, St. Andrews was portrayed as the resting-place of the elite, and the *St. Andrews Beacon* insisted quite regularly: “the class of travellers that has been here is of the very best”.⁶¹

The Algonquin became more and more an integral part of life in St. Andrews. Its success continued, and by 1895 it had been enlarged 50 per cent. There was also a successful golf course in operation by then, with two sets of links. The results of “extensive and judicious advertising” had proven so successful that the newspaper complained that “[t]his season the hotels are scarcely large enough to contain all the people who are eager to come”.⁶² By 1899 news about the Algonquin began to appear earlier in the year and was more prominently displayed in the newspaper,⁶³ reflecting the continued and growing importance of the hotel in the community. It was no longer just the textual content of the *St. Andrews Beacon* that was aimed at summer visitors. The advertisements also began to target them.

56 *St. Andrews Beacon*, 28 July 1892, 15 June 1893, and 13 May 1897.

57 For more details on the composition of the summer residents, see Willa Walker’s anecdotal history, *No Hay Fever and A Railway* (Fredericton, 1989). For a critical assessment of Walker’s book, see Alan MacEachern, “Massage with a Message”, *New Maritimes* (May/June 1992), p. 22.

58 *The Algonquin Hotel*, Promotional Brochure (1913), p. 3.

59 *The St. Andrews Beacon*, 20 March 1889.

60 Letter to the stockholders of the Algonquin Hotel Company, Ltd., 22 October 1889. Charlotte County Archives.

61 *The St. Andrews Beacon*, 4 September 1890.

62 *Ibid.*, 11 July 1895 and 12 August 1897.

63 *Ibid.*, 18 May 1899.

Summer visitors from the United States who come to St. Andrews in search of health and recreation will be able to find both — and more...Many Americans have found in the past that it paid them to get their clothing on this side of the line, and particularly from us — Harrison & Grady, Tailors and Outfitters.⁶⁴

By the end of 1899, 10 years after St. Andrews had become an established summer resort, a new lifestyle had developed. The town's economy now focussed on serving the needs of the mainly upper-class summer residents. The newspaper was again proud to report that “[t]he quality of our visitors has not deteriorated. The very best people from everywhere have stayed with us this season, and many have given assurance that they will return another year”.⁶⁵

How were these developers and promoters portraying St. Andrews? How did they make this small decrepit former port appear a desirable destination? Promoters claimed that in St. Andrews, “beauty of environment, salubrity of climate and healthfulness of locality reach perfection”.⁶⁶ The beauty of the landscape surrounding St. Andrews was in itself an attraction. By treating the beauty of the surroundings as a scarce commodity,⁶⁷ rather than something readily available and free to all, promoters of the town could ‘sell’ it to the wealthy, who could afford to go and see it. In the original brochure for the Algonquin Hotel, the centrepiece of the town's attractions, this idea comes across clearly:

located on an eminence 150 feet above sea level, its piazzas and windows afford unobstructed views of Passamaquoddy Bay, Chamcook Mountain, River St. Croix, Bay of Fundy, coast of Maine, and the quaint, sleepy old town of St. Andrews beneath it.⁶⁸

Prominent among the features offered to guests at the Algonquin were “unobstructed views” from every room, the observatory and tower, and the dining room, “supplied with windows on three sides”. There was an exclusive, beautiful landscape for sale, and only certain people could afford to pay for it. Another element of the exclusive resort was space,⁶⁹ and it too was being sold here. This can be seen not only in the unobstructed views, but in the amount of room within the hotel made available to guests; there were private chambers for every conceivable purpose, including a writing room, “a quiet nook in which to wield the pen”.⁷⁰ The language used to describe the Algonquin was formal, and, by its very tone, implied

64 *Ibid.*, 25 June 1899.

65 *Ibid.*, 7 September 1899.

66 *The Way we Were*, p. 75.

67 T.D. Seymour Bassett, “Documenting Recreation and Tourism in New England”, *American Archivist* (Fall 1987), p. 551.

68 *The Algonquin Hotel*, original 48 page brochure, 1888, Charlotte County Archives.

69 Bassett, “Documenting Recreation and Tourism”, p. 551.

70 *The Algonquin Hotel*, original 48-page brochure.

exclusivity and 'good taste'. "There is a bay view on three sides of this Inn of All Joy, where one eats one's breakfast, plays one's golf, drinks one's tea, and dances one's last number all to the interwoven scents and sighs and glories of the sea".⁷¹

The surroundings were made into a landscape, stressed as a commodity by promoters from the very beginning. Over time, the physical setting of St. Andrews became a vital part of advertising. When the syndicate of American capitalists first arrived to view the town — already having invested in it — they knew what they planned to sell. They were framing the area as a landscape of private wealth, accessible to their elite market.⁷² On that initial visit they brought with them "Mr. Frank H. Taylor, photographic artist, who took a number of views in the town and suburbs, to be used, we understand, illustrating a letter press description of the town, shortly to be published".⁷³ This was, however, a mere drop in the proverbial bucket compared to the later promotions of the C.P.R., which used its resources to hire G. Horne Russell, the noted Canadian artist, to paint a series of watercolours illustrating the town. Miniature reproductions of these striking paintings were published, accompanied by glowing, mystical prose:

'The principal person in a picture is the light', said Manet, and at St. Andrews light is regnant indeed. The sun calls to the deeps of the quiet bay — the blue Bay of early morning, the silver-frosted bay of night — and out of the waters spring pale jonquils of dawn, tulip-tinted flowers of sunset, hyacinths of purple twilight that bloom in the fleeting shadows of the boatside, under the straying flowers of the clouds. The rocks about the bay are as red as deep roses, and the pines are Chinese jade, — unburnished, set among the ivory shafts of the poplars. To add the last touch of witchery to the Maeterlinckian unreality of this dream landscape, there is the light mist of evening, a breath from the deep outer seas.⁷⁴

Promoters framed the area, with its soft rolling hills and decaying fishing sheds, as picturesque, and, through their brochures and articles, constructed a landscape for visitors to appreciate.⁷⁵

71 Thornley, *St. Andrews By-the-Sea*.

72 The connection between photographs of the landscape and tourist promotion is documented by Colin Howell, who writes that "the connection between literary and artistic themes and the emergence of the tourist trade is striking. Photographer Amos Lawrence Hardy's picturesque views of Grand Pré Willows, Fundy Tides and peaceful orchards collected in *The Evangeline Land* (1902) were intended to evoke images of an unspoiled natural paradise that would attract summer visitors to the province". Colin Howell, "The 1900s: Industry, Urbanization and Reform", in E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise, eds., *The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation* (Toronto, 1993), p. 179.

73 *The Bay Pilot*, 10 May 1888.

74 Thornley, *St. Andrews By-the-Sea*.

75 For more on the construction of landscape for tourists in Canada, see Patricia Jasen's "Romanticism, Modernity, and the Evolution of Tourism on the Niagara Frontier", *Canadian Historical Review*, 3 (1991), pp. 283-92.

The “healthfulness” of the location soon began to take precedence over the beauty of the landscape and the pleasant climate in the promotional literature, however. Thus, it is to this quality that we must turn to understand the resort’s continuing appeal, and, indeed, the growth of other, similar, turn-of-the-century resorts (such as Campobello Island, N.B., where Franklin D. Roosevelt’s parents, and later he, himself, had a summer home). The summer visitors were not only drawn by the many pleasures offered by a summer resort. There were also philosophical and medical reasons which led them to choose St. Andrews as their summer home. In advertising literature and newspaper articles St. Andrews was publicized not only as an “ideal spot for a summer sojourn, ...blending romance with the beautiful in nature”, but, also, as having “a peculiar charm for health-seekers”.⁷⁶ What special healing process in this seaside community attracted, each year, a pilgrimage of the ailing, drawn by the promise of miraculous relief? Two common 19th century complaints which brought sufferers to St. Andrews were neurasthenia and hay fever. Although symptomatically and causally these afflictions were, and are, unrelated, St. Andrews came to be seen as a refuge from both. To understand why it is necessary to consider how contemporary medical experts viewed these diseases, and how they proposed to cure the people, almost exclusively elites, who seemed to suffer from them.

Neurasthenia may be characterized as the physical manifestation of an intellectual movement circulating among the educated and affluent members of North American society in the closing years of the 19th century. This movement, which took many forms, was essentially a recoil from modernity. Labelled by T.J. Jackson Lears as ‘antimodernism’, it was socially and intellectually significant, often, paradoxically, coexisting with support for material progress.⁷⁷ Though Lears’ work concentrates primarily on the United States, antimodern sentiments were spread “among the educated and affluent on both sides of the Atlantic”. Moreover, Lears’ specific focus on New England is particularly appropriate to this study, since it was members of the New England elite who first promoted St. Andrews as a summer and health resort, and they were also prominent among its early consumers. Antimodern sentiments resulted from a profound cultural crisis, caused by the rapid urbanization and industrialization of parts of eastern North America during the 19th century.⁷⁸ According to Colin Howell, “rapid industrialization and rural depopulation encouraged essentially romantic testimonies to the virtues of small-town and rural life.”⁷⁹ Antimodernism was not a clearly formulated intellectual doctrine, but rather an impulse, or sentiment. For many, the cults of progress, stability and materialism had become both oppressive and suffocating. They brought restraint and uniformity into the world, but did not resolve the

76 *Sea Coast Resorts*.

77 T.J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920* (New York, 1981), pp. xiii-xvii.

78 David W. Noble, *The Progressive Mind, 1890-1917* (Chicago, 1970), p. 1.

79 Howell, “The 1900s”, p. 178.

increasing conflicts in society.⁸⁰ Many North American intellectuals feared that urban living was accompanied by 'effeminacy' and 'luxury', produced by material progress. The triumph of modern culture produced a sensation that life was not only overcivilized, but, perhaps because of this, somehow unreal. Renunciation of this unreality was manifested in a desire for authentic experience, a desire to "smash the glass and breathe freely". On a more theoretical level, it resulted from an abhorrence of the rationalization of modern society.⁸¹ In *The Quest of the Folk*, Ian McKay explains that, from the late 19th century, "scepticism about 'progress' and fear that unprecedented social and economic changes were destroying the possibility of 'authentic' experience...shaped social thought and cultural expression across a wide cultural spectrum".⁸²

The elite were particularly susceptible to the antimodern impulse. For the Victorians, "economic success contained the seeds of moral failure". If a businessman was diligent and frugal, then prosperity resulted. With prosperity, however, came an inevitable decline into a life of luxury. As urban North America moved inexorably towards a consumer-oriented economy, the urban bourgeoisie, with the premium placed on purchasing material comfort, were becoming 'overcivilized'. This 'decline into luxury' was accompanied by a longing for authentic experience. "Antimodern impulses were rooted in longings to recapture an elusive 'real life' in a culture evaporating into unreality".⁸³ These longings were concentrated in a desire to return to the "simple life". Antimodernists saw an ideal in rural culture which had disappeared from urban living. As Ian McKay observes, the simplicity and security of the rural village were juxtaposed to the modern, complex and chaotic instability of the city.⁸⁴

Promoters of St. Andrews, implicitly, if not explicitly, responded to the longings of the antimodernists.

Conditions for a summer residence here are ideal. The influence of the sea in tempering the climate, the charm of well-kept roads, wooded hills, and excellent boating facilities are only a few of the attractions which lure visitors and summer residents to this delightful place. There is something

80 John Higham, "The Reorientation of American Culture in the 1890's", in *Writing American History* (Indiana, 1970), p. 89.

81 Lears, *No Place of Grace*, pp. 4-7. The process of rationalization mentioned here is best described by Max Weber: "the systematic organization of economic life for maximum productivity and of individual life for maximum personal achievement; the drive for efficient control of nature under the banner of improving human welfare; the reduction of the world into a disenchanted object to be manipulated by rational technique" (p. 7).

82 Ian McKay, *The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal & Kingston, 1994), p. 31.

83 Lears, *No Place of Grace*, pp. 26, 28, 32-3.

84 Ian McKay, "Among the Fisherfolk: J.F.B. Livesay and the Invention of Peggy's Cove", *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 1 & 2 (1988), p. 32.

about this quiet town that supplies all the needs for relaxation and repose. In St. Andrews is eliminated the hurry and the tension of modern life.⁸⁵

The overcivilized, nervous bourgeoisie needed to return to the clear purpose of rural life. The easiest way for them to do this was to go out into the unspoiled countryside. In St. Andrews, this goal was simple enough to achieve. "Out from St. Andrews-by-the-Sea, in all directions [were] perfectly constructed roads, forest-lined and shaded, reaching sheltered spots by ocean and inland lake".⁸⁶ Summer visitors could take any number of trips into the unspoiled countryside: they could go to Chamcook mountains and lakes, to other nearby coves, along the river and, at low water, across the bar road to Minister's Island. This last drive, to the island where Sir William Van Horne had built his summer cottage, was unique, as

it present[ed] the novelty once experienced by the children of Israel — that of going through a passage in the sea which had fallen back on either side. This drive takes one through the bed of the ocean twenty feet below sea level at high water.⁸⁷

Rural areas were attractive to antimodernists in other ways; the spacious nature of the outdoors signified a release from the institutional and physical constraints of modern capitalist society. In St. Andrews, the town's promoters stressed the unobstructed views offered by the landscape. The Algonquin Hotel, the primary destination for summer visitors, stood overlooking the town, 150 feet above sea level. "From its broad piazzas an unobstructed view is had, disclosing the whole panorama of Passamaquoddy Bay, with the Chamcook Mountains, the St. Croix River and the distant shores of Nova Scotia for a background".⁸⁸ It was not only these surroundings that differed from modern capitalist society. The town, too, was very different from visitors' urban homes, "quiet and peaceful, and many of its quaint and old-fashioned streets and by-ways are embowered in trees, making fragrant shady resting-places for those whose only glimpse of nature during the greater part of the year is caught in the city's small artificial parks".⁸⁹ Life in a small rural town was indeed very different from that in the city. The promotional brochure for another, smaller hotel, The Inn, also owned by the C.P.R., underlined this fact. Coming to St. Andrews was "an agreeable change from city life", and provided children "ample room for play without annoying the neighbours, for here they are practically out in the country, with plenty of freedom, without isolation".⁹⁰

85 *The Algonquin Hotel*, Promotional Brochure (1913).

86 *The Way we Were*, p. 75.

87 *The Algonquin Hotel*, Promotional Brochure (1913).

88 *Sea Coast Resorts of the Atlantic Coast*.

89 *The Way we Were*, p. 75.

90 Booklet advertising The Inn, St. Andrews by the Sea, N.B., published c.1912. Charlotte County Archives.

Most importantly, all this could be enjoyed in the company of others of one's social class. This rural experience was not the solitary hiking or wilderness camping of the 20th century. There was still interaction with other people, but it was an escape from those who were less fortunate. The year-round residents, while not, perhaps, of the same social class as the visitors, were always properly respectful to them; and during the summer the local newspapers became a veritable social column for the hotel guests, listing their names, origins and activities in painstaking detail, always deferring to their social status. The more restful aspects of the city elites' culture were also available to nourish their sensibilities in the country. An impromptu performance by a hotel guest rated considerable coverage in "Notes and News about the Summer Tourists", a regular feature in one local newspaper.

On Sunday evening the many guests of the "Algonquin" were most charmingly entertained by Mrs. Julia Houston-West, the well-known soprano of Boston, who kindly consented to sing several songs which she rendered with great brilliancy and feeling, much to the delight of the audience which quickly gathered upon hearing the first tunes of her fine voice. Among other selections were "The Lost Chord," "Watchman what of the Night," "One Sweetly Solemn Thought." Miss Ilsley, of Philadelphia, accompanied Miss West on the piano.⁹¹

Rural areas also represented virility and vitality, providing the opportunity to respond to a perceived need to toughen the 'flabby bourgeoisie'.⁹² Wilderness came to be seen as a "source of virility, toughness, and savagery — qualities that defined fitness in Darwinian terms".⁹³ Enthusiasm for wilderness was manifested most strongly in a growing enthusiasm for the outdoor life in general, particularly for outdoor activities.⁹⁴ This revitalized interest in untamed nature and upsurge in enthusiasm for outdoor recreation translated into anything from taking up golf to going to a vacation resort that emphasized its outdoor facilities.⁹⁵ St. Andrews could provide this, with its "plethora of outdoor sports and amusements".⁹⁶ The elites could come to this small town and indulge in the bygone pleasures of the rural life, such as fishing. At the turn of the century, fishing was excellent in St. Andrews; there are about twenty lakes within 15 miles of the town. Thus promoters could claim, without exaggeration, that "the fisherman can go to nearly all the best

91 *The St. Andrews Beacon*, 1 August 1889.

92 Higham, "The Reorientation of American Culture", pp. 80-1, argues that masculinity was "an absolutely indispensable remedy for the artificiality and effeteness of late nineteenth-century urban life".

93 Roderick Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* ([1967]; New Haven, 1973), p. 145.

94 Lears, *No Place of Grace*, pp. 102, 108.

95 Higham, "The Reorientation of American Culture", pp. 80-1.

96 *The Algonquin Hotel*, Promotional Brochure (1913), p. 5.

lakes and streams in the morning, returning in the evening”.⁹⁷ Activities provided by the Algonquin Hotel included “one of the best golf courses in America. Here also, the visitor finds agreeable bathing conditions, splendid boating facilities, numerous tennis courts and croquet lawns, [and, by 1913] an electric-lighted bowling green”.⁹⁸

The most prominent health-related manifestation of the antimodern impulse was the immobilizing, self-punishing depression called ‘neurasthenia’. A response to modern culture, neurasthenia was a new nervous malady, combining a variety of modern-day neurotic symptoms. The first major work on this subject was published in 1881 by George Miller Beard, an American neurologist. He discovered that many of his patients suffered from vague, unclassifiable symptoms, like morbid anxiety, unaccountable fatigue, irrational fears and compulsive or inadequate sexual behaviour. He characterized this multitude of symptoms as belonging to one disease: neurasthenia, a weakness of the nervous system. Neurasthenia was a condition that had evolved during the 19th century. According to Beard, it was caused by modern civilization, which could be distinguished from earlier times by “five characteristics: steam-power, the periodical press, the telegraph, the sciences, and the mental activity of women”.⁹⁹ There were also secondary and tertiary causes, including climate, institutions and personal habits, all of which were only dangerous when connected with modern civilization. Neurasthenia was the primary type of nervous disorder, but it was allied with other “functional nerve-maladies”, including hysteria, hay fever, sick-headache, inebriety and insanity. Commentators agreed that, in the United States, neurasthenia predominated in metropolitan New England; in addition, educated business and professional men, and their wives, were the most likely to be bedridden with nervous prostration. The conclusion they reached seems obvious: more civilized individuals were the most susceptible to these new varieties of nervousness; therefore, they resulted from overcivilization. There were not necessarily actually more people with nervous diseases, but observers believed that there were.¹⁰⁰

Although Beard thought that the cure for neurasthenia should be patient-specific, other writers prescribed the rest cure. Not only did this seem less intrusive to the patient, it would be easy for the elite sufferers of neurasthenia to arrange. Originally, absolute rest was thought essential, but this view quickly softened, and for some

97 *The Algonquin Hotel*, Promotional Brochure (1913), p. 19. Hunting and fishing for wealthy tourists, particularly Americans, brought in significant revenue throughout the Maritimes, and were promoted as part of the growing focus on tourism at this time. See Howell, “The 1900s”, p. 180. The St. Andrews area, however, was not well-known for these activities, in contrast to the Restigouche and Miramichi areas, judging from the data in Geoffrey Wall, “Recreational Lands”, in D. Kerr and D.W. Holdsworth, eds., *Historical Atlas of Canada, Vol. III* (Toronto, 1990), plate 36.

98 *The Algonquin Hotel*, Promotional Brochure (1913), p. 3.

99 George M. Beard, *American Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences* ([1881] New York, 1972), p. vi.

100 Lears, *No Place of Grace*, pp. 50-2.

patients moderate exercise was suggested.¹⁰¹ The sort of rest needed was not bed-rest, but rather making “every day a Sabbath”, free from the demands and stresses caused by modern civilization.¹⁰² The rest cure was the most popular form of therapy. To cure their neurasthenia people were enjoined to cultivate relaxation and repose in a setting isolated from nervous stimuli. St. Andrews was able to capitalize on these needs. That St. Andrews

possesses all the advantages that a tourist desires in the way of pure air, picturesque scenery, health-giving surroundings and wholesome sport is a fact that is patent to every stranger who has personally investigated the matter...The atmosphere is clear and bracing, and to the individual whose nerves have lost their grip through the sedentary habits of city life it opens up possibilities that he had thought were beyond his ken.¹⁰³

St. Andrews seemed the ideal destination for the elite sufferers of neurasthenia. After its first real season as a summer resort, in an article in the *St. Andrews Beacon* entitled “A Resting Place — A Sanatorium — A Pleasant Resort”, A.W. Smith explained the value of a trip to St. Andrews to the neurasthenic.

[T]here is no question of its being a sanatorium — a place where the influences are naturally and spontaneously promptive of health and vigour without human aid — a place where those seeking rest and relaxation can tarry at pleasure in the excellent hotels and nice cottages, and establish health without taking any other treatment than such is afforded by hygienic tables, sea baths, and exercises of their own selection. Here the tired, worn-out, nervously prostrated man or woman, or the afflicted dyspeptic may cast a hopeful anchor in this haven of havens. If the matter-of-fact reader should imagine this picture is slightly overdrawn, I can refer him to any of the visitors who were here, [who] left restored with excellent health.¹⁰⁴

Testimonials from such satisfied visitors poured into the offices of the *Beacon*, at least judging from the number printed. Every year, writers attested to its suitability as a destination. In 1890, for example, one visitor wrote that “[i]t is difficult to imagine surroundings more congenial to restfulness and health”. And in 1891, Octave Thanet, another typical correspondent, reported that “Beyond any resting place that I know its very air distils rest”.¹⁰⁵ As the 1892 season opened,

101 These views are cited in Simon Wessely, “Old wine in new bottles: neurasthenia and ‘ME’”, *Psychological Medicine*, 20 (1990), pp. 45-7.

102 George M. Beard, *A Practical Treatise on Nervous Exhaustion (Neurasthenia), Its Symptoms, Nature, Sequences, Treatment* ([1888, 1905] New York, 1971), p. 184.

103 *The St. Andrews Beacon*, 15 July 1897.

104 *Ibid.*, 12 September 1889.

105 *Ibid.*, 31 July 1890 and 16 July 1891.

advertising increasingly targeted people looking for “pure, health-giving air from the sounding sea and the balsamic forest groves”. The advertising apparently proved effective, for the summer crowd described by the *Sun* of Pittsfield, Massachusetts epitomized the neurasthenic type: “Every summer the Algonquin fills more and more overflowing with the tired and the overwrought, to get refreshment in the invigoration and balm of the breezes and the peace that dwells like a blessing upon it”. The summer visitors were still undoubtedly drawn largely from among the elite. As the *St. Andrews Beacon* proudly boasted, “thousands of well-to-do Canadians and Americans who had heard of the natural attractions of the place, and the health-giving properties of its climate, have made ‘The Algonquin’ their summer home”.¹⁰⁶

The other complaint that drove people to St. Andrews was hay fever. *Catarrhus aestivus* was first investigated scientifically by Charles Harrison Blackley, a Manchester physician. He was not the first person to suspect a causal relationship between pollen and hay fever, but he was the first to prove it existed.¹⁰⁷ By the time Blackley’s *Experimental Researches on the Causes and Nature of Catarrhus aestivus* was first published, in 1873, many theories which sought to explain the occurrence of hay fever had been presented.¹⁰⁸ They included “high temperature with dryness of the atmosphere, ...excess of moisture with high temperature”, ozone, “odours of various kinds, especially those given off by plants”, common dust and “the agent which has given the popular name to the malady”. The pollen of grass and other flowering plants had also been put forth as a cause.¹⁰⁹ Even George Beard had theories about hay fever, although he was completely wrong. For Beard, “the rise and growth of hay-fever” in the United States was an extraordinary and instructive example of nervous disease, being “subjective more than objective, though excited and maintained by invading objective irritations”.¹¹⁰ According to Beard, hay fever was, if “philosophically analyzed”, simply a “nervous idiosyncrasy”, usually manifested as a reaction against an external irritant, such as pollen, sunlight, dust, heat or smoke. These external irritants could “no more excite hay fever than they can excite small-pox or leprosy”, unless the sufferer was already predisposed by neurasthenia.¹¹¹ Bringing the misconceptions closer to home, a patent medicine advertisement in the *Bay Pilot* (the first mention of hay fever in a St. Andrews advertisement) claimed that hay fever sufferers, along with those suffering from catarrh and catarrhal deafness, “are not generally aware that these

106 *Ibid.*, 2 June, 4 August 1892, 16 July 1893.

107 Geoffrey Taylor and Jane Walker, “Charles Harrison Blackley, 1820-1900”, *Clinical Allergy*, 3 (1973), pp. 103, 108.

108 Charles Harrison Blackley, *Experimental Researches on the Causes and Nature of Catarrhus Aestivus (Hay-Fever or Hay-Asthma)* ([1873] London, 1959), pp. 5-6.

109 Blackley, *Experimental Researches*, pp. 12-13.

110 Beard, *American Nervousness*, p. 60.

111 Beard, *Nervous Exhaustion*, pp. 170-1.

diseases are contagious, or that they are due to the presence of living parasites in the lining membrane of the nose".¹¹²

Who suffered from this ailment? As with neurasthenia, it was the elites. One of the most interesting features of Blackley's analysis of hay fever is his conviction that it was solely an upper-class affliction, striking those who were educated and of Anglo-Saxon stock. "Hay-fever is said to be an aristocratic disease, and there can be no doubt that, if it is not wholly confined to the upper classes of society, it is rarely, if ever, met with but among the educated".¹¹³ He stated that most writers were agreed on this point, explaining that "that condition of the nervous system which mental training generates is one which is especially favourable to the development of the disorder". Beard's treatment of hay fever agreed with this diagnosis. He asserted that "where neurasthenia is rare, hay fever is rare, and *vice versa*; they rise and fall together". The people who were afflicted, or at least diagnosed as being afflicted, by neurasthenia, were the same people who, in Blackley's eyes, suffered from hay fever. Luckily for the 'farming class', however, they were practically immune. This was attributed to two possible factors: either their lack of education meant they did not have the predisposition generated by "mental culture", or they had developed an immunity to the effects of pollen due to prolonged exposure. After a brief history of education and the cultivation of hay-grass in England, Blackley concluded:

it is highly probable that hay-fever was at one time altogether unknown, and it is tolerably certain that it has not only become much more frequent of late, but as population increases and as civilisation and education advance, the disorder will become more common than it is at the present time.¹¹⁴

Statistics eventually belied these assertions.¹¹⁵

There have been a number of suggested remedies for hay fever. In late 19th-century America, cocaine was featured in hay fever remedies, as well as in local anaesthetics and soft drinks.¹¹⁶ This remedy was even featured at the Algonquin once, in the form of "cocaine caramels" at Saturday night dinner. It was explained "for the benefit of those who are not acquainted with the dish that it is a species of nerve food, equally as good for hay fever people as for those who are not affected with the malady".¹¹⁷ Blackley tried many treatments in search of a cure: these

112 *The Bay Pilot*, 1 November 1888. The advertisement appeared three more times, then disappeared.

113 Blackley, *Experimental Researches*, p. 7.

114 Blackley, *Experimental Researches*, pp. 155-62.

115 William Scheppegegrell, *Hayfever and Asthma: Care, Prevention and Treatment* (New York, 1922), pp. 129-31.

116 David F. Musto, "Cocaine's history, especially the American experience", in *Cocaine: scientific and social dimensions (Ciba Foundation Symposium 166)* (Toronto, 1992), p. 7. Mariani's wine (a popular cocaine concoction) was also recommended for lassitude, poor appetite and melancholy — as a tonic for mind and body, and a common remedy for neurasthenia.

117 Attributed to *The St. Andrews Beacon*, from the collection of the Charlotte County Archives.

included “baths in various forms — the vapour bath, the hot-air bath, as well as the plunge and the shower bath — but none of these seemed to be of the slightest use”. He also tried drugs, including Quinine, Arsenic and *Nux vomica*, but their effects convinced him instead to “put up with the annoyance occasioned by the yearly occurrence of the disorder”. The only pharmacological treatment he suggested was direct application of Opium or Belladonna inside the nose, and then only in extreme cases, “when the patient will be glad to purchase temporary relief at any reasonable cost”.¹¹⁸

Admitting that drugs had proven ineffective, Blackley did suggest one less intrusive method of alleviating the disease: “a sojourn at the sea-side is one of the best modes of palliating and often curing the disease for the time”. But, he went on to note, “it is not every sea-side district that gives the hay-fever patient relief”. The ideal district should have “the form and character of a small island or narrow peninsula”. Since pollens are wind-borne, it is

a matter of importance in selecting a retreat for the hay-season to find one where the prevailing winds are from the sea...where the patient can be continually near the water, and if possible a place where the shore is backed with high cliffs, because these act as a sort of screen when a land wind is blowing.¹¹⁹

This is, geographically, a perfect description of St. Andrews. It is on the end of a peninsula, surrounded by water on three sides, and protected from the land by a series of hills called the Chamcook Mountains. Other experts, such as William Scheppegrell, agreed that often meteorological or topographical conditions prevent the growth of hay fever-causing plants and pointed to hay fever resorts as an option for sufferers. If the resort were located on the coast, then a prevailing wind from the ocean would bring pollen-free air, and thereby relief to the sufferers. But Scheppegrell claimed that “there are few localities in the United States absolutely free of hayfever, as the pollen of most of hayfever plants are very buoyant, and will traverse 5 or more miles under favorable wind conditions”.¹²⁰ Perhaps this explains the popularity of St. Andrews, a locality which, according to many claims, was “absolutely hay-fever exempt”.

Local newspaper editors soon recognised the promotional possibilities of this issue. The first mention of hay fever in *The Bay Pilot* appeared after the summer of 1888. In a reprinted article about St. Andrews as a tourist destination from Eastport, Maine, the town was touted as “a locality which is a sure cure for that pernicious and semi-fashionable disease, hay fever”.¹²¹ St. Andrews’ apparent freedom from hay fever was first discussed in detail in *The St. Andrews Beacon* on

118 Blackley, *Experimental Researches*, pp. 198-9.

119 Blackley, *Experimental Researches*, pp. 199-200.

120 Scheppegrell, *Hayfever and Asthma*, pp. 210-12, 237. Unfortunately, his list does not include Canadian resorts.

121 *The Bay Pilot*, 9 September 1888.

15 August 1889. The article focussed on the United States Hay fever Association, organised in the early 1870s, “for mutual benefit”, to find any remedies or exempt districts which may exist. St. Andrews was one such exempt district and the editor of *The St. Andrews Beacon* quickly realized the potential of the town’s hay fever-free status. He confidently announced that “those hayfever people who have hitherto entertained doubts as to St. Andrews being an exempt locality can henceforth bid farewell to all their fears and wipe their weeping eyes”.¹²² By the close of the season, he claimed that it had been demonstrated that “St. Andrews enjoys perfect immunity from that most distressing malady — hay fever”. Indeed, there was considerable anecdotal evidence to support this claim. “We have had some of the worst cases of hay fever here lately, and in every instance the malady has succumbed to our healthful atmospheric influences”. Perhaps more importantly for the town’s revenues, the United States Hay Fever Association, at its annual meeting, discussed St. Andrews.

Promoters immediately prepared to take advantage of this potential market. “As there are thousands of people in the United States who suffer from this painful malady, and who are constantly seeking for exempt localities, we think there is good ground for anticipating a large influx of this class of people next year”. To attract hay fever sufferers, the summer hotels found it expedient to extend their season “to the 1st of October at least”. Why? The hay fever season lasted well into the autumn, and if hay fever sufferers returned home before that date they were liable to have a recurrence of their malady.¹²³ As the next season approached, the town’s hotels stressed their role as a hay fever resort. The Algonquin Hotel Company released a new advertising circular, which contained “testimonials from physicians and others showing the absolute immunity from hay fever which St. Andrews enjoys”. Similarly, the Argyll Hotel, in its first advertisement of the year, declared itself “Absolutely exempt from HAY FEVER”.¹²⁴

Trying to appeal to people with hay fever may have been a successful strategy, but it was not an original one. Promoters in the Passamaquoddy region had been trying to attract such people since at least 1882, as an advertisement from the International Steamship Company’s *Eastern Sea Coast Route* indicates: “Persons liable to the inflictions of Hay Fever or Autumnal Catarrh can readily escape its pain and torments by going to Eastport, Campobello, Grand Manan, St. John or other places on the shores of the Bay of Fundy”.¹²⁵ However, once local partisans adopted the strategy as their own, the campaign became more focussed, and brooked no opposition. In the 10-year period after St. Andrews became a hay fever resort, references to cures for hay fever appeared only twice in the *Beacon*’s patent medicine advertisements. The first, “‘Got hay-fever?’ Some say Johnson’s Anodyne Liniment will cure it. Try it and report to us” appeared on 6 June 1891. It is probable that the advertisement brought some complaints from businessmen in the

¹²²*Ibid.*, 29 August 1889.

¹²³*Ibid.*, 12, 19 September 1889.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 20 March, 1 May 1890.

¹²⁵International Steamship Company, *Eastern Sea Coast Routes* (Boston, 1882).

town, for this was its only appearance. St. Andrews was considerably enriched by hay-feverites, and by the publicity it received as a hay fever exempt district. If the town's organ of self-promotion were to begin advertising alternate cures for hay fever, then its status as a hay fever-exempt locality could quite possibly be threatened. After all, such cures should be unnecessary there! The second advertisement appeared six years later in May 1897, promoting Dr. Chase's Catarrh Cure, which "cures cold in the head in ten minutes. Cures chronic catarrh, hay fever and rose fever. Complete, with blower free. Price 23 cents". This advertisement made a second appearance the following week, then disappeared. In both cases, the advertisements for the patent medicines continued to appear regularly, but without the promise that they would cure hay fever.

In 1891, the Algonquin's advertisement again stressed the "absolute exemption from hay fever".¹²⁶ The United States Hay Fever Association was also back in the news. Emory Speer, a hay-feverite and a Georgia judge, as well as a vice-president of that eminent organization, had, the article reported, written a letter to the association, in which he endorsed St. Andrews: "I feel it my duty, as a member of the Association, to apprise you, and through you, our members, of the conditions of St. Andrews, as they relate to hay fever.... [St. Andrews] is wholly free from our remorseless enemy".¹²⁷ Hay fever was still undoubtedly a topic of interest for *The Saint Andrews Beacon* in 1891. An editorial once again extolling the virtues of St. Andrews for a hay fever patient claimed "*materia medica* had nothing that could alleviate his sufferings, the skill of the most skilful physicians was set completely at naught". The same issue of the newspaper also included yet more testimonials from overjoyed hay-feverites who found themselves free from the dreaded affliction. Mr. Frank J. Lewis was one of them, Mr. V.C. Crosby another.

Lewis: "Being fond of fishing and out-door sports, I was exposed night and day to all kinds of weather, without having a single symptom of the disease, which cannot be said of any other place I have ever visited".

Crosby: "I have been a victim of hay fever it its most acute forms for the last 23 yrs, and have tried many of the so-called exempt districts...I am entirely free from this disease, even in its mildest form, at St. Andrews".¹²⁸

In the next few years, the advertisements continued to mention the absolute hay fever exemption enjoyed by St. Andrews. By 1897, however, the Algonquin was presumably secure in its market as a destination for hay-feverites, as it stopped mentioning hay fever in its seasonal advertisements.¹²⁹

According to Colin Howell and Michael Smith, "by the 1890s the cry for physical regeneration through appropriate exercise had become a standard part of

¹²⁶*The St. Andrews Beacon*, 7 May 1891.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 21 May 1891.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, 6 August 1891.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, 13 May 1897.

the vocabulary of the medical doctor".¹³⁰ Concurrently, St. Andrews had risen in prominence as a fashionable resort, building its reputation on the twin pillars of its natural beauty and salubrious climate. Local newspapers like *The St. Andrews Beacon* helped to maintain the momentum of development, regularly publishing glowing testimonials:

[St. Andrews is] a desirable and healthy resort, with its pure clean air, impregnated with ozone from the salt water; in proof of which, a letter received a few days ago from a Montreal lady, who with members of her family sojourned for some time at the Algonquin, writes: — 'since our return, our friends have been congratulating me on my appearance, naturally concluding that there is no place like St. Andrews for restoring an invalid to perfect health'. This is not only highly commendatory, but a gratifying testimonial to the healthfulness of the town — indeed a sanatorium.¹³¹

Attempts by local entrepreneurs to use the area's natural resources as health attractions were not unusual; in 1891, for example, the Algonquin's advertisement contained a new item: "pure Artesian well water". This sounds delightfully refreshing. Sometimes, however, the promoters who attempted to take advantage of the town's reputation for remarkable curative powers went too far. Take the new business for St. Andrews that year: Koomoosaba, a "large and commodious residence" promoted as a sanatorium. Presumably hoping to capitalize on the summer business, advertisements for Koomoosaba began appearing at the same time as advertisements for the other hotels. It was surrounded by pine and fir trees, and within one minute's walk of the water. The owners, Dr. W. Osburn and Dr. C.V. Forster, had been trained in the United States and England. Many conveniences were offered under their supervision. According to their advertisement,

[a] limited number of invalids can be accommodated and provided with every comfort, in addition to medical attendance and nursing. The hygienic requirements are perfect in every respect, and the appointments of the house are all that can be desired, most careful attention having been given to the plumbing, ventilation and drainage.¹³²

The sanatorium at Koomoosaba, however, remained open for only one summer. Drs. Osburn and Forster had, apparently, misjudged the market. The types of people who came to St. Andrews for health were not looking for pseudo-hospital care; instead, they wanted rest, fresh air and exercise, or, in the case of hay-feverites, a respite from that dreaded affliction. They did not want to be invalids,

¹³⁰Colin Howell and Michael Smith, "Orthodox Medicine and the Health Reform Movement in the Maritimes, 1850-1885", *Acadiensis*, XVIII, 2 (Spring 1989), p. 71.

¹³¹*The Saint Andrews Beacon*, 22 August 1889.

¹³²*Ibid.*, 7 May 1891.

and really needed very little medical attention or nursing. Nor is it likely that a sanatorium would have been greeted very enthusiastically in a town where the newspapers reported that there was “very little sickness of any kind...and the doctors have abundance of time to do their gardening”.¹³³ The Boston *Courier* reported that “there has never been a case of hay fever, malaria or nervous prostration that originated, or that could be self-sustaining in St. Andrews”.

Still, some enterprising entrepreneurs continued to find ways to capitalize on St. Andrews’ reputation as a health resort. One of the more successful of such projects was the development of Algonquin Springs. Purchased as part of the Samson property by Robert S. Gardiner in the late 1890s, it was believed to have valuable medicinal properties. In 1904, a chalet was constructed over the Algonquin mineral spring, and drinking taps were provided for public use.

A neat pavilion with the sides open all round has been erected about the well. Within the pavilion seats have been provided. The water of the spring bubbles up...[and] a drinking cup has been provided for those who wish to partake of the sparkling waters of the spring.¹³⁴

The hotel management was quick to take advantage of the spring’s commercial possibilities, and by the next year they were advertising the “tables supplied with Algonquin Spring water”.¹³⁵ The water from the spring was said to have a slight smell and taste of sulphur; this does not seem particularly pleasant, and, indeed, “to many people it just tasted ‘bad’, and they could not understand why it was shipped inland to people in large glass jars”.¹³⁶

References to the healthfulness of St. Andrews tapered off as its status as a summer resort rose. Instead, the pleasurable aspects of vacationing there were stressed. This could be because neurasthenia was eventually discredited, as medical scepticism increased, psychiatric diagnoses became more precise, and its social demography changed.¹³⁷ The causes of hay fever, too, became more widely known, and it, too, was determined to be an affliction of more than the upper classes. In the early days of the town’s heyday as a resort, however, promoters boasted that “no better medicine can be recommended the tired brain-worker, or summer health and pleasure-seeker, than a sojourn at this Passamaquoddy Resort”.¹³⁸

The flight from civilisation and progress, from the heat of the city to the restful calm of the coast and, of course, from the dreaded affliction of hay fever brought people to St. Andrews. The elite were able to flee to a unique lifestyle in a community which catered to their needs and wants. Life at a resort such as St. Andrews was splendid for the elite visitors who made it their summer home. There

133 *Ibid.*, 15 May 1890.

134 *Ibid.*, 16 March 1899, 7 July, 25 August 1904.

135 *Ibid.*, 6 July 1905.

136 *A Brief History of Fresh Water*, Charlotte County Archives.

137 Wessely, “Old Wine in New Bottles”, pp. 47-8.

138 *Sea Coast Resorts*, p. 35.

was a social season, with “dancing every evening to the music of a fine orchestra”. The wealthy could frolic, enjoying “excellent sea bathing at half a dozen places about St. Andrews”, or join a club, like *The St. Andrews Lawn Tennis Club*, the *St. Andrews Cricket Club*, or the *Pic-nic Club*. It was a delightful place to spend one’s summers, with “the amusement-providers at the Algonquin [keeping] their hands full devising ways and means to entertain the large number of guests at the hotel”. Take, for example, this typical evening:

On Monday night, a brilliant euchre party assembled in the Algonquin parlors on the invitation of Mrs. Wheeler of Montreal. The ladies wore their most beautiful dresses and their most captivating smiles, and the gentlemen — there is an abundance of good looking summer men here this year — were as gallant as gallants could be. Everything passed off pleasantly. Light refreshments were served.¹³⁹

St. Andrews, New Brunswick, underwent a renaissance in the last 15 years of the 19th century. By 1870 the town had suffered a serious period of decline, and had become a quaint, dilapidated little former port. By 1900 it was a boom town, and a fashionable summer resort. The New England and Eastern Canadian elites, driven by antimodernist impulses and their resultant neurasthenia, combined with the suffering hay-feverites to give the town a reputation as a health resort. A new lifestyle had developed around it, one of health and pleasure, however fleeting. Indeed, the retreat from ‘modernity’ anticipated what Ian McKay calls “a new ‘primitivist’ style in which tourism became ‘a flight from civilisation and progress in search of a world of pleasure’”.¹⁴⁰ It is perhaps best to let the town’s newspaper, *The Saint Andrews Beacon*, end this study, as it provided an epilogue upon the closing of each season at the Algonquin, bowing to those who now provided the town with its livelihood.

The summer season, so far as tourists are concerned, is at an end. The summer girl and the summer man have put on their hats, packed up their valises, stowed away their bundle of golf sticks, broken their summer ‘engagements’, and have hastened back to the grind of city life, with a fresh stock of tan and freckles, a fresh stock of stories with which to while away the long winter months, and what is of more importance, a fresh stock of health and energy....The quality of our visitors has not deteriorated. The very best people from everywhere have stayed with us this season, and many have given assurance that they will return another year.¹⁴¹

139 *The St. Andrews Beacon*, 26 July 1894.

140 Ian McKay, “Among the Fisherfolk”, p. 37.

141 *The Saint Andrews Beacon*, 7 September 1899.

The 1904 Anglo-French Newfoundland Fisheries Convention: Another Look

THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS at the turn of the century, as well as that which specifically addresses the 1904 *entente cordiale*, for the most part makes only passing mention of the Newfoundland fisheries issue. Understandably, the focus of these accounts tends to be on the changing relations between the great powers, and on the most important aspect of the *entente* itself, which was the definition of boundaries and spheres of influence in North and West Africa. The exceptions are P.J.V. Rolo's study of the *entente*, which does recognize the crucial place of the fisheries issue in the context of the overall negotiation, and F.F. Thompson's brief account of the Newfoundland settlement from a colonial perspective in his standard work on the French, or Treaty, Shore question.¹ This note expands these accounts of the evolution of the 1904 Anglo-French Fisheries Convention, reinforces the view that it was vital to the successful completion of the overall package, and looks at the aftermath.

This is not the place to discuss in detail the reasons for Anglo-French rapprochement which culminated in the 1904 *entente cordiale*. At the risk of oversimplification, one can point to several key factors. The Fashoda incident (1898) demonstrated, in time, to many French politicians that there was no hope of ending the resented British occupation of Egypt and the Nile valley. Confrontation with Britain in Africa was clearly futile, and accommodation potentially advantageous. Increasingly, the *parti colonial* urged the French government to consider giving up its financial and economic influence in Egypt, recognizing British predominance there, in return for British acceptance of France's ambition to establish a protectorate over Morocco and concessions elsewhere.² Once this reasoning had been accepted and advanced by the French government, the British government eventually proved willing to respond positively (if carefully). The South African war had been a humiliating experience, and both Britain and France were concerned about German military expansion. In addition, the Foreign Office hoped that France might be able to help reduce the threat which her ally, Russia,

1 P.J.V. Rolo, *Entente Cordiale. The Origins and Negotiation of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April 1904* (London, 1969); F.F. Thompson, *The French Shore Problem in Newfoundland. An Imperial Study* (Toronto, 1961), pp. 176-87. A summary can be found in A.M. Fraser, "The Convention of 1904", in R.A. MacKay, ed., *Newfoundland. Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies* (Toronto, 1946), pp. 329-32.

2 Christopher Andrew, *Theophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale* (London, 1968), pp. 48, 52, 103; Ann Williams, *Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa* (London, 1968), pp. 7, 69; Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco. Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912* (Chicago, 1976), p.49; Pierre Guillen, "Les accords coloniaux franco-anglais de 1904 et la naissance de l'Entente cordiale", *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 82 (1968), pp. 322-9.

seemed to pose to the security of India. Finally, the British government wanted a free hand in Egypt. In these circumstances an agreement became a real possibility.

Since the 1870s, the traditional rivalry between France and Britain had been expressed in the imperial sphere — Africa, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. It followed that, initially, rapprochement would take the form of a settlement of imperial disputes: this was not to be a formal alliance so much as a removal of irritants. While the need to tidy up the African scramble was of central importance to both countries, there was agreement that a resolution of the long-standing Newfoundland fisheries dispute should be an important component of any overall settlement.

By the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), France had given up its claims to the island of Newfoundland, but had been granted the right to fish, in season, on the Newfoundland coast between Cape Bonavista and Pointe Riche.³ This privilege was renewed in subsequent Anglo-French treaties, though in 1783 the boundaries of the Treaty Shore were shifted to Cape St. John and Cape Ray. In addition, in 1763 Britain ceded to France the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. In effect, France had retained in North America what was necessary to maintain a viable migratory fishery: the right to an inshore fishery along a huge stretch of the Newfoundland coast, and an *abri* from which an offshore bank fishery could be pursued.

During the 19th century, however, a number of serious disputes brought the definition and exercise of these rights into question. By the 1820s the English migratory fishery at Newfoundland had died out. In its place, a resident fishery developed, operated by increasing numbers of permanent settlers, and in the mid-1820s the island (with Labrador) finally became a colony in the official sense. Not surprisingly, Newfoundlanders found the French seasonal presence on the Treaty Shore increasingly objectionable and the treaties which protected that presence anachronistic and frustrating. Supported by the British government, the colony argued that France held a *concurrent* right of fishery on the Shore: so long as French fishing operations were not impeded in any way, British subjects had every right to fish there, and to create settlements. Against this interpretation, France claimed, as it always had, that it possessed an *exclusive* fishery on the Treaty Shore, and that settlement there was strictly illegal.⁴ In some respects this was a not unreasonable position, since it had been the clear intention of 18th century negotiators to create separate French and English fishing zones, and in a declaration appended to the 1783 Treaty of Versailles the British government had promised to remove “the fixed settlements which shall be formed” on the Treaty Shore.

From this fundamental difference an array of subsidiary yet important disputes

- 3 J.K. Hiller, “Utrecht Revisited: The Origins of French Fishing Rights in Newfoundland Waters”, *Newfoundland Studies*, 7,1 (1991), pp. 23-39.
- 4 Thompson, *French Shore Problem*. See also Peter Neary, “The French and American Shore Questions as Factors in Newfoundland History”, in James Hiller and Peter Neary, eds., *Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Essays in Interpretation* (Toronto, 1980), pp. 95-122; and J.K. Hiller, “The Newfoundland Fisheries Issue in Anglo-French Treaties, 1713-1904”, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 24, 1 (1996), pp. 1-23.

over jurisdiction and land use developed. In effect, French insistence that Newfoundlanders had no right to fish, settle, farm or mine on the Shore delayed the development of local government and political representation, and prevented the colonial government from making clear grants of land. In addition, France claimed that its fishermen were not subject to local law. From the 1860s the Newfoundland government had ambitions to control and develop the Treaty Shore, and found French objections increasingly irritating — all the more so as the French fishery there declined steadily, becoming relatively insignificant by the end of the 19th century.⁵ After 1850 the French offshore fishery became far more important, the banking fleet expanded, and St. Pierre boomed as a fishing base and trading centre. This development in turn created another set of difficulties. French bankers habitually used bait fishes (herring, caplin, squid) sold fresh at St. Pierre by Newfoundlanders from the island's south coast. The Newfoundland government disliked this trade because it both encouraged smuggling and assisted the French fishery, whose product was, by the 1880s, competing successfully with Newfoundland fish in glutted European markets. To make matters worse, French outfitters and exporters were subsidized by their government in the form of bounties. The colony's discontent found expression in the 1887 Bait Act, which was primarily designed to prevent bait sales at St. Pierre and so damage the French bank fishery. This legislation was much resented by French fishing interests, and was viewed by the French government as a hostile act. As a form of retaliation, and to strengthen its bargaining position, France responded by asserting and defending its rights, and those of the comparatively few French subjects who still fished on the Treaty Shore.

Despite sporadic attempts to reach a settlement, it proved impossible to find a formula which would satisfy both France and Newfoundland — or, more precisely, all political groups in the colony. By the 1890s the general position was that France was prepared to make significant concessions on the Treaty Shore, so long as Newfoundland guaranteed French bankers free and unimpeded access to bait. But Newfoundland would only concede bait if France lowered or removed its fishery bounties, thereby restoring what was considered to be “fair” competition. The situation was effectively deadlocked.

In 1898 Théophile Delcassé became French foreign minister, and late that year Paul Cambon was appointed ambassador in London with instructions to seek a settlement of the points at issue between the two countries.⁶ This did not mean that substantive discussions began immediately. The Boer War created a postponement, and Delcassé hesitated, clinging to the hope that it might be possible to end Britain's occupation of Egypt. Moreover, he wanted firm evidence that Britain was prepared to come to terms over Morocco.⁷ There were hesitations on the British side as well, where a number of senior politicians and officials, among them Arthur

5 James Hiller, “The Railway and Local Politics in Newfoundland, 1870-1901”, in Hiller and Neary, eds., *Newfoundland*, pp. 123-47.

6 Andrew, *Delcassé*, p. 112.

7 *Ibid.*, chapter 8.

Balfour and Lord Lansdowne, needed convincing that an accommodation with France made sense.⁸

Such factors did not prevent Cambon from probing the possibilities for settlement — indeed, it has been argued that it was he rather than Delcassé who initiated the *entente*.⁹ So far as Newfoundland was concerned, his initial suggestion, in 1901, was that French treaty rights there might be exchanged for the Gambia, a British possession which France had wanted for a long time. Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, refused, but indicated that compensation might be found elsewhere in West Africa — perhaps on the Nigerian border in the region of Sokoto.¹⁰ The idea of linking Newfoundland to Morocco, which Cambon also raised, was dismissed as far-fetched.¹¹ Cambon made other probes in 1902, but it was not until the beginning of 1903 that Delcassé, fearful of Germany and anxious to prevent Britain from checking French ambitions in Morocco, reluctantly came round to the position of Cambon and the *parti colonial* — that is, France would recognize Britain's position in Egypt in return for an agreement on Morocco.¹² Once this linkage was accepted in London, where officials were seriously disturbed by the possibility that Russia might defeat Japan in a Far Eastern War,¹³ it was possible for negotiations to begin. Another strand would, of course, be the link between Newfoundland and West Africa.¹⁴

Though Cambon's early initiatives had had little impact on British policy, the Colonial Office had nevertheless begun serious discussions with the Newfoundland government, whose co-operation was vital to the success of any future negotiation and agreement. This was no doubt an initiative of the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, who was an early convert to a French *entente*. The Liberal government led by Sir Robert Bond reacted in the traditional manner: free access to bait would be included as part of the deal only if France abandoned or modified its bounties, or if the British government provided Newfoundland with financial compensation. Exasperated officials were unable to shift the Newfoundland premier, even after telling him that inflexibility might be punished by denial of permission to open reciprocity talks with the United States — permission which Bond was anxious to obtain. The premier apparently thought that an arbitration on the treaties could well be favourable to Newfoundland, and thus remove the need for compromise. But in July 1903 legal experts in London advised the Newfoundland government that an arbitration would be unwise. As a result, Bond

8 Rolo, *Entente Cordiale*, p. 131; Andrew, *Delcassé*, pp. 124-5, 178.

9 M.B. Hayne, *The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898-1914* (Oxford, 1993), p. 102.

10 Rolo, *Entente Cordiale*, pp. 131-3; Andrew, *Delcassé*, p. 49.

11 Andrew, *Delcassé*, p. 181.

12 Hayne, *French Foreign Office*, p. 105.

13 Guillen, "Les accords coloniaux", p. 320; Zara S. Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (London, 1977), pp. 28-9.

14 Rolo, *Entente Cordiale*, p. 149; Andrew, *Delcassé*, p. 194.

had little option but to accept the necessity of a negotiated settlement.¹⁵

This development coincided with the opening of substantive discussions between Delcassé and Lansdowne in London. With reference to Newfoundland, Delcassé pointed out that while bait supply was of great importance, the considerations that had to be taken into account were “largely of a sentimental nature”. By this he meant that although the French fishery on the Shore was small, it could possibly revive in the future, and the surrender of rights there would be much resented unless there was adequate compensation. For his part, Lansdowne indicated that, in order to gain Newfoundland’s co-operation and agreement, France should consider making concessions on the bounty question. If this were done, a deal might be possible on the basis of French renunciation of treaty rights in return for financial indemnity and free access to bait. Delcassé gave the usual French reply that bounties were a domestic matter, and the conversation moved on to Morocco, Egypt and other areas of the globe.¹⁶

The French price for surrendering Newfoundland treaty rights was threefold: a financial indemnity to outfitters and others adversely affected; a guarantee that French fishers could freely buy or catch bait; and territorial compensation.¹⁷ The reaction in London was that these demands were excessive and impractical. Given that the French Treaty Shore fishery had become insignificant,¹⁸ territorial compensation seemed out of the question, certainly on the scale which France seemed to be contemplating. As for bait, this depended on colonial legislation, and Newfoundland had indicated that free access would depend on France either reducing bounties, or removing them from the St. Pierre and Miquelon fleet.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the Foreign Office continued to seek a comprehensive Newfoundland settlement. The Colonial Office was far less optimistic.

Sir John Anderson, who had long experience of Newfoundland affairs, had suggested in January 1902 that a partial settlement which avoided the bait and bounty questions was more practical, and the idea had been broached to the colonial government.²⁰ During the summer of 1903 Anderson returned to this theme, arguing that the bait-bounty equation should be dropped altogether, since neither France nor Newfoundland was likely to change its traditional position. He

15 Governor Boyle to Chamberlain, secret, 3 July 1903; Minute by Fiddian, 7 September 1903; CO 194/252, pp. 374, 463, Public Record Office, London [PRO]. Thompson, *French Shore*, pp. 177-81.

16 Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson, very confidential, 7 July 1903, printed in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, II (London, 1927), pp. 294-7. Lansdowne to de Bunsen, 7 July 1903, CO 537/499, p. 9, PRO. The interview is summarized in Rolo, *Entente Cordiale*, pp. 179-83.

17 Lansdowne to Monson, very confidential, 29 July 1903, CO 537/499, p. 12, PRO; *British Documents II*, pp. 304-5.

18 There were a total of 394 French citizens on the Treaty Shore in 1903, of whom 97 were from St. Pierre and Miquelon. This compares with 1,731 in 1885 and 665 in 1892. “Annual Report of the Newfoundland Department of Fisheries for the Year 1903”, *Journal of the House of Assembly* (1904), Appendix, p. 140.

19 Governor Boyle to Chamberlain, 3 July 1903, FO 27/3647, p. 425, PRO.

20 Minute by Anderson, 8 January 1902; Chamberlain to Boyle, conf., 22 January 1902; CO 194/249, pp. 504, 507, PRO.

suggested that France should be asked to negotiate

on the lines of internationalizing the waters of the Treaty Coast, and giving up their rights on shore or limiting them to the same right as the Americans enjoy on the greater part of the Treaty Coast - (i.e.) to land and dry fish on the unoccupied parts of the Coast Our best plan if not our only one is to try for an arrangement limited to the Treaty Coast.²¹

In addition, France could be guaranteed a right to catch bait on the Shore as part of an officially concurrent fishery. Given that their rights there were of little practical use any more, France might well agree to such a deal. For Newfoundland, the advantage would be the removal of all impediments to the economic development of the area. For British negotiators, a limited agreement of this nature would weaken the French case for territorial compensation.²²

Before adopting this suggestion, Lansdowne told Cambon in early October that, while Britain would provide a financial indemnity, territorial compensation would depend on the settlement of other points at issue, and France should bear in mind that its rights were not "an asset of much practical value" and had "sentimental rather than a substantial importance". The condition for bait was the exclusion of St. Pierre and Miquelon from the bounty system.²³ Cambon retorted that the value of French rights could not so easily be dismissed, and once again raised the possibility of Britain ceding Gambia. As for bounties, he thought it would be impossible to exclude residents of St. Pierre and Miquelon.²⁴

Lansdowne then reverted to Anderson's alternative, and suggested to Cambon that the two countries eliminate the main cause of trouble: "the obstacle presented to the development and utilisation of the coast by the French rights of drying their fish on the shore". French subjects could be allowed to fish and buy bait there, but not to use the land. There would be financial but not territorial compensation.²⁵ The French reaction replaced one deadlock with another: Delcassé and Cambon

21 Minute by Anderson, 5 August 1903, CO 537/499, pp. 16-17, PRO. Anderson's description of American rights on the Newfoundland coast under the 1818 Anglo-American Fisheries Convention was not completely accurate, in that Americans did not have the right to land and dry fish on the island's west coast — only on part of the south coast and the Labrador coast.

22 Anderson's other minutes are in CO 537/499, pp. 1, 26, PRO. His views, approved by Chamberlain, were incorporated in "Notes on Colonial Questions referred to in Lord Lansdowne's recent Conversation with M. Cambon", 19 August 1903, CO 537/499, p.45, PRO.

23 Lansdowne to Cambon, personal and confidential, 1 October 1903, *British Documents*, II, pp. 314-15. CO 537/499, pp. 55-6, PRO.

24 Cambon to Lansdowne, 26 October 1903, II *British Documents*, pp. 321-2. CO 537/499, p. 61, PRO.

25 Lansdowne to Cambon, 19 November 1903, *British Documents*, II, p. 326.

continued to insist on significant territorial compensation, preferably Gambia.²⁶

The British argued that France was not making a sufficiently large concession to warrant extensive compensation. All France was losing was the use of the land, not the right of participating in the Newfoundland fishery. Moreover, in 1903 only about 400 French subjects had taken advantage of the privilege of using the shore, and the total value of this unprofitable fishery was no more than £14,000. It was arguable that the fishery survived only because of the tolerance of the British and Newfoundland authorities who, as the Colonial Office put it, overlooked “the departure from the Treaty stipulations which has taken place”.²⁷ Nonetheless, in demanding such compensation France seemed to be assuming the possession of territorial rights in Newfoundland, a claim which had never been admitted.²⁸ In such circumstances the cession of Gambia was inconceivable; the most France could expect was a favourable but modest adjustment of the Nigerian boundary.²⁹

In response, Cambon argued that France was, in fact, giving up a great deal — the exclusive right first acquired in 1713 to use both the sea and the coast of the Treaty Shore for fishery purposes. Though he admitted that France’s use of that right had declined significantly, it was possible that the fishery there would be of value to future generations. Moreover, France, in reality, did possess territory: not in the sense of being the proprietor, but having a usufruct which, if exercised fully, could prohibit British subjects from using the Shore at all. Thus, if France renounced the right to occupy the Shore it abandoned a territory, and deserved generous compensation. Cambon rejected the assertion that the fishery survived only as a result of British forbearance and refused to accept the argument that economic development had been seriously retarded.³⁰ He indicated that, unless the issue was resolved to French satisfaction, all the agreements which comprised the emerging *entente* would be endangered.³¹

Given this impasse, why did the negotiators not drop the Newfoundland question altogether and concentrate on the centrally important North African agreement? As Pierre Guillen remarks, “... on demeure aujourd’hui confondu que l’abandon de droits de pêche à Terre-Neuve contre de médiocres concessions en Afrique noir ait pu, pendant des mois, compromettre le règlement des questions de Maroc et d’Egypte, bien plus considérables, et ... le rapprochement politique entre les deux pays”.³² The reason, he thought, was that public opinion had to be

26 Lansdowne to Monson, 9 December, 11 December 1903, *British Documents*, II, pp. 331, 334; Rolo, *Entente Cordiale*, p. 224.

27 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 20 May 1903, FO 27/3647, p. 130, PRO.

28 Memorandum, “The Newfoundland Fishery”, 13 November 1903, CO 537/499, p. 79, PRO.

29 Memorandum communicated to Cambon, 5 January 1904, *British Documents*, II, pp. 336-7.

30 Lansdowne to Monson, 9 December 1903, 13 January 1904, *British Documents*, II, pp. 331, 337; Cambon to Delcassé, 25 February 1904, *Documents Diplomatiques Français* (série II), vol. 316, p. 417.

31 Rolo, *Entente Cordiale*, p. 233.

32 Guillen, “Les accords coloniaux”, p. 352.

prepared to accept sacrifices, and diplomats were obsessed by the principle of balance. Rolo broadly agreed: The British government saw a Newfoundland agreement as a balance to concessions in Morocco. For its part, the French government could only claim territorial compensation against concessions in Newfoundland, and without such compensation the Egypt-Morocco deal would be unacceptable.³³ This being the case, both sides continued to explore an acceptable compensation package, the British government being urged on by the influential Lord Cromer, its Agent in Egypt, who was anxious that a settlement be reached.³⁴ The result was considerably more generous than Lansdowne had originally intended. France gained favourable adjustments of both the Nigerian and Gambian boundaries, a right of transit on the River Gambia, and the Iles de Los off French Guinea. The only additional concession which Britain was able to obtain was French agreement to the appointment of a British consul at St. Pierre.³⁵ "L'Entente cordiale fut enfantée au milieu de marchandages sans grandeur."³⁶

With these issues settled, the parties began to negotiate the text of a convention. The main problem proved, predictably enough, to be French access to bait supplies. The British accepted a French draft (21 March 1904) which spelled out the right of French fishermen to buy or fish for bait on the Shore, but rejected a further draft article which would have allowed French subjects to buy bait anywhere on the Newfoundland coast on the same conditions as Newfoundlanders — in effect, a repeal of the Bait Act.³⁷ Under pressure from fishing interests at St. Malo and elsewhere, France persisted in this demand. Already bruised by the territorial concessions, Lansdowne refused to abandon the link between bait and bounties, and, in his turn, threatened to break off all negotiations. He also rejected the idea of a French bait depot on the south coast.³⁸ Having won the main point — Egypt against Morocco — and having provided evidence of fighting for the interests of French outfitters, Cambon and Delcassé accepted the situation. The convention was signed on 8 April.

In the final text, France renounced its privileges under the Treaty of Utrecht, retaining a right to a seasonal fishery on the Treaty Shore "on a footing of equality with British subjects", ending annually on 20 October. The French could take all kinds of fish and shellfish, fish at the mouths of rivers, and enter any port or harbour to obtain supplies (including bait) or to shelter, subject to local regulations. They were not to use "stake-nets or fixed engines" without local

33 Rolo, *Entente Cordiale*, pp. 237-9.

34 Andrew, *Delcassé*, p. 213.

35 There had been a French representative in St. John's for many years, but he was not officially recognized as a consul, since France had consistently refused to accept a British consul at St. Pierre. Lansdowne had raised the issue when conceding West African territory as compensation: Lansdowne to Monson, 1 March, 2 March 1904, *British Documents*, II, pp. 347-9. For the official notes, CO 880/18/199, p. 59, PRO. See also Rolo, *Entente Cordiale*, pp. 240 ff.

36 Guillen, "Les accords coloniaux", p. 353.

37 The drafts can be found in *British Documents*, II, pp. 374-84; Lansdowne to Monson, 22 March 1904, FO 27/3662, p. 210, PRO.

38 Lansdowne to Monson, 31 March 1904, FO 27/3662, pp. 247-8, PRO.

permission. All fishers were to be subject to local laws and regulations for close times or “the improvement of the fisheries”. However, the policing of the common fishery, and the control of smuggling, was to be the subject of separate regulations drawn up by the British and French governments and enforced by them. French citizens with establishments on the Shore would be compensated, the amounts to be decided by an arbitral tribunal.

The signature of the convention was followed by an exchange of notes on three points. The first confirmed the appointment of consuls at St. John’s and St. Pierre. Second, in response to an enquiry as to the meaning of “stake nets” and “fixed engines”, Lansdowne explained that these terms related to the salmon fishery, and meant all nets and other implements fixed to the soil, or made stationary in any other way.³⁹ Third, Cambon requested confirmation that the convention prevented the colonial government from stopping, on the Treaty Shore, the sale of bait to French subjects. In reply, Lansdowne agreed that article 2 “precludes the suppression of the liberty hitherto enjoyed by French fishermen of purchasing bait” on the Treaty Shore.⁴⁰

Yet another explanation was requested by the Newfoundland government: what was meant by the provision that “the usual fishing season” would close for “all persons on the 20th October of each year”? The answer was that, while the summer season would close for all fishers on that date, and the French would have to leave, Newfoundlanders could continue to fish since they alone had the right to exploit the autumn and winter fisheries. In fact, all existing rights of Newfoundlanders were maintained, augmented by equal fishing rights in the summer.⁴¹

This was only the most recent of a series of clarifications requested by a suspicious colonial government since it had been informed of, and had eventually accepted the new basis of negotiation in January 1904.⁴² Formal acceptance of the main principles of the proposed convention came in late January, on condition that France receive no new rights, and abandon all claims and right to use the land on the Treaty Shore.⁴³ Though the colony would have preferred to see French rights extinguished completely, the final agreement was greeted with enthusiasm by most Newfoundlanders, and was endorsed by the Legislature.⁴⁴

In France, however, the Newfoundland convention faced considerable opposition from fishing interests. The main complaint of the *armateurs* was that bait supplies

39 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 8 April 1904, encl. Cambon to Lansdowne 8 April 1904, and a draft reply which the CO approved. CO 880/18/199, pp. 60-1, PRO.

40 Cambon to Lansdowne, Lansdowne to Cambon, 8 April 1904, CO 880/18/199, pp. 61-2, PRO.

41 Lyttleton to Governor Boyle, tgm., 14 April 1904; 19 April 1904; CO 880/18/199, pp. 68-9, 71, PRO.

42 Lyttleton to Boyle, tgm., 14 January 1904, CO 880/18/199, p. 6, PRO.

43 Boyle to Lyttleton, tgm., 27 January 1904, CO 880/18/199, p. 11, PRO.

44 Boyle to Lyttleton, tgm., 28 April 1904, CO 880/18/199, p. 77, PRO. The colonial government claimed the right to ratify or at least formally to concur in the agreement. The Colonial Office had to explain that only the Crown could ratify, and that even formal concurrence was unnecessary since the rights of Newfoundlanders were being increased, not ceded or exchanged — if the latter had been the case, then formal approval would have been needed.

had not been adequately safeguarded. Many vessels had come to rely on the *bulot* (periwinkle), which they caught on the banks. If this supply ran out, which was thought likely, then Newfoundland bait would become even more important.⁴⁵ Thus it was argued that France should continue to press for the repeal of the Bait Act, which might be considered reasonable compensation for giving up traditional rights on the Treaty Shore. It was also pointed out that bait fishes were found in bays; the Newfoundland government might well claim that every bay on the Shore was the estuary of a river and prevent French citizens from fishing there.⁴⁶ The French government was sensitive to such pressure, particularly in the months before the convention passed through the Chamber and was finally ratified (8 December 1904). As a result, Delcassé and Cambon attempted to gain additional concessions with which to pacify their critics.

Cambon was successful in obtaining an assurance that the British government did not intend to exclude French fishermen “from any waters which have hitherto by common consent been recognised as forming part of bays in which they have the right to fish”.⁴⁷ Thus French fishermen could enter bays on the Treaty Shore to catch bait. But on other issues the British were less flexible, in part, no doubt, because of the presence in London of Bond, who was helping to draft the regulations which would police the common fishery.

When Cambon ingeniously advanced the novel argument that French fishermen should be admitted to the autumn and winter herring fisheries on the grounds that the convention guaranteed “a footing of equality”, and, if others continued to fish after 20 October, then the season had been lengthened, the claim was tartly rejected.⁴⁸ As for the complaint that United States fishermen were allowed to participate in the winter fishery, it was dismissed as irrelevant since the right derived from a different treaty, the 1818 Fisheries Convention.⁴⁹

Another ploy to appease the convention’s opponents was an attempt to obtain additional guarantees relating to bait purchase and the bait fishery beyond those conveyed in Lansdowne’s note of 8 April. It was a move fuelled also by a deep mistrust of the Newfoundland authorities: Cambon wrote that they were “de si mauvaise foi qu’il y a lieu de craindre à mille tracasseries de leur part dans

45 This is discussed in M. Hignette, *La Question de Terre-Neuve avant et après la convention du 8 avril 1904* (Paris, 1905), pp. 167-73.

46 Submission by the Bordeaux Chambre de Commerce to Delcassé, 13 May 1904, supporting the Comité Central des Armateurs de France. FO 27/3693, p. 383, PRO.

47 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 17 May 1904, encl. Lansdowne to Monson, 13 May 1904; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 10 June 1904, encl. Lansdowne to Monson, 6 June 1904. CO 880/18/199, pp. 101, 134, PRO.

48 Note submitted by Cambon, 10 June 1904, FO 27/3693, p. 491. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 13 June 1904, encl. memorandum by Cambon, 10 June 1904; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 18 June 1904, encl. draft memorandum on the winter fishery; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 20 June 1904, encl. Lansdowne to Monson, 15 June 1904. CO 880/18/199, pp. 138, 147, 150, PRO.

49 The 1818 convention allowed U.S. inhabitants to fish “in common” with British subjects on the west coast of Newfoundland, part of the south coast, the Labrador coast, the North Shore as far west as Mount Joly, and at the Magdalen Islands. See note 21.

l'exécution".⁵⁰ Evidence of this seemed to him to be provided by the passage of the Cold Storage Act (4 Ed. VII c.2) in April 1904. This legislation endorsed a contract with the Newfoundland Cold Storage and Reduction Co., which, in return for government subsidies, agreed to erect between five and 13 frozen bait depots at places to be determined by the government. The bait could be sold only to Newfoundlanders. Though this was clearly an internal matter (like fishery bounties), Cambon loudly complained, claiming that the act created a monopoly, that it was discriminatory, and that if the company did not build a depot on the Treaty Shore, then France was being deprived of a right which it could justifiably expect. In short, the act contravened the convention.⁵¹ This preposterous argument was rejected. The act did not create a monopoly; there was nothing to prevent an unsubsidized company from establishing a depot on the Shore; there was no monopoly, and France had no right to claim either that frozen bait should be on sale to its citizens, or that Newfoundland was under an obligation to ensure that the company build a depot on the Treaty Shore.⁵²

While rejecting this demand, as well as a proposal that French fishermen be allowed to obtain bait at "un point d'approvisionnement" on the south coast in return for abandoning the eastern side of the Treaty Shore,⁵³ the Foreign Office was prepared to consider making additional assurances on bait supply. Lansdowne finally ruled that French fishermen on the Treaty Shore had the liberty to obtain bait on the same conditions as Newfoundlanders (thus without having to obtain licences under the Bait Act), but subject to local regulations. There was nothing to prevent them from taking the bait away to process or use elsewhere, but neither the British nor the colonial government would allow "a steamer of two or three thousand tons burthen to come in to the Treaty Shore, take on board a cargo of bait, and then convey it to the Banks".⁵⁴ Bond was told firmly that French fishermen had an equal right to purchase any bait that might be for sale, whether subsidized or not.⁵⁵

The French also remained concerned about "stake nets" and "fixed engines", and requested an assurance that seine nets, lobster pots, bultows, and salmon and herring nets would all be allowed. The Foreign Office suggested a formula proposed by Bond: French fishermen could use the same nets and "engines" as allowed to

50 He went on to refer to the Newfoundland premier, Bond, as "un homme âpre, grossier, qui veut tout pour lui ...". Letter to Henri Cambon, 8 July 1904, in Paul Cambon, *Correspondance, 1870-1924* (Paris, 1940), II, p. 148.

51 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 13 June 1904, encl. memorandum by Cambon, 10 June 1904, CO 188/18/199, p. 138, PRO.

52 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 18 June 1904, *British Documents*, III, pp. 4-5. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 18 June 1904, CO 880/18/199, p. 147, PRO.

53 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 24 June 1904, encl. Lansdowne to Monson, 24 June 1904 and "Memoranda communicated to M. Cambon, June 24, 1904", CO 880/19/199, pp. 154-5, PRO. Lansdowne to Monson, 5 July 1904, *British Documents*, III, p. 7.

54 Lansdowne to Monson, 5 July 1904; Lansdowne to Cambon, 5 July 1904, *British Documents*, III, pp. 7-9.

55 Colonial Office to Bond, 16 July 1904, CO 880/18/199, p. 190, PRO.

Newfoundlanders, and under the same conditions, except that they could not land or make use of the foreshore. Cambon objected: French citizens had the right to fish on “a footing of equality”; they used seines extensively; and they were hauled on shore. To forbid them from hauling as they always had done was to strain the convention.⁵⁶ Lansdowne replied that “French fishermen shall have the right of using the same implements as they have hitherto been in the habit of using and in the same manner as British fishermen on the Treaty Coast, subject, however, to any local regulations for the protection and improvement of the fishery”.⁵⁷ The debate rumbled on, and in December 1904 the British government decided to allow the use of the beach to haul seines.⁵⁸

This may have seemed an insignificant matter in London, but in Newfoundland the perspective was very different. The colony had assented to the convention only on condition that French rights on land were completely extinguished. Permission to dry fish had led, it was argued, to extensive claims of a territorial nature: here was the thin edge of another wedge. Thus the Newfoundland government refused to consider any such concession, threatening to refuse legislation implementing the policing regulations.⁵⁹ Such truculence caused offence in London, but officials had to admit that Bond had a point — depending on how one interpreted the phrase “footing of equality”. Did it mean “perfect equality”,⁶⁰ or something different? At the Colonial Office, C.T. Davis argued that France had been deprived of the use of the shore for fishery purposes, and therefore could not expect to be as advantageously positioned as local inhabitants: “equality” could only apply to “waterborne fisheries”. He also pointed out that Americans had the right to fish “in common” with British subjects in the same area, a phrase which the Law Officers had defined as “upon ‘an equality’”, but they could not land.⁶¹ Finally — and largely because colonial regulations to which the French would be subject already prohibited the use of seines in the major bays — it was agreed to try to convince the French that they were being unreasonable, and offer to arbitrate the issue if need be.⁶² In the end, the Newfoundland government solved the problem by prohibiting the hauling of seines from land anywhere in the colony.⁶³

The British and Newfoundland governments had assumed throughout the negotiation of the convention that fishery rules and regulations on the Shore would be the responsibility of the colonial authorities, and would apply equally to Newfoundland and French fishermen. The quite separate policing regulations were

56 Memorandum by Sanderson, 30 June 1904, *British Documents* III, p. 5.

57 Lansdowne to Cambon, 5 July 1904; and Lansdowne to Monson, 5 July 1904, *British Documents*, III, pp. 7-9.

58 Lyttleton to Governor MacGregor, 15 December 1904, CO 880/18/199, p. 299, PRO.

59 MacGregor to Lyttleton, 7 January 1905; 23 January 1905; CO 880/18/200, pp. 13, 36-7, PRO.

60 Minute by Ommanney, 20 March 1905, CO 194/256, p. 327, PRO.

61 Minutes by Davis 5 January 1905, March 1905, CO 194/256, pp. 2-4, 13, 328-39, PRO.

62 Minute by Ommanney, 20 March 1905, CO 194/256, p. 327. See also Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 31 March 1905, CO 880/18/200, pp. 112-16, PRO.

63 MacGregor to Lyttleton, 29 April 1904, CO 194/256, p. 481, PRO.

to regulate the fishery *inter se*. The British draft was formulated during 1904 by an interdepartmental committee, working closely with Bond. After consultation with the Admiralty and the Newfoundland government, the draft was given to Cambon in mid-February 1905. A French draft had been submitted a few weeks before. The process of negotiating a single document took so long that there was no possibility of introducing the new regime for the 1905 fishing season; and quite soon, serious difficulties began to appear. The resolution of these problems was complicated and delayed by the eruption of a serious dispute between Newfoundland and the United States which involved the question of American access to the Newfoundland herring fishery, and the interpretation of American rights under the 1818 Convention.⁶⁴

The first fundamental problem common to both disputes was the definition of territorial waters. Though the concept of a three-mile limit was generally accepted at this time, there remained uncertainty about how baselines should be drawn.⁶⁵ In connection with the Newfoundland regulations, France suggested using the formula contained in the 1882 North Sea Convention, which called for baselines to be drawn where bays reached a width of 10 miles. Britain upheld headland-to-headland baselines, regardless of a bay's width.⁶⁶ France objected that if lines were drawn across the mouths of the huge bays which indented Newfoundland's south and west coasts, its fishers would lose access to areas which, it argued, had always been considered open sea.⁶⁷ The Foreign Office's desire for compromise was opposed by Canada, which was also involved in the dispute with the United States (which advocated six-mile baselines), and by the Colonial Office. There it was suspected that France was trying to gain the right to fish in bays both inside *and outside* the Treaty Shore. Indeed, in June 1906 France advanced the astonishing argument that the British claim to sovereignty over all Newfoundland bays was not justified by the wording of the 18th century treaties, and that even if the treaties could be held to have created exclusive fishing rights within the bays beyond the three-mile limit, this zone could not be considered territorial waters.⁶⁸

France was, of course, trying to minimize the area within bays which would be under exclusive colonial jurisdiction. And even within the conventional coastal limit, where there would be joint policing, France (like the United States) was

64 A brief account of the early stages of this dispute can be found in James Hiller, "The Career of Robert Bond", in James Hiller and Peter Neary, eds., *Twentieth-Century Newfoundland: Explorations* (St. John's, 1994), pp. 28-32. See also Alvin C. Glueck, Jr., "Programmed Diplomacy: The Settlement of the North Atlantic Fisheries Question, 1907-12", *Acadiensis*, VI, 1 (Autumn 1976), pp. 43-70.

65 Sayre A. Swarztrauber, *The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas* (Annapolis, Md., 1972), pp. 110-11.

66 Lyttleton to MacGregor, tgm., 30 May 1905, CO 880/18/200, p. 201, PRO.

67 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 10 June 1905, CO 880/18/200, pp. 213-14, PRO.

68 Foreign Office, "Memorandum respecting Newfoundland French Fisheries", November 1907, FO 414/196, p. 40, PRO. See also Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 31 October 1905, CO 880/18/200, p. 560; Grey to Elgin, 8 January 1906, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 30 January 1906, CO 880/19/202, pp. 25, 50-64. "Memorandum as to the extent of the British jurisdiction over the Bays of Newfoundland, and the existence of any French right to fish in the Bays of that Colony outside the Treaty Coast", CO 880/19/203, pp. 1-21, PRO.

reluctant to allow its fishermen to be subject to colonial fishery laws enforced by local officials. Cambon argued that the relevant laws and regulations should become an annex to the policing regulations, which allowed French offenders to be tried in French courts, since it was inconvenient for fishers to be subject to two modes of “surveillance et sanction”.⁶⁹ Cambon added that the Newfoundland authorities were unlikely to be impartial.⁷⁰ Here again was an important issue of principle which impinged on the American dispute. The British position was that all foreign vessels were amenable to British jurisdiction, except as otherwise provided. In this instance, French fishermen were subject to local law, and the French government was trying to vary the clear meaning of the convention, while at the same time insinuating that Britain could not properly implement an international agreement. There was also a political factor. Bond had very reluctantly agreed that French tribunals would deal with French offenders against the policing regulations, and only on condition that other matters would be dealt with by local courts. If this principle was changed, then the Newfoundland government might refuse the legislation necessary to enforce the regulations, thus creating a serious impasse.⁷¹

The British government adopted a policy of deliberate delay on these issues. The existence of the American dispute, and, from 1907, the virtual certainty of an arbitration at The Hague, made negotiations with France undesirable. In any event, there were very few French vessels using the Treaty Shore, and those that did so made no complaint about their treatment. If the French fishery was dying, then what was the point of entering into a very complex agreement which, among other things, would require Britain to send a naval vessel to the Treaty Shore each year? Perhaps the matter should be allowed to drop.⁷² The French government disagreed. In August 1907 Cambon addressed a personal letter to Lansdowne’s successor as Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, urging a compromise on both the matters at issue.⁷³ But an official note maintained France’s stand, and suggested that the only way to find a solution was through arbitration.⁷⁴ Though the British government had concluded an arbitration treaty with France in 1903, it did not want to have two arbitrations on its hands at the same time dealing with very similar issues. For this reason alone, arbitration had to be postponed; but could it be refused? The eventual consensus was that while the bays issue might have to be arbitrated at

69 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 20 January 1906, encl. Cambon to Grey, 15 January 1906, CO 880/19/202, p. 33, PRO. See also Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 26 June 1906, encl. Cambon to Grey, 10 June 1906, CO 880/19/202, p. 196, PRO.

70 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 15 March 1906, encl. Cambon to Grey, 13 March 1906, CO 880/19/202, p. 110, PRO.

71 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 8 February 1906, and Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 17 April 1906, encl. Grey to Cambon, 17 April 1906, CO 880/19/202, pp. 67-8, 141-4, PRO.

72 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 21 February 1907; Grey to Cambon, 18 March 1907; CO 880/19/208, pp. 101-7, PRO.

73 Cambon to Grey, personal, 19 August 1908, CO 880/20/212, pp. 29-32, PRO.

74 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 2 September 1907, encl. Géoffray to Grey, 19 August 1907, CO 880/20/212, pp. 53-7, PRO.

some point, it was impossible to arbitrate over colonial fisheries jurisdiction. Therefore, in April 1908, Grey asked Cambon for a detailed response to British arguments on the bays, and in strong language registered a refusal to arbitrate on jurisdiction. The French request, he said, was tantamount to an accusation that Britain was unable to carry out its treaty engagements, combined with a claim to revive extraterritorial status.⁷⁵

At this point another major complication emerged. In June 1908, the Newfoundland government reported that “petits pêcheurs” from St. Pierre, with official approval, were fishing from shore on the Port-au-Port Peninsula, and complained that this breached the convention.⁷⁶ The French government explained that the fishers had rented shore premises, and claimed that this was acceptable under the convention. France had conserved a right to fish on the basis of equality with British subjects. How could there be equality if French fishermen could not dry their catch on shore? If Newfoundland fishermen could acquire shore premises for fishery purposes, why not French fishermen? Admittedly, French owners of shore establishments had received cash indemnity payments. But these had been given to fishermen holding “terrains domaniaux” whose free use would in future be prohibited, and as compensation for the loss of the exclusive use of the shore. It was surely not the case that the indemnities would forever prevent French citizens from renting or buying lands or “hangards” owned privately by Newfoundlanders.⁷⁷ In a later memorandum France went so far as to claim that it had given up only the exclusive right of fishery in 1904, and that its negotiators had always aimed to maintain usage of the coast.⁷⁸

Newfoundland law allowed foreigners to rent or buy land,⁷⁹ and some difficulty was posed by Lansdowne’s statement in 1904 that there was nothing to prevent a French subject from “acquiring or renting land or business premises” on the Treaty Shore.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the British government responded that the clear purpose of the convention was to relieve Newfoundland of the burden imposed by French landing rights in connection with the fishery, and that the French had always been well aware that they would have to abandon use of the shore. If the French interpretation was admitted, then the financial and territorial compensation paid to France had been pointless. French citizens could indeed acquire land in

75 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 28 January 1908, encl. “Memorandum by Mr. E.A. Crowe respecting the French Fishery in Newfoundland” [5 January 1908]; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 14 April 1908, encl. Grey to Cambon, 10 April 1908, and Grey to Cambon, personal, 10 April 1908. CO 880/20/214, pp. 18-25, 106-12, PRO.

76 MacGregor to Crewe, 27 June 1908, CO 880/20/212, pp. 190-4, PRO.

77 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 13 February 1909, encl. Pichon to Bertie, 29 January 1909; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 1 May 1909, encl. Pichon to Bertie, 16 April 1909; CO 880/21/216, pp. 79, 105-7, PRO.

78 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 31 January 1910, encl. Pichon to Bertie, 10 January 1910, CO 880/212/218, pp. 13-19, PRO.

79 The colonial government claimed that the act [63 Vic c 7, 1900] applied to “domiciled aliens” only. Governor Williams to Colonial Office, 22 September 1909, CO 880/21/216, p. 208, PRO.

80 Lansdowne to Cambon, 5 July 1904, *British Documents*, III, pp. 8-9.

Newfoundland; but they could not use it for the purposes of the fishery.⁸¹

The existence of these disputes prevented the conclusion and implementation of the policing regulations. Though the French fishery had virtually disappeared — in 1910 there were only two St. Pierre schooners on the Shore and four St. Pierrais fishing from Red Island⁸² — France continued to press for an arbitration. This was in spite of the 1910 decision of the Hague Tribunal on the questions in dispute with the United States. The Court stated that the unilateral right to make fishery regulations was inherent in British sovereignty, so long as they were reasonable and did not diminish treaty rights. Second, the Court ruled that a baseline should be drawn in a bay at the point where it ceased to have “the configuration and characteristics” of a bay, and suggested the adoption of the ten-mile rule.⁸³ Grey concluded in 1911 that he would have to consult the Law Officers on two points: whether or not the British government could refuse to arbitrate; and whether the Newfoundland government could pass legislation preventing use of the shore by French subjects.⁸⁴

At this point the British documentary trail fades away, and so, it seems, did seven years of increasingly sterile argument. Though the reference to the Law Officers was still under discussion in 1913,⁸⁵ it never went forward, possibly because of the outbreak of war the next year. There was no arbitration,⁸⁶ and the policing regulations were forgotten. Without official explanation, the discussion of the meaning and implementation of the 1904 Convention terminated. In effect, France finally accepted that, following the award in the American dispute, it was unlikely to gain very much by arbitration; and it was hardly worth the contest, given that the metropolitan fishery on the Shore had disappeared, and the right to fish there was exercised only on an occasional basis by a few St. Pierrais, who were severely hampered by the prohibition on using the coast for fishery purposes. Moreover, as French outfitters turned away from banking schooners to steam trawlers, the availability of bait ceased to be an important issue. The French government had, in fact, been devoting considerable effort to protecting a dying Shore fishery and an obsolescent technology.

It is often assumed that the 1904 convention ended the “French Shore Question”.

81 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 9 March 1909; Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 8 June 1909; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 18 June 1909; CO 880/21/216, pp. 91, 147-68. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 27 June 1910, CO 880/21/218, p. 39, PRO.

82 Admiralty to Colonial Office, 26 March 1911, CO 880/21/220, pp. 44-5, PRO.

83 St.J. Chadwick, *Newfoundland. Island into Province* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 122. Swarztrauber, *Three-Mile Limit*, pp. 119-21. The Court defined Conception Bay as an “historic bay”, wholly within Newfoundland jurisdiction, and suggested baselines for Placentia and Fortune bays.

84 The French government set out its arguments in a lengthy memorandum in August 1910; the Colonial Office reacted in January 1911; Grey’s decision to refer to the Law Officers was communicated in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 25 May 1911, CO 880/21/218, pp. 59-107; CO 880/21/220, pp. 2-17, 59-63, PRO. The reasons for France’s determination to proceed to arbitration are not explained by British records, nor by the published French documents.

85 M.W. Furlong to Premier E.P. Morris, 3 October 1913, GN 2/5/367(6), Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador [PANL].

86 There is no report on these questions in the Law Officers’ Opinions collected in CO 885/16, PRO.

No historian who has examined the issue has ever said as much, and the fact that French fishermen did not make much use of their rights under the convention did not mean that it lapsed. There are scattered references to French rights in Newfoundland government papers. In the late 1930s, for instance, there was a revival of French interest,⁸⁷ and inquiries about local regulations were made as late as 1952.⁸⁸ It was not until 1972 that France finally renounced its Treaty Shore privileges, as part of the Canada-France Fishing Agreement, which also extinguished “all previous treaty provisions relating to French nationals off the Atlantic coast of Canada” — meaning the residual right, under the 1783 Treaty of Versailles, to fish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. But in effect, if not in law, the 1904 convention did end the Treaty Shore dispute by speeding the demise of the French fishery there, and allowing Newfoundland to use and manage the area as it saw fit. Only a ghost of the French presence lingered on after 1914, a reminder of

... the rowdy days
when they thought
this shore
belonged to them.

.....
It must have been hard
for them to accept defeat
and leave the coves
where they cured their cod.⁸⁹

JAMES K. HILLER

87 The correspondence is in GN 13/2/A, box 372, PANL.

88 M. Moreaux to Newfoundland Fisheries Board, 18 September 1952. GN 2/5/317(9), PANL.

89 Tom Dawe, “The French Shore Man”, *In Hardy Country. New and Selected Poems* (St. John’s, 1993), p. 60.